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SUMMARY 
Game  theory  has  been  used  to  investigate  a  wide  range  of  evolutionary  questions, 
and  has  been  important  in  explaining  apparently  selfish  patterns  in  animal  behaviour, 
and  behaviours  that  do  not  appear  to  benefit  the  individual.  The  modelling  chapters 
in  this  thesis  develop  new  game  theory  approaches  to  modelling  animal  conflict, 
investigating  the  acquisition  of  territories  and  the  trade-offs  that  occur  between 
behaviours. 
Many  game  theory  models  of  conflicts  between  individuals  make  predictions 
regarding  the  duration  of  fights  in  relation  to  asymmetries  in  resource  holding 
potential  (RHP).  Duration  is  often  interpreted  as  a  result  of  mutual  assessment  of 
RHP,  allowing  the  weaker  individual  to  avoid  costly  interactions.  However,  the 
duration  of  a  contest  may  also  be  the  result  of  each  individual  persisting  to  a 
threshold  determined  by  its  own  RHP.  In  fiddler  crabs,  Uca  mjoebergi,  I  show  that 
duration  of  contests  increases  with  increasing  size  of  the  loser,  and  decreases,  but  to 
a  lesser  extent,  with  increasing  size  of  the  winner,  suggesting  that  neither  the  mutual 
assessment  or  individual  threshold  hypothesis  can  explain  fight  duration  in  this 
species.  Instead,  individual  cost  thresholds  may  determine  duration,  but  larger 
opponents  may  inflict  costs  more  rapidly,  consistent  with  the  cumulative  assessment 
game  of  animal  conflict. 
In  animal  contests,  the  larger  opponent  is  often  victorious,  but  contests  are  often 
initiated  by  individuals  that  have  little  chance  of  winning  (generally  smaller 
individuals).  A  number  of  hypotheses  may  explain  this  behaviour,  including  a  lack  of 
alternative  options  (the  `desperado  effect').  Recent  work  has  suggested  that  likely 
1 Summary 
losers  attack  first  due  to  an  error  in  perception:  they  mistakenly  perceive  their 
chances  of  winning  as  being  greater  than  they  are.  Using  a  game  theoretical  model,  I 
show  that  if  smaller  individuals  can  accurately  assess  their  chance  of  winning,  if  this 
chance  is  relatively  high,  and  if  they  have  few  alternative  options,  they  are  predicted 
to  be  as  aggressive  as  their  larger  opponents.  In  addition,  when  resources  are 
abundant,  and  small  individuals  have  some  chance  of  winning,  they  may  be  more 
aggressive  than  their  larger  opponents. 
Many  game  theory  models  of  animal  contests  consider  the  evolution  of  fighting 
when  the  winner  claims  the  resource.  An  alternative  hypothesis  suggests  that  space 
can  be  divided  if  animals  avoid  areas  where  they  have  been  involved  in  aggressive 
interactions.  Using  a  game  theory  model,  I  show  that  avoidance  of  a  single  fight 
location  can  be  adaptive  if  the  benefits  of  access  to  the  area  are  low  compared  to  the 
costs  of  fighting.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  then  one  individual  (typically  the  winner) 
returns  to  the  area  to  claim  the  resource,  while  the  other  (the  loser)  avoids  it.  In  a 
spatially  realistic  model,  where  space  must  be  divided  between  competitors, 
avoidance  behaviour  is  adaptive  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  high  and  the 
population  density  is  low,  and  well-defined,  exclusive  territories  are  formed.  Low 
fight  costs  and  high  population  densities  lead  to  the  break  down  of  territoriality  and 
the  formation  of  large,  overlapping  home  ranges. 
Paradoxical  solutions  to  contests  over  the  acquisition  of  indivisible  space,  where 
owners  retreat  when  challenged  by  intruders,  are  found  when  asymmetries  in  RHP 
are  small  or  absent.  In  the  game  theory  approach  to  spatial  division,  paradoxical 
strategies  are  stable  when  asymmetries  between  the  contestants  are  small,  when 
individuals  adhere  strictly  to  behavioural  rules,  and  when  the  ancestral  population 
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used  a  paradoxical  strategy.  In  the  spatially  realistic  approach,  a  novel  reason  why 
paradoxical  strategies  do  not  exist  in  nature  emerges.  Fights  may  end  without  a  clear 
winner  or  loser,  and  draws  may  be  common.  When  this  is  the  case,  a  common-sense 
strategy  is  often  more  adaptive  than  the  paradoxical  alternative. 
Individuals  may  face  conflicts  of  time  or  energy,  when  they  are  faced  with  a  choice 
of  which  of  two  or  more  mutually  incompatible  behaviours  they  can  perform.  Time 
allocated  to  two  such  behaviours  may  trade-off  in  a  counterintuitive  way.  Intuition 
suggests  that  the  time  invested  in  performing  a  behaviour  should  decline  as  the 
individual's  ability  to  perform  the  behaviour  increases,  but  this  may  not  always  be 
the  case.  Instead,  investment  in  one  behaviour  is  shown  to  first  increase  and  then 
decrease  as  ability  increases.  This  could  have  implications  for  the  empirical  study  of 
trade-offs  as  it  may  appear  that  individual  ability  has  no  effect  on  the  trade-off  under 
consideration. 
Animals  often  compete  for  limited  resources,  and  this  competition  can  have 
fundamental  implications  for  population  dynamics.  Mate  choice  favours  males  who 
outperform  others  in  securing  resources,  but  the  effects  of  resource  depletion  have 
rarely  been  discussed  in  the  context  of  sexual  selection.  If  males  compete  for 
resources  used  in  sexual  displays,  I  show  that  intense  female  preference  for  high 
quality  displays  can  reduce  display  quality.  This  is  because  males  benefit  from 
excluding  others  from  resources,  damaging  the  overall  efficiency  of  resource  use  in 
the  population,  and  leading  to  poorer  prospects  for  efficient  female  choice. 
In  socially  monogamous  birds,  males  are  able  to  protect  their  paternity  by  guarding 
their  social  mate,  and  preventing  her  from  seeking  extra-pair  copulations.  Thus,  the 
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paternity  gained  by  a  male  depends  both  on  the  intensity  with  which  females  seek 
extra-pair  copulations,  and  the  guarding  behaviour  of  males.  The  relationship 
between  evolutionary  stable  guarding  behaviour  and  the  risk  of  cuckoldry  can  be 
complex  and  non-linear.  Attractive  males  are  generally  predicted  to  guard  less  than 
unattractive  ones,  but  within-pair  paternity  may  correlate  either  positively  or 
negatively  with  the  number  of  extra-pair  offspring  fertilised  by  a  male.  Negative 
correlations,  where  attractive  males  are  cuckolded  more  than  unattractive  ones, 
become  likely  if  female  extra  pair  behaviour  is  due  to  factor  applicable  to  most 
females  (e.  g.  fertility  assurance)  rather  than  the  subset  mated  to  unattractive  males 
(e.  g.  good  genes). 
There  have  been  a  number  of  recent  developments  in  game  theoretical  techniques, 
which  have  the  potential  for  increasing  our  understanding  of  animal  behaviour  and 
providing  better  matches  for  observed  data  where  this  is  required.  These  techniques 
provide  useful  avenues  of  further  research  in  game  theoretical  modelling  of  different 
systems,  including  those  in  this  thesis. 
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CHAPTER  1 
GENERAL  INTRODUCTION General  Introduction  Chapter  1 
In  this  thesis,  I  consider  the  general  theme  of  ownership  conflicts.  In  chapters  2  to  5 
of  this  thesis,  I  consider  conflicts  between  individuals,  in  the  form  of  contests  over 
territories  and  other  limited  resources.  In  chapters  6  to  8,1  will  discuss  conflicts  that 
occur  within  an  individual  who  is  the  owner  of  a  resource,  when  the  individual  must 
allocate  time  or  energy  between  two  or more  mutually  incompatible  behaviours. 
Animal  behaviour  can  be  thought  of  as  the  outcome  of  a  series  of  trade-offs  between 
the  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  performing  various  actions.  A  central  tenet  of 
behavioural  ecology  is  that  animals  are  expected  to  maximise  net  benefits,  measured 
in  units  of  fitness;  a  process  that  leads  to  optimal  behaviour.  Therefore  studying  these 
trade-offs  can  improve  our  understanding  of  the  way  animals  behave.  For  example, 
early  optimisation  studies  of  the  size  of  animal  territories  phrased  the  question  of 
how  large  territories  should  be  in  terms  of  the  costs  of  defending  those  territories 
against  intruders,  traded  off  against  the  benefits  to  be  gained  from  monopolisation  of 
the  resources  they  contained  (e.  g.  Hixon  1980;  Schoener  1983;  reviewed  in  Adams 
2001).  However,  most  of  these  models  assumed  that  animals  were  free  to  adjust 
their  territory  boundaries  without  constraint  from  neighbours  (Grant  1997;  Adams 
1998;  Keeley  2000).  In  reality,  contiguous  territories  may  be  compressed  below  their 
optimal  size  by  the  pressure  exerted  by  neighbours,  and  thus  the  behaviour  of  other 
individuals  is  also  important  when  considering  territoriality.  When  considering  how 
individuals  in  a  population  should  respond  to  the  behaviour  of  the  other  population 
members,  game  theory  modelling  is  needed. 
The  theory  of  games  was  first  developed  by  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  (1953) 
in  reference  to  human  economic  behaviour.  The  concepts  were  first  explicitly  applied 
to  evolutionary  biology  by  Lewontin  (1961),  who  pictured  a  species  playing  a  game 
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against  nature,  and  aimed  to  find  the  strategies  that  minimised  the  risk  of  extinction 
(Maynard  Smith  1982).  Game  theory  can  provide  an  important  tool  in  understanding 
any  situation  in  which  an  individual's  success  depends  not  only  on  that  individual's 
own  behavioural  choices  but  also  on  the  decisions  of  others.  The  central  concept  of 
evolutionary  game  theory,  the  evolutionarily  stable  strategy  (ESS),  was  introduced 
by  Maynard  Smith  and  Price  in  1973.  An  ESS  is  a  strategy  (behavioural  phenotype), 
which,  if  adopted  by  all  members  of  a  population,  cannot  be  invaded  by  a  mutant 
strategy  (an  alternative  behavioural  phenotype)  under  the  influence  of  natural 
selection  (Maynard  Smith  1982). 
The  first  application  of  evolutionary  game  theory  to  a  biological  phenomenon  dealt 
with  the  problem  of  animal  conflict.  Among  the  questions  answered  by  game  theory 
include  the  problem  of  why  animal  conflicts  are  often  settled  by  conventional 
behaviour,  rather  than  by  injurious  fighting.  Maynard  Smith  and  Price  (1973) 
demonstrated  that  conventional  behaviour  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  selfish 
interests  of  the  individual  contestants,  clearly  demonstrating  that  animal  conflict  can 
be  explained  in  terms  of  individual  costs  and  benefits  rather  than  'good-of-the- 
species',  group  selectionist,  arguments. 
Both  optimisation  and  game  theory  approaches  to  modelling  territorial  behaviour 
(see  above)  have  produced  testable  predictions,  and  in  many  cases  their  findings  have 
been  supported  by  empirical  investigation.  In  order  to  find  the  optimal  behaviour  of 
individuals  in  the  different  situations  I  consider,  I  use  a  combination  of  optimisation 
(chapter  6)  and  game  theory  (chapters  3,4,5,7  and  8)  approaches.  I  will  now 
discuss  the  background  to  each  chapter  in  this  thesis,  including  the  existing  theory 
and  empirical  approaches  that  lead  to  each  of  the  questions  investigated. 
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Conflicts  over  ownership 
In  the  first  chapters  of  this  thesis,  I  consider  conflicts  between  individuals 
competing  for  resources,  generally  territories.  I  look  at  fights  between 
individuals  for  ownership  of  an  existing  territory,  and  investigate  the 
question  of  how  space  is  divided  to  form  territories. 
ACQUIRING  TERRITORIES 
Competition  to  obtain  a  territory  is  a  major  determinant  of  fitness  in  territorial 
animals.  Ownership  of  a  territory  may  be  a  prerequisite  to  breeding,  or  essential  for 
foraging.  The  individuals  that  win  in  fights  for  territory  ownership  tend  to  be  those 
that  already  own  the  resource,  are  larger,  or  have  more  to  gain  or  lose  (e.  g.  Davies 
1978;  Krebs  1982;  Turner  &  Huntingford  1986;  Enquist  et  al.  1990;  Marden  & 
Waage  1990;  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Edsman  &  Jonsson  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell 
1996;  Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Tobias  1997;  Brandt  1999;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999; 
Johnsson  et  al.  2000;  Wenseleers  et  al.  2002).  These  factors  combine  to  produce  an 
individual's  resource  holding  potential,  or  RHP  (Parker  1974a),  a  measure  of  an 
individual's  capacity  to  win  a  fight  against  an  opponent.  Much  of  the  theory  applied 
to  the  study  of  how  animals  obtain  exclusive  use  of  space  stems  from  game 
theoretical  models  developed  to  study  animal  conflicts.  The  models  are  used  to 
investigate  the  outcome  of  contests  for  indivisible  resources,  in  which  the  winner  of 
the  contest  gains  sole  use  of  the  resource.  Four  important  models  applied  to  the  study 
of  territory  acquisition  are  the  hawk-dove  game  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973, 
Maynard  Smith  1979;  Maynard  Smith  1982),  the  war  of  attrition  (Maynard  Smith 
1974;  Bishop  &  Cannings  1978,  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982),  the  sequential 
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assessment  game  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1983,1987;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984)  and  the 
cumulative  assessment  model  (Payne  1998).  These  models  describe  pair-wise 
contests  between  two  opponents,  and  investigate  ESSs  for  territory  acquisition. 
1.  Hawk-Dove  Game 
In  the  classic  hawk-dove  game  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973;  Maynard  Smith 
1979;  Maynard  Smith  1982)  the  behavioural  options  available  to  an  individual 
are  'hawk'  (escalate  until  injured  or  opponent  retreats)  and  'dove'  (display,  but 
retreat  if  opponent  escalates).  In  the  early  models,  competitors  were  identical 
(e.  g.  they  were  of  the  same  body  size),  and  it  was  assumed  that  there  was  a 
finite  set  of  discrete  strategies,  a  model  too  simple  to  have  any  real-world 
validity.  Complexities  have  since  been  added  including  conditional  strategies 
based  on  role  asymmetries  (owner  or  intruder)  such  as  'bourgeois',  where 
owners  attack  (play  hawk)  and  intruders  retreat  (play  dove;  Maynard  Smith  & 
Parker  1976;  Maynard  Smith  1979).  It  is  from  this  that  the  idea  of  the 
'paradoxical  ESS'  has  emerged:  in  this  case,  owners  retreat  in  the  face  of 
attacking  intruders,  thus  giving  up  their  territories  without  a  fight.  Other 
complexities  that  have  been  added  include  asymmetries  in  the  value  of  the 
resource  to  the  two  competitors,  assessment  of  asymmetries  in  resource 
holding  potential,  and  extended  contests  involved  repeated  interactions 
(Hammerstein  1981;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992;  Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams 
1998;  Crowley  2000).  These  additions  increase  the  general  validity  of  the 
game,  particularly  with  respect  to  paradoxical  strategies. 
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2.  War  of  Attrition 
The  war  of  attrition  (WOA)  is  another  classical  game,  which  asks  how  long  a 
contestant  should  display  or  fight  over  a  disputed  resource,  given  that  the 
winner  is  the  one  that  persists  for  longest  (Maynard  Smith  1974;  Bishop  & 
Cannings  1978;  Riechert  1998).  In  the  asymmetric  war  of  attrition,  individuals 
adopt  different  roles  (such  as  owner  and  intruder),  and  the  cost  of  displaying  (k, 
set  by  the  individual's  RHP)  and  value  of  the  resource  (V)  may  differ  between 
them.  The  individuals  assess  their  ratio  of  V/k  relative  to  that  of  their  opponent, 
and  the  game  allows  for  error  in  this  assessment  (Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982; 
Bradbury  &  Vehrencamp  1998).  Escalated  contests  occur  when  both 
individuals  perceive  themselves  as  likely  winners  of  the  contest.  More  recent 
developments  of  the  WOA  include  the  energetic  WOA  (Payne  and  Pagel  1996, 
1997;  Payne  1998)  and  the  WOA  without  assessment  (Mesterton-Gibbons  et 
al.  1996).  These  models  base  persistence  bids  on  the  RHP  of  the  individual, 
and  assume  that  no  assessment  of  the  size  of  the  opponent  needs  to  take  place. 
3.  Sequential  Assessment  Game 
In  the  sequential  assessment  game  (SAG,  Enquist  &  Leimar  1983,1987; 
Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990),  fights  consist  of  a  sequence  of 
behaviours;  at  each  step  in  the  sequence  the  contestants  assess  their  relative 
strength  and  each  of  them  decides  whether  to  give  up  or  to  continue  to  fight 
based  on  these  assessments.  The  SAG  assumes  that  opponents  gain  additional 
information  about  RHP  asymmetries  with  each  consecutive  exchange  of 
actions,  and  the  error  in  assessment  decreases  as  the  contest  continues.  The 
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greater  the  asymmetry,  the  more  quickly  the  error  in  assessment  will  decrease 
and  result  in  a  contest  of  short  duration.  Extended  contests  are  predicted  when 
the  asymmetry  between  the  contestants  is  low.  Fights  are  expected  to  follow  a 
predictable  sequence  of  escalation,  with  each  fight  element  being  more  intense 
than  the  preceding  one  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1983,1987;  Leimar  &  Enquist 
1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990). 
4.  Cumulative  Assessment  Model 
In  the  cumulative  assessment  model  (CAM),  developed  by  Payne  (1998),  each 
individual  has  a  threshold  of  costs  that  it  is  willing  to  accrue  in  a  contest 
(determined  by  their  RHP),  and  costs  accrue  as  the  result  of  actions  by  the 
rival.  An  individual's  decision  to  persist  or retreat  is  based  on  a  cumulative  sum 
of  its  adversary's  actions,  and  superior  rivals  may  inflict  higher  costs  than  rivals 
of  lower  quality.  Contests  are  resolved  quickly  when  individuals  with  low 
thresholds  compete  against  rivals  who  are  able  to  inflict  higher  costs,  but 
contests  escalate  when  the  eventual  loser  has  high  cost  thresholds. 
Empirical  studies  of  the  duration  of  contests  have  shown  a  great  deal  of  support  for 
the  SAG  as  a  model  of  animal  conflict,  finding  that  contest  duration  increases  as  the 
asymmetry  in  RHP  between  the  individuals  decreases,  or  that  relative  size  is  the  best 
predictor  of  contest  outcome  (Englund  &  Olsson  1990;  Enquist  et  al.  1990;  Faber  & 
Baylis  1993;  Marden  &  Rollins  1994;  Smith  et  al.  1994;  Dale  &  Slagsvold  1995; 
Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Hack  et  al.  1997;  Moya-Lorano  &  Wise  2000;  Renison 
et  al.  2002;  Pratt  et  al.  2003).  Some  studies  exist,  however,  which  suggest  some 
support  for  models  based  on  individual  thresholds  (namely  the  energetic  WOA, 
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Payne  &  Pagel  1996,1997;  Payne  1998)  and  the  WOA  without  assessment, 
Mesterton-Gibbons  et  al.  1996),  where  contest  duration  increases  with  size  in 
contests  between  size-matched  competitors  (Dixon  &  Cade  1986,  Glass  & 
Huntingford  1988,  Foster  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996,  Whitehouse  1997). 
However,  recent  modelling  work  suggests  that  the  pattern  of  decreasing  duration 
with  increasing  difference  in  size  between  competitors,  commonly  cited  as  support 
for  the  SAG,  would  also  be  seen  if  duration  depended  on  the  RHP  of  the  eventual 
loser  (Taylor  &  Elwood  2003).  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  suggest  that  many  of  the 
studies  seeming  to  support  the  SAG  may  be  incorrectly  interpreted,  as  the  authors  of 
those  studies  failed  to  consider  the  RHP  of  the  loser  as  an  independent  predictor  of 
contest  duration.  In  chapter  2,  I  report  the  results  of  an  empirical  study  investigating 
the  factors  determining  the  duration  of  contests  over  burrow  ownership  in  the  males 
of  the  Australian  fiddler  crab  Uca  mjoebergi  (Figure  1.1).  The  chapter  attempts  to 
distinguish  whether  persistence  is  based  on  individual  thresholds  or  mutual 
assessment  of  relative  RHP,  and  thus  considers  which  of  the  models  are  most 
appropriate  when  describing  contests  within  this  species. 
Figure  1.1:  Male  Uca  mjoebergi 
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Game  theory  models  of  animal  contests  predict  that  individuals  of  low  RHP  are  able 
to  assess  their  relative  inferiority  in  a  contest  and  retreat  accordingly,  and  thus 
aggression  is  expected  in  larger  individuals  but  not  in  smaller  ones.  Although  there 
are  many  examples  of  larger  individuals  acting  aggressively  towards  smaller  ones 
(e.  g.  Zack  1975;  Brace  &  Pavey  1978;  Dowds  &  Elwood  1983;  Figler  &  Einhorn 
1983;  Barlow  et  al.  1986;  Turner  &  Huntingford  1986;  Lindström  1992;  Keeley  & 
Grant  1993;  Thorpe  et  al.  1994),  there  are  also  cases  where  aggression  is 
predominantly  initiated  by  the  smaller  competitors  (Dow  et  al.  1976;  Enquist  & 
Jakobsson  1986;  Ribowski  &  Franck  1993;  Smith  et  al.  1994;  Morris  et  al.  1995; 
Moretz  2003). 
Smaller  individuals  may  act  aggressively  for  a  number  of  reasons,  including 
asymmetries  in  the  value  of  the  resource  to  the  two  competitors  (Davies  &  Houston 
1981;  Shutler  &  Weatherhead  1992;  Eason  &  Hannon  1994;  Johnsson  et  al.  2000; 
Johnsson  &  Forser  2002),  an  increased  probability  of  winning  for  the  individual  that 
attacks  first  (Jackson  1991;  Figler  et  al.  1995;  Hack  1997;  Martin  et  al.  1997;  Taylor 
et  al.  2001;  Roeder  et  al.  2002),  a  lack  of  alternative  options  (the  desperado  effect; 
Grafen  1987)  and  misperception  of  either  themselves  as  being  larger  than  their 
opponent  (Bradbury  &  Vehrencamp  1998)  or  their  chances  of  winning  as  being 
higher  than  they  actually  are  (Just  &  Morris  2003).  In  chapter  3,1  develop  a  model 
investigating  whether  it  is  necessary  to  invoke  perception  errors  or  asymmetries  in 
costs  and  rewards  to  explain  aggression.  In  the  chapter,  competitors  can  accurately 
perceive  their  chances  of  winning  in  a  fight,  and  I  explore  the  conditions  under  which 
aggression  is directed  from  small  to  large  individuals. 
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While  the  standard  game  theory  models  discussed  previously  are  appropriate  to 
contests  over  established  territories  and  indivisible  resources,  the  process  of  territory 
formation  may  more  resemble  bargaining  and  negotiation,  rather  than  winner-takes- 
all  fights  (Maynard  Smith  1982;  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1995,1998,1999,2001).  An 
alternative  approach  to  modelling  the  acquisition  of  territories  has  recently  emerged, 
using  local  rules  of  movement  and  interaction  to  predict  space  use  by  adjacent 
residents  (Adams  2001).  Examples  of  such  mechanistic  models  of  territory 
acquisition  include  models  of  movement  and  scent  marking  to  predict  spatial  patterns 
in  timber  wolves  (Canis  lupus,  Lewis  &  Murray  1993;  White  et  al.  1996),  and  the 
formation  of  juvenile  Anolis  aeneus  lizard  territories  as  a  learning  process  governed 
by  an  individual's  experiences  in  different  locations  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999; 
2001).  Stamps  and  Krishnan's  (1999;  2001)  models  of  territory  formation  suggest 
that  space  can  be  gained  through  `nagging'  rather  than  decisive  fights,  and  that 
animals  newly  arriving  in  a  territory  can  divide  space  between  them  through  two 
processes:  familiarity  with  an  area  increases  the  individuals'  use  of  a  particular 
location,  but  aggressive  interactions  decrease  use  of  that  location  (Stamps  & 
Krishnan  1999,2001;  Sih  &  Mateo  2001).  These  models  (and  other  mechanistic 
models)  differ  from  game  theory  models  in  one  fundamental  way:  they  do  not  assess 
the  adaptiveness  of  the  behaviours  on  which  they  are  based,  that  is,  they  do  not 
analyse  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  behaviour.  In  chapter  4I  use  a  game  theory 
approach  to  investigate  whether  the  avoidance  behaviour  on  which  Stamps  and 
Krishnan's  (1999,2001)  models  are  based  is  adaptive,  investigating  the  ESS 
probabilities  for  an  individual  to  return  to  a  single  contested  area  following  a  fight, 
under  various  conditions  of  costs,  benefits  and  adherence  to  behavioural  rules. 
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Currently,  no  model  of  fights  between  individuals  exists  that  combines  realistic  two- 
dimensional  division  of  space  (a  typical  feature  of  mechanistic  models)  with 
arguments  of  evolutionary  optimality  (found  in  game  theory  models).  Approaches  to 
the  division  of  space  have  considered  only  the  winning  of  a  single  patch  of  habitat  as 
a  potential  extension  to  a  individual's  territory  (chapter  4),  or  the  question  of  how 
individuals  can  negotiate  the  division  of  a  line  (one  dimensional  habitat)  into  two 
territories  (Maynard  Smith  1982;  Lewis  &  Moorcroft  2001;  Mesterton-Gibbons  & 
Adams  2003;  Pereira  et  al.  2003),  and  do  not  explicitly  model  two-dimensional 
space.  In  chapter  5,  I  develop.  a  model  that  addresses  the  issues  of  multiple 
competitors  and  continuous,  two-dimensional  space,  while  investigating  the 
adaptiveness  of  four  different  strategies  for  territory  acquisition.  This  chapter 
combines  the  spatially  explicit  approach  of  mechanistic  models  with  some  of  the 
evolutionary  aspects  of  game  theory  models,  continuing  to  investigate  the  stability  of 
the  avoidance  strategies  for  territory  acquisition  proposed  by  Stamps  and  Krishnan 
(1999;  2001),  and  discussed  in  chapter  4. 
PARADOXICAL  STRATEGIES 
A  further  question  addressed  in  chapters  4  and  5  is  that  of  paradoxical  strategies. 
These  strategies  emerged  from  early  hawk-dove  games  of  territorial  contests,  and 
suggest  (in  contrast  to  the  `common-sense'  solution)  that  intruders,  individuals  of 
lower  RHP  or  individuals  with  less  to  gain  are  more  likely  to  win  contests  than  their 
better  equipped  opponent.  Paradoxical  strategies  are  extremely  rare  in  nature  (see 
Burgess  1976;  Fernet  &  Smith  1976;  Peeke  et  al.  1998  for  possible  examples),  and 
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thus  it  is  important  to  develop  modelling  approaches  that  explain  why  this  is  the  case, 
i.  e.  to  develop  models  that  do  not  predict  that  the  paradoxical  alternative  to  a 
common-sense  solution  can  be  an  ESS.  Maynard  Smith  and  Parker  (1976) 
recognised  the  problem  of  the  paradoxical  ESS,  and  developed  extensions  of  the 
hawk-dove  and  war  of  attrition  games.  They  concluded  that  paradoxical  solutions  are 
only  favoured  under  limited  conditions,  and  are  likely  to  be  rare  in  nature  because 
there  is  always  an  alternative,  common-sense  ESS  that  can  evolve  from  a  greater 
range  of  starting  conditions.  Further  work  continues  to  predict  paradoxical  solutions 
if  RHP  or  resource  value  asymmetries  exist  but  are  small  enough  (Hammerstein  and 
Parker  1982;  Maynard  Smith  1982;  Enquist  and  Leimar  1987;  Mesterton-Gibbons 
1992;  Mesterton-Gibbons  and  Adams  1998;  Field  and  Hardy  2000;  chapter  4), 
except  when  making  a  priori  assumptions  that  render  the  common-sense  strategy 
stronger  and  more  likely  to  prevail  (Mesterton-Gibbons  1992).  The  attempt  to 
'explain  away'  paradoxical  strategies  seems  to  have  been  successful:  the  current 
interpretation  by  empiricists  is  that  paradoxical  strategies  are  theoretically  close  to 
impossible  (Field  &  Hardy  2000;  but  see  Kemp  &  Wiklund  2001). 
In  addition  to  asking  how  animals  can  divide  space,  Chapters  4  and  5  investigate  the 
conditions  under  which  a  paradoxical  strategy  for  dividing  space  (a  different 
situation  to  that  in  the  hawk-dove  game,  in  which  paradoxcial  strategies  have  been 
extensively  studied)  can  be  adaptive.  In  chapter  4,  a  paradoxical  strategy  is  one  in 
which  an  individual  is  more  likely  to  return  to  a  constested  area  after  losing  a  fight 
than  after  winning  one,  and  I  investigate  the  effects  of  RHP  asymmetry  and 
behavioural  variability  on  the  stability  of  such  a  strategy,  and  show  that  paradoxical 
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solutions  can  exist  when  RHP  asymmetries  are  small  enough,  and  animals  adhere 
strictly  to  behavioural  rules. 
However,  in  the  absence  of  RHP  asymmetries,  the  common-sense  and  paradoxical 
strategies  become  equivalent  (unless  there  is  some  other  asymmetry  such  as 
residency  which  could  determine  fight  outcome).  Where  RHP  asymmetries  do  not 
exist,  'winning'  and  'losing'  are  labels  that  denote  the  outcome  of  a  fight,  but  give  no 
information  on  the  fighting  ability  of  the  individuals  (when  asymmetries  do  exist,  the 
winner  of  a  fight  is  likely  to  be  of  greater  fighting  ability  than  the  loser).  In  this 
situation,  the  paradoxical  strategy  (where  losers  gain  resources  at  the  expense  of 
winners)  should  find  itself  a  niche.  In  chapter  5,1  investigate  whether  a  paradoxical 
strategy  can  be  stable  in  the  absence  of  RHP  differences  (which  are  not  included  in 
the  model),  and  offer  a  solution  unrelated  to  such  differences.  Winning  and  losing  are 
not  the  only  possible  outcomes  of  a  fight:  fights  may  also  end  up  in  a  draw,  without  a 
clear  winner  and  loser  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1994a,  b,  1997,1998,  Adams  1998, 
Stamps  1999).  In  this  case,  a  paradoxical  strategy  must  mirror  the  common-sense  one 
in  its  response  to  draws,  as  well  as  wins  and  losses,  and  I  investigate  whether  this 
creates  an  asymmetry  which  renders  the  common-sense  strategy  more  likely  to 
persist  that  the  paradoxical  one,  even  in  the  absence  of  RHP  or  resource  value 
asymmetries. 
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Conflicts  faced  by  the  owner  of  a  resource 
The  second  part  of  the  thesis  considers  the  general  theme  of  conflicts 
faced  by  an  individual,  who  is  the  owner  of  a  resource,  when  chosing 
between  two  or  more  mutually  exclusive  behaviours. 
Many  behaviours  are  seen  as  a  trade-off  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  action: 
when  defending  a  territory,  an  owner  may  base  its  response  to  an  intruder  on  the 
quality  of  the  resource  at  stake  and/or  their  own  fighting  abilities  (e.  g.  Jennions  & 
Backwell  1996;  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999; 
Alcock  &  Bailey  1997),  thus  trading-off  the  costs  of  fighting  against  the  benefits 
gained  from  retaining  the  territory.  Game-theoretical  models  of  aggressive  base  an 
individual's  decisions  to  attack  or  retreat  on  the  respective  benefits  and  costs  of  the 
different  approaches  when  asymmetries  between  the  opponents  exist  (Maynard 
Smith  &  Parker  1976,  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982,  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987, 
Mesterton-Gibbons  1992).  Parental  care  is  often  thought  of  as  a  trade-off  between 
current  and  future  reproduction  (Webb  et  al.  2002),  but  in  choosing  the  amount  of 
time  or  effort  to  invest  in  caring  for  offspring,  parents  are  limiting  the  amount  of  time 
they  can  spend  foraging  (Komdeur  &  Kats  1999)  or  seeking  to  produce  further 
offspring  through  additional  copulations  (Magrath  &  Elgar  1997,  Szekely  &  Cuthill 
2000),  and  thus  face  a  trade-off  between  two  or  more  behaviours  within  a  given 
breeding  attempt.  The  trade-off  between  feeding  and  watching  for  predators 
(vigilance)  has  been  intensively  studied,  and  theory  predicts  that  the  optimal  solution 
simultaneously  balances  predator  detection  and  intake  rates  (Krause  &  Ruxton  2002). 
When  individuals  are  faced  with  a  choice  between  mutually  incompatible  behaviours 
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that  could  potentially  be  performed  at  any  given  time,  the  solution  to  the  trade-off 
between  those  behaviours  can  have  fundamental  consequences  for  their  fitness. 
Territorial  defence  and  mate  searching  behaviours  trade  off  with  predator  avoidance, 
and  have  been  found  to  alter  as  the  risk  of  predation  increases  (e.  g.  Jennions  &  Petrie 
1997;  Candolin  &  Voigt  1998;  Koga  et  al.  1998).  For  example,  courtship  displays 
involving  conspicuous  behaviours  are  reduced  when  courting  individuals  perceive  a 
greater  risk  of  predation  (e.  g.  Endler  1987;  Sih  et  al.  1990;  Godin  1995;  Fuller  & 
Berglund  1996).  Thus,  the  behavioural  decisions  made  by  the  owner  of  a  resource 
can  have  fundamental  impacts  on  their  fitness,  and  one  should  expect  the  conflicts 
between  these  behaviours  to  be  resolved  optimally.  In  chapter  6,  I  present  a  general 
optimisation  model  that  investigates  the  trade-off  decision  faced  by  an  individual 
when  allocating  time  or  energy  to  two  behaviours.  Specifically,  I  ask  how  much  of 
their  available  time  individuals  should  invest  in  each  activity  when  their  ability  to 
perform  the  necessary  behaviours  varies.  I  illustrate  the  model  with  several 
examples,  including  a  trade-off  between  courtship  and  defence  behaviours  (Candolin 
1997;  Santangelo  et  al.  2002),  and  between  these  behaviours  and  predator  detection 
and  avoidance  behaviour  (Sih  et  al.  1990;  Fuller  &  Berglund  1996;  Godin  1995). 
The  acquisiton  of  resources  is  essential  to  survival.  In  the  early  chapters  of  this 
thesis,  I  consider  contests  for  territory  ownership,  but  where  each  resource  item  is  of 
lower  value  (e.  g.  a  single  food  item),  resources  can  be  acquired  in  a  different  way. 
Foraging  indivduals  can  search  for  food  items  themselves,  or  steal  resources  from 
others  (kleptoparasitism).  This  has  been  studied  extensively  in  `producer-scrounger' 
games  of  foraging  individuals  (e.  g.  Barnard  &  Sibly  1981,  Vickery  et  al.  1991, 
Giraldeau  &  Beauchamp  1999,  Giraldeau  &  Caraco  2000).  In  these  games, 
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individuals  can  either  search  for  food  (producers)  or  search  for  other  individuals  that 
have  located  food  (scroungers),  but  cannot  do  both  simultaneously  (Barnard  &  Sibly 
1981;  Vickery  et  al.  1991).  The  frequency  of  scroungers  in  the  population  decreases 
the  rate  at  which  food  can  be  discovered,  and  hence  decreases  the  benefits  that  can  be 
gained  (Parker  1984). 
Obtaining  mates  is  a  fundamental  part  of  the  life  of  any  sexually  reproducing 
organism.  In  many  species,  males  compete  to  obtain  access  to  females,  and  females 
base  their  choice  of  male  on  some  aspect  of  the  male  which  is  believed  to  indicate  his 
quality  and/or  the  benefits  he  can  provide.  Such  benefits  range  from  his  ability  to 
provide  care  for  offspring  (direct  benefits  of  sexual  selection;  Moller  &  Jennions 
2001)  to  the  quality  of  his  genes  which  could  be  passed  on  the  the  offspring  (indirect 
benefits;  Fisher  1930;  Zahavi  1975;  Jennions  et  al.  2001;  Kokko  et  al.  2003). 
Competiton  between  males  to  attract  mates  has  been  well  studied,  is  well  known  to 
have  strong  effects  on  their  displays  (Andersson  1994).  However,  the  idea  that  males 
could  interfere  directly  with  each  other's  displays  has  received  less  attention.  In 
chapter  7,1  consider  the  effects  of  theft  in  a  sexual  context.  The  model  is  phrased  in 
terms  of  male  bowerbirds  searching  for  items  with  which  to  decorate  their  bowers 
and  thus  attract  females  (e.  g.  Borgia  1985;  Borgia  &  Mueller  1992;  Borgia  1995; 
Madden  2003).  Chapter  7  also  considers  the  question  of  time  allocation  by  the 
owner  of  a  particular  resource,  the  bower.  In  this  chapter  I  consider  the  proportion  of 
time  a  male  should  allocate  to  searching,  raiding  and  bower  defence  behaviours,  as 
these  behaviours  are  likely  to  be  mutually  incompatible  and  therefore  trade-off 
against  one  another. 
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Reproduction  involves  conflicts  of  interest  between  the  sexes.  Males  can  increase 
their  reproductive  success  by  mating  with  a  large  number  of  females,  and  females  by 
mating  with  carefully  selected,  high  quality  males  (reviewed  in  Chapman  et  al.  2003; 
Pizzari  &  Snook  2003).  In  socially  monogamous  birds,  females  have  been  shown  to 
actively  seek  extra-pair  fertilisations  (Westneat  et  al.  1990;  Petrie  et  al.  1998;  Griffith 
et  al.  2002),  a  strategy  with  a  number  of  potential  benefits  (Jennions  &  Petrie  2000). 
If  females  are  mating  outside  the  pair  bond,  a  male  should  endeavour  to  protect  his 
paternity  and  avoid  being  cuckolded,  that  is,  avoid  providing  care  to  the  offspring  of 
another  male.  One  mechanism  by  which  males  may  be  able  to  prevent  cuckoldry  is  to 
guard  their  mate  and  prevent  her  from  engaging  in  copulations  with  other  males. 
Mate  guarding  has  been  extensively  studied  in  crustaceans  and  insects  (e.  g.  Grafen  & 
Ridley  1983;  Carroll  1993;  Plaistow  et  al.  2003;  Härdling  et  al.  2004),  but  is  less  well 
studied  in  vertebrates.  Although  empirical  descriptions  are  common  (e.  g.  Birkhead  & 
Biggins  1987;  Moller  1987;  Burke  et  al.  1989;  Morton  et  al.  1990;  Johnsen  et  al. 
1998;  Chuang-Dobbs  et  al.  2001),  the  theoretical  background  is  sparse.  In 
invertebrates,  pre-  or  post-copulatory  mate  guarding  is  achieved  by  maintaining 
continuous  physical  contact,  but  this  is  impossible  for  vertebrates,  and  here  males 
maintain  proximity  to  their  females,  and  thus  are  able  to  fend  off  intruders  or  prevent 
the  female  from  seeking  potential  extra-pair  mates. 
The  benefits  associated  with  avoiding  cuckoldry  select  for  guarding  behaviour  (Van 
Rhijn  1991;  Fishman  et  al.  2003).  However,  if  females  are  mating  outside  the  pair 
bond,  this  implies  that  males  have  fitness  opportunities  away  from  their  own  social 
mate,  which  could  potentially  select  for  males  who  maintain  less  physical  proximity 
to  their  mate.  Males  can  thus  maximise  their  within-pair  paternity  by  guarding  their 
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social  mate,  but  can  maximise  their  extra-pair  paternity  by  not  guarding  and  seeking 
extra-pair  copulation  instead.  As  such,  males  face  a  trade-off,  as  they  cannot 
simultaneously  maximise  both  within-  and  extra-pair  paternity  (Hasselquist  & 
Bensch  1991).  In  chapter  8,1  investigate  how  this  conflict  might  be  resolved,  and 
develop  general  predictions  on  mate  guarding  and  patterns  of  parentage  in  socially 
monogamous  species. 
In  chapter  9,1  summarise  the  main  findings  of  chapters  2  to  8,  and  discuss  how 
they  relate  to  general  principles  of  game  theory.  I  make  a  number  of  suggestions  as 
to  how  the  work  in  this  thesis  could  be  extended,  discussing  recent  developments  in 
game  theory  modelling  that  have  provided  new  and  interesting  avenues  of  research, 
and  how  these  could  be  used  in  to  further  explore  and  develop  the  preceding 
chapters 
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CHAPTER  2 
FIGHTING  IN  FIDDLER  CRABS  UCA  MJOEBERGI:  WHAT 
DETERMINES  DURATION? 
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Abstract 
The  duration  of  a  contest  between  two  individuals  is  often  interpreted  as  being  a 
consequence  of  mutual  assessment  of  the  difference  in  their  resource  holding 
potential  (RHP),  allowing  the  inferior  individual  to  avoid  costly  interactions  it  is 
likely  to  lose.  Contest  duration  is  thus  predicted  by  the  relative  size  of  the 
competitors,  and  increases  as  the  difference  between  them  decreases.  An  alternative 
hypothesis  suggests  that  each  individual  persists  in  accordance  with  thresholds 
determined  by  its  own  RHP,  and  weaker  rivals  retreat  due  to  their  having  lower 
thresholds.  Contest  duration  depends  on  the  RHP  of  the  contestant  that  gives  up  first 
(the  loser).  Recent  work  suggests  that  even  though  duration  is  determined  by  the  size 
of  the  loser,  this  hypothesis  also  predicts  a  negative  correlation  between  duration  and 
the  relative  RHP  of  the  contestants.  However,  it  predicts  (unlike  the  mutual 
assessment  hypothesis)  that  contest  duration  should  increase  with  the  mean  size  of 
the  contestants.  Here,  we  present  the  results  of  a  study  investigating  the  determinants 
of  fighting  duration  in  the  fiddler  crab  Uca  mjoebergi.  In  this  species,  fight  duration 
increases  with  increasing  size  of  the  loser,  and  decreases,  but  to  a  lesser  extent,  with 
increasing  size  of  the  winner.  Fights  between  closely  size-matched  individuals 
increase  in  duration  with  increasing  mean  size  of  the  competitors.  Neither  the  mutual 
assessment  or  own-RHP  dependent  persistence  hypotheses  can  accurately  explain  the 
data.  Instead,  we  present  a  modification  of  recent  modelling  work,  and  suggest  that 
in  U.  mjoebergi  individual  cost  thresholds  may  determine  duration,  but  that  larger 
opponents  may  inflict  those  costs  more  rapidly,  consistent  with  the  cumulative 
assessment  game  of  animal  conflict. 
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Introduction 
Differences  in  resource  holding  potential  (RHP;  Parker  1974a)  play  an  important  role 
in  determining  the  outcome  of  contests  for  territory  ownership.  Body  size  is  often 
used  as  an  indicator  of  RHP  (e.  g.  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996; 
Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999),  but  other  factors  may  contribute  to 
RHP,  including  asymmetries  in  residency  (Davies  1978;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996; 
Chellappa  et  al.  1999;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999;  Wenseleers  et  al.  2002),  resource  value 
(Krebs  1982;  Alcock  &  Bailey  1997;  Tobias  1997;  Johnsson  &  Forser  2002),  energy 
reserves  (Marden  &  Waage  1990;  Marden  &  Rollins  1994),  body  condition 
(Fitzstephens  &  Getty  2000),  age  (Kemp  2003),  and  prior  experience  of  winning  or 
losing  (Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Hsu  &  Wolf  2001). 
These  factors  may  also  be  important  in  determining  the  duration  of  fights  between 
individuals.  Individuals  may  avoid  extended  and  costly  contests  by  assessing  their 
own  RHP  relative  to  that  of  their  rival,  before  making  a  decision  as  to  how  to 
proceed  (the  'mutual  assessment  hypothesis').  The  ability  for  rivals  to  assess  their 
relative  sizes  has  been  incorporated  into  models  of  animal  conflicts,  including  some 
war  of  attrition  games  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Parker  &  Rubenstein  1981; 
Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982)  and  the  sequential  assessment  game  (Enquist  &  Leimar 
1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990).  Asymmetries  between 
individuals  can  lead  to  quick  resolution  of  contests  based  on  those  asymmetries,  but 
when  competitors  are  evenly  matched,  escalated  fighting  results  (Maynard  Smith 
1982;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1983).  Many  empirical  studies  have  tested,  and  found 
support  for  these  models,  finding  that  contest  duration  increases  as  some  measure  of 
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the  difference  between  competitors  in  RHP  decreases  (e.  g.  Englund  &  Olsson  1990; 
Enquist  et  al.  1990;  Leimar  et  al.  1991;  Faber  &  Baylis  1993;  Marden  &  Rollins 
1994;  Smith  et  al.  1994;  Dale  &  Slagsvold  1995;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Hack  et 
al.  1997;  Moya-Lorafio  &  Wise 2000;  Renison  et  al.  2002;  Pratt  et  al.  2003). 
More  recent  game-theory  approaches  to  modelling  contest  dynamics  have  included 
the  possibility  that  contest  duration  and  escalation  could  be  determined  by  the  size  of 
one  (usually  the  size-disadvantaged)  of  the  competitors  (war  of  attrition  without 
assessment:  Mesterton-Gibbons  et  al.  1996,  energetic  war  of  attrition:  Payne  &  Pagel 
1996,1997;  Payne  1998).  If  each  individual  involved  in  an  energetically  costly 
contest  has  a  threshold  level  of  costs  they  are  willing  to  accumulate,  determined  by 
that  individual's  RHP,  a  contest  will  persist  until  the  individual  with  the  lowest  costs 
threshold  reaches  that  level,  and  thus  duration  will  be  determined  by  the  RHP  of  the 
eventual  loser.  Under  the  'own-RHP  dependent  persistence  hypothesis',  no 
assessment  of  the  size  of  the  opponent  need  take  place.  Support  for  these  models 
includes  situations  where  the  escalation  probability  or  duration  of  a  contest  between 
size-matched  rivals  is  positively  associated  with  body  size  (Dixon  &  Cade  1986; 
Glass  &  Huntingford  1988;  Foster  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Whitehouse 
1997).  Fight  duration  in  orb-web  spider  (Metellina  mengei;  Bridge  et  al.  2000)  and 
jumping  spider  (Plexippus  paykulli;  Taylor  et  al.  2001)  contests,  and  escalation  in 
fallow  deer  (Dama  dama;  Jennings  et  al.  2004)  are  better  predicted  by  the  size  of  the 
loser  than  measures  of  relative  size,  supporting  the  own-RHP  dependent  persistence 
hypothesis. 
Taylor  &  Elwood  (2003)  have  recently  shown  using  simulation  models  that  a  strong 
correlation  exists  between  measures  of  relative  size  and  duration  of  fights  even  when 
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individual  thresholds  actually  determine  contest  duration.  In  addition,  there  is  a 
strong  correlation  between  smaller  rival  size  and  duration  when  mutual  assessment 
determines  duration.  Thus,  careful  examination  of  data  is  needed  to  discover  the  true 
determinant  of  fighting  duration  (loser  RHP  or  mutual  assessment).  The  models 
suggest  that  by  considering  the  direction  of  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the 
sizes  of  the  smaller  and  larger  rival  and  the  duration  of  fighting,  it  should  be  possible 
to  distinguish  between  the  two  possibilities  (Taylor  &  Elwood  2003;  Gammell  & 
Hardy  2003).  In  both  cases,  loser  RHP  will  correlate  positively  with  duration.  When 
duration  is  determined  by  the  loser's  RHP,  winner  size  will  correlate  positively  but 
more  weakly  with  duration.  If  mutual  assessment  occurs  exclusively,  winner  size  will 
correlate  negatively  with  duration,  but  with  approximately  the  same  strength  as  the 
relationship  between  loser  size  and  duration  (Taylor  &  Elwood  2003;  Gammell  & 
Hardy  2003). 
Here,  we  investigate  the  question  of  whether  contest  duration  in  the  Australian 
fiddler  crab  Uca  mjoebergi  is  determined  by  individual  thresholds  or  mutual 
assessment  of  fighting  ability,  and  which  type  of  game  theory  model  is  most 
appropriate  for  this  species.  We  employ  the  framework  for  contest  analysis  suggested 
by  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003),  one  of  the  first  studies  to  do  so  (see  Jennings  et  al. 
2004).  In  our  study  species,  both  males  and  females  occupy  and  aggressively  defend 
burrows,  used  as  refugia  from  the  high  tide  and  for  mating.  The  surface  area  around 
the  burrow  entrance  is  used  for  feeding  during  diurnal  low  tides  and  courtship  of 
wandering  females.  In  fiddler  crabs,  gravid  females  select  males  partly  on  the  basis 
of  burrow  characteristics,  and  remain  in  the  chosen  male's  burrow  while  the  eggs 
develop  (Backwell  &  Passmore  1996),  and  thus  ownership  of  a  burrow  and 
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surrounding  area  of  the  mudflat  is  important  for  both  survival  and  reproduction. 
Burrow-holding  males  aggressively  defend  their  burrows  from  wandering  males 
(intruders).  An  intruder  is  a  male  that  has  lost  his  burrow,  either  because  he  forfeited 
it  to  a  female  whom  he  mated,  or  because  he  lost  it  in  fighting  with  another  male. 
Intruders  wander  through  the  population  of  territory-holders,  and  fight  with  several 
males  before  eventually  winning  a  territory.  In  this  study,  we  artificially  create 
intruders  in  the  population  (see  Methods  for  justification),  and  examine  the  duration 
of  fights. 
Methods 
We  studied  a  population  of  U.  mjoebergi  at  East  Point  Reserve,  Darwin,  Northern 
Territory,  Australia,  from  October  to  December  2003.  The  study  was  conducted  for 
4-6  hours  per  day  during  diurnal  low  tides.  Within  the  areas  of  the  mudflat  occupied 
by  U.  mjoebergi,  the  population  was  divided  into  several  smaller  sub-populations, 
separated  by  unused  areas  (>  lm  in  diameter),  presumably  unsuitable  for  the 
construction  of  burrows  (pers.  obs.  ).  We  examined  fights  between  intruders  and 
burrow-holding  resident  males.  There  are  two  ways  to  do  this:  either  by  following 
naturally  occurring  wandering  males  and  documenting  their  fight  with  a  resident;  or 
by  artificially  creating  wanderers  by  capturing,  relocating  and  releasing  resident 
males  and  following  them  until  they  fight  with  a  resident.  We  chose  the  second 
method  because  it  eliminates  several  potentially  important  problems.  Firstly,  it 
prevents  winner-loser  effects  since  both  males  were  burrow-holders  and  must 
therefore  have  won  their  last  fights  (see  Hsu  &  Wolf  1999).  Secondly,  this  method 
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overcomes  the  possibility  that  wandering  males  are  a  class  of  weaker  individuals  that 
are  unable  to  successfully  hold  territories  (Bradbury  &  Vehrencamp  1998;  Olsson  & 
Shine  2000).  Finally,  it  avoids  the  possibility  of  size-assortative  fighting  if 
individuals  are  distributed  in  a  size  assortative  pattern  through  the  habitat  (Christy 
1980),  as  it  ensures  that  males  of  all  sizes  could  be  introduced  to  each  habitat  patch. 
We  captured  a  burrow-holding  male  (n  =  531)  and  measured  his  carapace  width  and 
major  claw  length  (pollex  and  manus)  to  the  nearest  0.1mm  using  dial  callipers,  a 
highly  repeatable  method  (Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Backwell  &  Passmore  1996). 
All  measurements  were  carried  out  by  a  single  observer  (LJM).  We  released  each 
male  at  least  2m  away  from  his  own  burrow  and  observed  him  until  he  completed  his 
first  fight  with  a  resident  male  defending  another  burrow.  A  fight  was  defined  as  any 
interaction  in  which  the  males  touched  claws,  even  briefly.  We  recorded  the  duration 
of  the  fight  using  a  stopwatch  in  seconds  (from  first  to  last  contact,  n=  173  fights), 
and  noted  the  winner  (the  male  occupying  the  burrow  when  the  interaction  ended). 
For  a  subset  of  the  data  (n  =  109  fights),  we  also  recorded  the  level  of  fight 
escalation.  Fights  in  U.  mjoebergi  escalate  from  pushing  to  grappling.  Many  fights 
are  settled  with  `pushing':  while  facing  each  other,  males  align  their  claws  and  push. 
If  this  does  not  end  an  encounter,  they  proceed  to  grapple  by  interlocking  claws  and 
twisting  (Crane  1975).  Once  the  fight  was  settled,  we  captured  and  measured  the 
male  who  was  originally  resident. 
We  only  examined  fights  between  brachychelous  (non-regenerated  claw)  males  since 
regenerated  claws  have  been  shown  to  be  inferior  weapons  (Backwell  et  al.  2000). 
We  included  only  those  fights  in  which  both  males  remained  on  the  surface 
throughout  the  interaction,  and  excluded  those  that  involved  digging  or  fighting  from 
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within  the  burrow  shaft  (n  =  173  fights  recorded).  While  males  were  not  marked,  we 
avoided  recording  the  same  males  in  observations  on  the  same  day.  During  each  day 
of  observations,  we  recorded  fights  in  at  least  two  locations  on  the  mudflat  (<2m 
apart),  and  avoided  using  the  same  areas  consecutively  between  days.  Thus  it  is 
unlikely  that  the  same  males  or  the  same  dyad  were  observed  repeatedly. 
For  the  analysis  of  fighting  duration,  we  employ  the  framework  advocated  by  Taylor 
and  Elwood  (2003).  We  thus  investigate  winner  and  loser  size  as  distinct  explanatory 
variables.  If,  in  simple  and  multiple  regression,  winner  and  loser  size  correlate 
positively  with  duration,  then  duration  is  determined  by  individual  thresholds.  If, 
however,  winner  size  correlates  negatively  with  duration,  with  an  effect  size 
approximately  equal  to  that  of  loser  size,  then  mutual  size  assessment  is  likely  to  be 
occurring,  and  the  two  variables  can  be  replaced  with  a  measure  of  relative  size  or 
size  difference  (Ganunell  &  Hardy  2003;  Taylor  &  Elwood  2003).  Taylor  and 
Elwood  (2003)  also  suggest  that  if  mutual  assessment  has  been  shown  to  occur,  in  a 
multiple  regression  involving  the  size  of  the  loser  and  a  measure  of  relative  size  as 
explanatory  variables,  only  the  measure  of  relative  size  should  be  significant. 
Additionally,  we  investigate  the  duration  of  fights  between  size  matched  competitors: 
mutual  assessment  predicts  that  contests  between  size  matched  individuals  should 
not  vary  with  the  absolute  size  of  the  competitors,  as  their  size  relative  to  each  other 
is  constant  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1983).  If  fight  duration  is  based  on  individual 
thresholds,  fights  between  two  larger  size-matched  individuals  should  be  longer  than 
those  between  two  smaller  size-matched  individuals.  Encounter  duration  was  log- 
transformed  to  normalise  the  data.  All  tests  are  two-tailed  and  summary  statistics  are 
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presented  as  mean  ±  SE.  Analyses  were  performed  using  SPSS  for  Windows,  and  all 
reported  r2  are  adjusted. 
Results 
The  mean  carapace  size  for  crabs  was  11.31  ±  0.046mm,  and  the  mean  claw  size  was 
17.79  f  0.124mm  (n  =  704).  Carapace  width  and  claw  length  were  highly  correlated 
(r  =  0.958,  n=  704,  p<0.001),  and  thus  we  present  here  only  the  results  of  the 
analyses  for  claw  size:  the  results  using  carapace  width  are  qualitatively  similar. 
There  was  no  difference  in  mean  size  between  intruders  and  the  residents  they  chose 
to  fight  (residents:  17.82  ±  0.26mm  intruders:  17.89  ±  0.24mm,  paired  t-test:  t= 
0.269,  d.  f.  =  172,  p=0.788).  Fighting  was  size  assortative  (correlation  between  claw 
size  of  resident  and  intruder:  r2  =  0.189,  F1,171  =  41.167,  p<0.001),  but  with  much 
variation:  the  ratio  of  claw  sizes  (winner  claw/loser  claw)  ranged  from  0.741  to  1.852 
(mean  =  1.153  ±  0.016).  To  investigate  the  factors  determining  the  outcome  of  fights, 
we  followed  the  approach  of  Taylor  and  Jackson  (2003)  and  used  three  independent 
predictors  of  outcome  in  multiple  logistic  regression:  size  of  the  smaller  rival,  size  of 
the  larger  rival,  and  whether  the  intruder  was  larger  or  smaller  than  the  resident 
(intruder  status).  Overall,  intruders  won  33.4%  of  fights  (exact  binomial  probability 
compared  to  the  null  expectation  of  50%:  p<0.001).  In  multiple  logistic  regression, 
the  outcome  of  a  fight  was  predicted  by  intruder  status  and  the  size  of  the  smaller 
rival  (status:  B=3.420,  d.  f.  =1,  p<0.001,  smaller  rival  size:  B=-0.316,  d.  f.  =1, 
p=0.003).  Stepwise  multiple  logistic  regression  revealed  that  only  intruder  status 
(larger  or  smaller)  was  important  in  determining  outcome  (B=3.270,  d.  f.  =  1, 
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p<0.001).  In  cases  where  the  intruder  attacked  a  larger  resident,.  intruders  won  only 
5.7%  of  fights,  and  only  the  size  of  the  larger  (resident)  individual  was  important 
(B=-2.673,  d.  f.  =1,  p=0.049).  Thus,  smaller  intruders  had  the  best  chance  of  winning 
when  their  opponent  was  not  much  larger.  In  cases  where  the  intruder  was  larger  than 
the  resident,  intruders  won  38.4%  of  fights.  The  size  of  both  rivals  predicted  fight 
outcome  (larger  rival:  B=0.552,  d.  f.  =1,  p=0.002;  smaller  rival:  B=-0.689,  d.  f.  =1, 
p<0.001;  overall  model:  p<0.001,  Nagelkerke  R2=0.331).  As  the  effects  are  of 
approximately  equal  magnitude  but  opposite  direction,  the  sizes  of  the  larger  and 
smaller  rival  can  be  more  economically  expressed  as  size  difference  (B=0.637, 
d.  f.  =1,  p<0.001).  Overall,  both  size  and  residency  asymmetries  are  important  in 
determining  the  outcome  of  fights  in  U.  mjoebergi.  The  probability  of  a  fight 
escalating  from  the  push  to  the  grapple  stage  was  best  predicted  by  the  duration  of 
the  fight  (stepwise  logistic  regression  using  smaller  rival  size,  larger  rival  size, 
intruder  status,  fight  outcome  and  fight  duration  as  predictors:  duration  B=7.60,  ' 
d.  f.  =1,  p<0.001).  Since  many  of  the  aspects  of  fighting  follow  patterns  well 
documented  in  other  species,  we  focus  our  discussion  of  fighting  behaviour  on  the 
factors  predicting  the  duration  of  fights. 
WHAT  DETERMINES  THE  DURATION  OF  FIGHTS? 
The  mean  duration  of  fights  was  7.48  ±  0.63  seconds  (range  0.34  -  71.67  seconds). 
We  began  by  investigating  the  relationships  between  measures  of  individual  size  and 
duration  using  simple  regression.  We  investigated  winner  size,  loser  size  and  three 
measures  of  relative  size  (winner/loser,  winner-loser  and  (winner-loser)/mean  size) 
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as  predictors  of  fight  duration  (table  2.1).  There  were  significant  bivariate 
relationships  between  the  predictor  variables  and  the  duration  of  fights  (table  2.1):  all 
relationships  remained  significant  after  correction  for  table-wide  probability  using 
the  sequential  Bonferroni  procedure  (Rice  1989,  n=5  correlations  tested).  The 
strongest  single  predictor  of  duration  was  the  size  of  the  loser,  and  duration 
correlated  positively  with  both  winner  and  loser  size  (table  2.1,  figure  2.1  a  and  b), 
and  negatively  with  measures  of  relative  size  (table  2.1,  figure  2.1  c  and  d). 
Following  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  we  compared  the  size  of  the  winner  and  loser 
claw  as  independent  predictors  of  duration  in  a  stepwise  multiple  regression  model 
(overall  model  r2  =  0.412,  F2,170  =  61.299,  p<0.001).  Both  factors  remained 
significant  (winner  claw:  F1,170  =  14.773,  p<0.001,  loser  claw:  F1,170  =  111.234,  p< 
0.001).  The  standardised  partial  regression  (ß)  coefficient  for  the  loser's  claw  size 
(ß  =  0.782)  is  positive,  while  the  ß  coefficient  for  the  winner's  size  is  negative  (ß  =- 
0.285),  opposite  to  the  simple  regression  in  table  2.1.  The  results  of  the  multiple 
regression  suggest  that  duration  increases  with  the  size  of  the  loser,  and,  for  a  given 
loser  size,  duration  decreases  as  the  size  of  the  winner  increases.  However,  if  mutual 
assessment  only  occurs,  the  effects  of  winner  and  loser  size  in  multiple  regression  are 
expected  to  be  of  opposite  direction  and  approximately  equal  magnitude  (Taylor  & 
Elwood  2003). 
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Table  2.1:  Bivariate  regression  relationships  between  claw  size  variables  and 
duration  (log  transformed)  of  fights  in  Uca  mjoebergi.  All  relationships  are 
significant  after  sequential  Bonferroni  correction  (n  =5  tests). 
Predictor 
variable 
(claw  sizes) 
r2  F  it  sign  of 
slope 
p 
loser  0.365  99.658  173  +  <0.001 
winner  0.033  6.824  173  +  0.01 
winner/loser  0.349  93.030  173  -  <0.001 
winner-loser  0.284  69.077  173  -  <0.001 
(winner-loser)  0.333  87.045  173  -  <0.001 
/mean  size 
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The  95%  confidence  interval  for  the  ß  coefficient  of  the  winner  size  (0.139  -  0.431; 
absolute  values)  does  not  overlap  with  the  95%  confidence  interval  for  loser  size 
(0.636  -  0.928),  and  thus  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  differs  at  the  a=0.05  level, 
and  the  size  of  the  loser's  claw  has  a  stronger  effect  on  contest  duration  than  the  size 
of  the  winner's  claw.  Thus,  duration  increased  most  strongly  with  loser  size,  and 
additionally  increased  as  competitors  became  more  size  matched.  When  loser  size 
and  a  measure  of  relative  size  (winner  size/loser  size)  are  used  as  predictors  in 
multiple  regression,  both  factors  remain  significant  (overall  model  r2  =  0.428,  F2,170 
=  65.368,  p<0.001,  loser  claw:  F1,170  =  24.773,  ß=0.381,  p<0.001,  relative  claw 
size:  F1,170  =  20.003,  ß=  -0.343,  p<0.001).  The  same  is  true  if  size  difference 
(winner  size-loser  size)  is  used  in  place  of  relative  size  (overall  model  r2  =  0.412, 
F2,170  =  61.229,  p<0.001,  loser  claw:  F1,170  =  38.309,  ß=0.445,  p<0.001,  size 
difference:  F1,170  =14.773,0  =  -0.277,  p  <  0.001). 
When  only  fights  between  closely  size  matched  individuals  (0.9  <  winner  size/loser 
size  <  1.1,  n=  63  fights)  were  considered,  duration  increased  with  increasing  mean 
size  of  the  competitors  (r2  =  0.158,  F1,62  =  12.651,  p=0.001,  figure  2.2). 
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competitors  and  the  duration  of  the  fight.  The  regression  line  is  y=0.054x  -  0.107 
(see  text  for  statistical  analysis). 
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Discussion 
Both  the  size  of  the  loser  and  measures  of  relative  size  were  related  to  the  duration  of 
the  fight  (figure  2.1).  Is  the  decision  of  fiddler  crabs  to  retreat  in  a  contest  (and  lose 
the  fight)  based  on  individual  thresholds  (own-RHP  dependent  persistence)  or  on  the 
assessment  of  their  relative  inferiority  (mutual  assessment)?  Our  data  provide 
evidence  in  support  of  both  hypotheses. 
Fighting  in  U.  mjoebergi  is  size  assortative:  intruders  tended  to  fight  residents  that 
were  of  a  similar  size  to  themselves,  although  there  was  considerable  variation. 
Fights  between  a  very  small  and  a  very  large  individual  tended  not  to  occur.  This 
suggests  two  possibilities.  Firstly,  small  individuals  may  be  able  to  assess  their 
relative  inferiority  prior  to  a  fight  with  much  larger  individuals,  and  attempt  to  avoid 
the  fight  by  retreating  down  the  burrow  (when  the  resident)  or  selecting  a  different 
opponent  (when  the  intruder).  Secondly,  large  individuals  may  choose  not  to 
challenge  residents  much  smaller  than  themselves  since  their  burrow  may  be 
unsuitably  small  (Jennions  &  Backwell  1996).  Both  possibilities  suggest  that  the 
decision  to  begin  a  fight  is  based  on  the  assessment  of  the  potential  opponent. 
The  mutual  assessment  hypothesis  is  also  supported  by  the  finding  that  winner  and 
loser  size  had  opposing  effects  in  multiple  regression.  Duration  increased  with 
increasing  size  of  the  loser  but  decreased  with  increasing  winner  size  for  a  given  size 
of  loser.  As  winners  tended  to  be  larger  than  losers,  this  implies  that  duration 
increases  as  the  size  of  the  winner  approached  that  of  the  loser,  i.  e.  as  the  competitors 
became  more  closely  size  matched,  or  the  smaller  individual  won  the  fight.  More 
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closely  size  matched  individual  fought  for  longer  than  pairs  in  which  there  was  a 
large  size  discrepancy  (figure  2.1c  and  d). 
Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  predict  that  if  only  mutual  assessment  is  occurring,  the 
effect  sizes  of  winner  and  loser  size  in  multiple  regression  would  be  of 
approximately  equal  magnitude  and  opposite  direction.  However,  we  found  that  loser 
size  had  a  significantly  stronger  effect  on  duration  than  winner  size.  This  suggests 
that  loser  size  has  the  greater  influence  on  fighting  duration,  and  that  individual 
thresholds  may  be  important  in  determining  the  duration  for  which  an  individual  is 
willing  to  fight.  Loser  size  was  also  the  single  best  predictor  of  contest  duration 
(table  2.1,  figure  2.1  a),  and  winner  size  correlated  positively  with  duration  (figure 
2.1b).  Additionally,  both  loser  size  and  measures  of  relative  size  remained  significant 
predictors  of  duration  in  multiple  regression. 
Further  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  fight  duration  is  determined  by  individual 
thresholds  is  seen  when  fights  occurred  between  closely  size-matched  individuals.  In 
this  situation,  fight  duration  increased  with  increasing  mean  size  of  the  competitors, 
suggesting  that  larger  individuals  are  able  to  fight  for  longer  than  smaller  ones. 
Models  based  on  relative  size  assessment  (e.  g.  the  sequential  assessment  game, 
Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990)  predict  that  the 
duration  of  fights  between  size-matched  individuals  should  be  constant  regardless  of 
the  size  of  the  competitors,  since  their  relative  size  to  each  other  is  constant. 
Increasing  duration  with  increasing  size  of  size-matched  competitors  has  been  noted 
before  (e.  g.  Dixon  &  Cade  1986;  Glass  &  Huntingford  1988;  Jennions  &  Backwell 
1996;  Whitehouse  1997;  Taylor  et  al.  2001),  but  the  implications  of  this  for  the 
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applicability  of  models  of  fighting  behaviour  may  not  have  always  been  recognised 
(Taylor  &  Elwood  2003). 
Which  models  of  animal  contests  provide  the  most  appropriate  description  of 
fighting  behaviour  in  this  particular  system?  Our  results  provide  partial  support  for 
both  the  own-RHP  dependent  persistence  hypothesis  and  the  mutual  assessment 
hypothesis,  but  also  provide  evidence  against  these  hypotheses.  Size  assortative 
fighting  and  opposite  effects  of  winner  and  loser  size  provide  support  for  models 
based  on  mutual  assessment,  such  as  the  war  of  attrition  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker 
1976;  Parker  &  Rubenstein  1981;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982)  and  sequential 
assessment  game  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al. 
1990),  but  not  for  models  based  on  individual  thresholds  (Mesterton-Gibbons  et  al. 
1996;  Payne  &  Pagel  1996,1997;  Payne  1998).  Increasing  duration  with  increasing 
mean  size  of  size-matched  rivals  and  a  stronger  effect  of  loser  size  suggest  the 
importance  of  individual  thresholds  and  support  models  based  on  own-RHP 
dependent  persistence,  such  as  the  war  of  attrition  without  assessment  (Mesterton- 
Gibbons  et  al.  1996)  and  the  energetic  war  of  attrition  (Payne  &  Pagel  1996,1997; 
Payne  1998),  but  not  models  based  on  mutual  assessment  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker 
1976;  Parker  &  Rubenstein  1981;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982  Enquist  &  Leimar 
1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990). 
SIZE-ASSORTATIVE  FIGHTING? 
How  can  we  reconcile  these  differences?  Firstly,  can  the  observed  size-assortative 
fighting  explain  the  differences  we  see  between  the  predictions  of  Taylor  and 
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Elwood  (2003)  and  the  findings  of  the  current  study?  In  order  to  investigate  this 
effect  on  the  duration  of  contests,  we  provide  a  modification  to  the  Taylor  and 
Elwood  (2003)  model,  where  we  consider  size-assortative  fighting.  Following  Taylor 
and  Elwood  (2003),  we  consider  an  animal  population  in  which  size  is  normally 
distributed  about  a  mean  ±  SD  of  30  ±  6mm.  We  set  up  150  random  pairings,  and 
select  only  those  where  the  ratio  of  the  sizes  of  the  two  individuals  lies  between  0.7 
and  1.3,  to  simulate  size-assortative  fighting  (n  =  121  fights).  As  in  Taylor  and 
Elwood  (2003),  where  fight  duration  is  based  on  individual  thresholds,  persistence 
times  are  randomly  dispersed  to  an  approximately  normal  distribution  centred  on 
duration  equal  to  own  size  with  a  standard  deviation  of  5  seconds.  Where  mutual 
assessment  occurs,  and  size  difference  determines  duration,  duration  is  equal  to  30 
seconds  minus  the  absolute  size  difference  between  the  contestants,  randomly 
dispersed  to  a  normal  distribution  with  a  standard  deviation  of  5  seconds.  We  found 
that  when  duration  is  determined  by  individual  thresholds,  duration  of  size 
assortative  fights  is  positively  related  to  winner  and  loser  size  in  multiple  regression 
(overall  model  r2  =  0.563,  F2,118  =  78.368,  p<0.001,  winner  size:  F1,118  =  53.000,  ß= 
0.523,  p<0.001,  loser  size:  F1,118  =  21.139,  ß=0.330,  p<0.001).  When  duration  is 
determined  by  size  difference  (i.  e.  mutual  assessment  operates),  duration  is  positively 
related  to  loser  size,  but  negatively  related  to  winner  size  (overall  model  r2  =  0.281, 
F2,118  =  24.423,  p<0.001,  larger  individual  size:  F1,118  =  47.290,  ß=  -0.847,  p< 
0.001,  smaller  individual  size:  F1,118  =  37.599,0  =  0.755,  p<0.001).  Comparison  of 
the  absolute  values  of  the  95%  confidence  intervals  of  the  ß  coefficients  (larger  size: 
0.6047  -  1.0893,  smaller  size:  0.5127  -  0.9973),  shows  that  the  effect  sizes  of  the 
larger  and  smaller  individuals  on  the  duration  of  contests  are  of  equal  magnitude,  as 
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in  the  original  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  model.  Thus,  size-assortative  fighting  alone 
cannot  explain  the  patterns  seen  in  U.  mjoebergi,  whether  mutual  assessment  or 
individual  thresholds  decides  the  duration  of  fights. 
CUMULATIVE  ASSESSMENT? 
A  potential  solution  can  be  found  in  the  cumulative  assessment  game  (Payne  1998). 
This  game  resembles  the  individual  threshold  models,  in  that  each  individual  has  a 
threshold  level  of  costs  it  is  willing  to  bear  before  retreating  in  a  contest,  and  costs 
accrue  as  the  result  of  the  actions  of  the  rival.  However,  superior  rivals  (of  higher 
RHP)  may  inflict  higher  costs,  and/or  costs  may  accrue  faster  for  weaker  rivals 
(Payne  1998,  Taylor  &  Elwood  2003;  Briffa  et  al.  2003).  To  investigate  such  effects 
on  the  duration  of  contests,  we  provide  a  further  extension  to  the  Taylor  and  Elwood 
(2003)  model,  in  which  fighting  is  size-assortative,  and  persistence  is  based  on 
individual,  size-determined,  costs  thresholds,  but  larger  rivals  inflict  costs  at  a  higher 
rate. 
In  our  second  modification  of  the  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  approach,  size  is  again 
normally  distributed  about  a  mean  ±  SD  of  30  ±  6mm,  and  we  again  select  only  those 
fights  where  the  ratio  of  the  sizes  of  the  two  individuals  lies  between  0.7  and  1.3  (n  = 
119  fights).  Each  rival  is  willing  to  accumulate  a  level  of  costs  proportional  to  its 
size,  but  we  incorporate  random  variation  in  the  relationship  between  size  and  cost 
threshold  (expressed  as  the  number  of  seconds  it  is  willing  to  fight  for)  such  that 
thresholds  are  randomly  dispersed  to  an  approximately  normal  distribution  centred 
on  size  with  a  standard  deviation  of  3  seconds.  Opponents  inflict  costs  at  a  rate 
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proportional  to  their  size:  larger  individuals  inflict  costs  more  rapidly.  The  duration 
persistence  of  an  individual  is  defined  as  (own  cost  threshold  -*  size  of  opponent). 
A  fight  between  two  individuals  continues  until  the  lower  of  the  two  persistence 
levels  has  been  reached,  and  this  individual  is  designated  the  loser.  Investigation  of 
the  simulated  population  using  simple  regression  (table  2.2,  figure  2.3)  reveals 
similar  patterns  of  relationships  to  that  obtained  from  our  study  of  fighting  in  fiddler 
crabs  (table  2.1,  figure  2.1).  Duration  increases  with  the  size  of  both  the  winner  and 
the  loser,  and  decreases  as  the  difference  in  size  between  the  opponents  increases. 
We  compared  winner  and  loser  size  as  predictors  in  stepwise  multiple  regression 
(overall  model  r2  =  0.554,  F2,116  =  61.229,  p<0.001),  and  both  factors  remained 
significant  (winner  size:  F1,116  =  7.498,  p=0.007,  loser  size:  F11116  =  118.033,  p< 
0.001).  As  we  found  in  U.  mjoebergi,  the  standardised  partial  regression  coefficient 
for  the  loser  size  (ß  =  0.871)  is  positive,  while  the  ß  coefficient  for  the  winner  size  is 
negative  (ß  =  -0.219).  The  absolute  values  for  the  95%  confidence  intervals  for  the  ß 
coefficients  do  not  overlap  (loser  size:  0.712  -  1.030,  winner  size:  0.060  -  0.378),  and 
thus  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  differs  at  the  a=0.05  level,  and  loser  size  in  this 
simulation  has  a  stronger  effect  on  contest  duration  than  the  winner  size,  as  it  did  in 
our  empirical  results. 
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Table  2.2:  Bivariate  regression  relationships  between  size  variables  and  duration  in  a 
simulated  population  of  individuals,  where  the  duration  for  which  an  individual  is 
willing  to  fight  depends  on  individual  thresholds,  but  costs  are  inflicted  more  quickly 
by  larger  rivals.  All  relationships  are  significant  after  sequential  Bonferroni 
correction  (n  =5  tests) 
Predictor 
variable 
(size) 
r2  F  n  sign  of 
slope 
p 
Loser  0.529  133.513  119  +  <0.001 
Winner  0.107  15.195  119  +  <0.001 
winner/loser  0.169  24.983  119  -  <0.001 
winner-loser  0.251  40.440  119  -  <0.001 
(winner-loser)  0.244  38.991  119  -  <0.001 
/mean  size 
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Figure  2.3:  In  a  modification  of  the  Taylor  and  Elwood  (2003)  model,  individual 
cost  thresholds  determine  duration,  but  larger  individuals  inflict  costs  more  rapidly 
than  smaller  ones.  When  this  is  the  case,  in  a  simulated  population,  contest  duration 
is  predicted  by  (a)  loser  size,  (b)  winner  size,  (c)  relative  size  (winner/loser)  and  (d) 
size  difference  (winner-loser).  The  patterns  seen  are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  in 
figure  2.1.  The  regression  lines  are  (a)  y=0.703x  -3.055,  (b)  y=0.306x  +  6.759,  (c) 
y=  -16.58x  +  36.651,  (d)  y=  -0.57x  +  19.59  (see  the  text  for  full  statistical  analysis). 
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The  simulation  provides  a  reasonable  match  to  the  observed  data,  and  suggests  that 
in  U.  mjoebergi,  the  persistence  of  individuals  in  fights  is  determined  by  individual 
thresholds,  but  that  fighting  a  large  opponent  causes  those  thresholds  to  be  reached 
more  quickly,  suggesting  that  no  assessment  of  the  opponent  need  occur.  The 
cumulative  assessment  game  (Payne  1998)  may  therefore  be  a  more  appropriate 
description  of  fighting  behaviour  in  this  species  than  the  games  involving  mutual 
assessment  (sequential  assessment  game:  Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist 
1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990,  war  of  attrition:  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Parker  & 
Rubenstein  1981;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982)  or  based  entirely  on  individual  size 
(energetic  war  of  attrition,  Payne  &  Pagel  1996,1997;  Payne  1998,  war  of  attrition 
without  assessment,  Mesterton-Gibbons  et  al.  1996).  Careful  consideration  of  the 
dynamics  of  contests  can  help  distinguish  between  the  true  assessment  of  rival  sizes 
(in  the  sequential  assessment  game)  and  the  effect  of  size  on  the  infliction  and 
accumulation  of  costs  (in  the  cumulative  assessment  model,  Payne  &  Pagel  1997; 
Payne  1998;  Briffa  &  Elwood  2000;  Taylor  &  Elwood  2003),  for  example,  the  rate 
and  sequence  of  actions  employed  by  the  contestants  within  a  fight  can  be  studied. 
Another  possibility  is  that  different  assessment  mechanisms  are  used  during  different 
phases  of  the  contest.  Our  data  on  size  assortative  fighting  suggest  some  assessment 
of  the  opponent  occurs  before  an  individual  decides  to  engage  in  an  interaction.  It  is 
possible  that  assessment  of  opponents  may  occur  during  one  phase  of  an  escalated 
fight,  while  individual  thresholds  are  important  in  another.  To  investigate  different 
assessment  mechanisms  during  different  phases,  data  on  the  duration  of  the  different 
phases  of  the  fight  (e.  g  the  push  and  grapple  phases  in  fiddler  crab  fights)  would  be 
needed. 
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Different  models  may  be  applicable  to  fighting  behaviour  in  different  species.  In 
sand  fiddler  crabs,  Uca  pugilator,  relative  size  is  a  better  predictor  of  contest 
duration  than  loser  size,  providing  support  for  the  sequential  assessment  game  (Pratt 
et  al.  2003).  In  fights  for  shells  in  the  hermit  crab,  Pagurus  bernhardus,  stamina  and 
fatigue  levels  determine  the  duration  and  outcome  of  contests,  supporting  the 
energetic  war  of  attrition  and  the  cumulative  assessment  games  (Briffa  et  al.  1998; 
Briffa  &  Elwood  2000).  Finally,  factors  not  considered  in  the  original  models  may 
also  influence  fighting  behaviour  (Pratt  et  al.  2003),  such  as  the  risk  of  predation 
(Brick  1999). 
Together  with  recent  studies  concluding  that  the  duration  of  fights  is  determined  by 
individual  thresholds  (Bridge  et  al.  2000;  Taylor  et  al.  2001),  our  result  supports  the 
request  for  reanalysis  of  much  fighting  data  to  take  the  possibility  of  individual 
thresholds  into  account  (Gammell  &  Hardy  2003).  The  results  of  the  current  and 
other  studies  suggest  that  different  models  may  be  appropriate  to  different  species 
and  situations,  but  the  differences  between  the  models  need  to  be  tested,  and  further 
analysis  of  the  structure  of  contests  may  be  needed  in  addition  to  studies  of  duration. 
This  is  especially  true  in  cases  where  previous  investigation  has  shown  only  some 
support  for  the  model  being  tested.  Alternative  models  need  to  be  considered  where 
the  predictions  of  only  one  model  have  been  tested,  as  data  may  have  been 
incorrectly  interpreted  (Gammell  &  Hardy  2003). 
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CHAPTER  3 
WHY  ARE  SMALL  MALES  AGGRESSIVE? 
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Abstract 
Aggression  is  ubiquitous  in  the  animal  kingdom,  whenever  the  interests  of 
individuals  conflict.  In  contests  between  animals,  the  larger  opponent  is  often 
victorious.  However,  counter-intuitively,  an  individual  that  has  little  chance  of 
winning  (generally  smaller  individuals)  sometimes  initiates  contests.  A  number  of 
hypotheses  have  been  put  forward  to  explain  this  behaviour,  including  the  `desperado 
effect'  according  to  which  the  likely  losers  initiate  aggression  due  to  lack  of 
alternative  options.  An  alternative  explanation  suggested  recently  is  that  likely  losers 
attack  due  to  an  error  in  perception:  they  mistakenly  perceive  their  chances  of 
winning  as  being  greater  than  they  are.  We  show  that  explaining  the  apparently 
maladaptive  aggression  initiated  by  the  likely  loser  can  be  explained  on  purely 
economic  grounds,  without  requiring  either  the  `desperado  effect'  or  perception 
errors.  Using  a  game-theoretical  model,  we  show  that  if  smaller  individuals  can 
accurately  assess  their  chance  of  winning,  if  this  chance  is  less  than,  but  close  to,  a 
half,  and  if  resources  are  scarce  (or  the  contested  resource  is  of  relatively  low  value), 
they  are  predicted  to  be  as  aggressive  as  their  larger  opponents.  In  addition,  when 
resources  are  abundant,  and  small  individuals  have  some  chance  of  winning,  they 
may  be  more  aggressive  than  their  larger  opponents,  as  it  may  benefit  larger 
individuals  to  avoid  the  costs  of  fighting  and  seek  alternative  uncontested  resources. 
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Introduction 
Aggression  is  ubiquitous  in  the  animal  kingdom,  occurring  whenever  the  interests  of 
individuals  conflict  (Huntingford  &  Turner  1987).  It  has  been  shown  that  differences 
in  resource  holding  potential  (RHP;  Parker  1974)  play  an  important  role  in 
determining  the  outcome  of  contests  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Maynard 
Smith  1982;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell 
1996  Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Alcock  &  Bailey  1997;  Chellappa  et  al.  1999). 
Individuals  may  assess  their  RHP  relative  to  that  of  their  opponent  before  making  a 
decision  as  to  how  to  proceed  in  a  contest,  and  low  RHP  individuals  may  avoid 
costly  competition  with  superior  rivals  by  assessing  their  relative  inferiority  and 
retreating  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Parker  &  Rubenstein  1981;  Enquist  & 
Leimar  1983).  Larger  individuals  are  likely  to  win  an  escalated  contest  whereas 
smaller  ones  are  unlikely  to  obtain  the  disputed  resource  in  such  a  contest,  and  often 
pay  a  cost  associated  with  fighting  (Parker  1974).  Although  there  are  many  examples 
of  larger  individuals  acting  aggressively  towards  smaller  ones  (e.  g.  Zack  1975;  Brace 
&  Pavey  1978;  Dowds  &  Elwood  1983;  Figler  &  Einhorn  1983;  Barlow  et  al.  1986; 
Turner  &  Huntingford  1986;  Lindström  1992;  Keeley  &  Grant  1993;  Thorpe  et  al. 
1994),  there  are  also  cases  where  aggression  is  predominantly  initiated  by  the  smaller 
competitors  (Dow  et  al.  1976;  Enquist  &  Jakobsson  1986;  Ribowski  &  Franck  1993; 
Smith  et  al.  1994;  Morris  et  al.  1995;  Moretz  2003).  As  one  would  expect  small 
individuals  to  be  the  likely  losers,  this  behaviour  may  seem  irrational  and  therefore 
the  evolution  of  such  a  `Napoleon  complex'  (Just  &  Morris  2003)  is intriguing. 
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There  are  several  possible  explanations  for  why  small  individuals  may  initiate  fights 
or  act  aggressively  towards  larger  individuals.  Firstly,  small  individuals  may 
perceive  themselves  as  being  of  higher  RHP  or  larger  size  than  their  opponent  and 
initiate  escalation  by  mistake  (Bradbury  &  Vehrencamp  1998),  or  they  may  not  be 
able  to  assess  relative  size  prior  to  an  interaction  if  such  information  is  only  obtained 
through  display  (Smith  et  al.  1994).  Secondly,  small  individuals  may  value  the 
resource  item  more  highly  than  larger  individuals,  that  is,  there  is  a  resource  value 
asymmetry  between  the  contestants,  known  to  influence  the  outcome  of  fights  (e.  g. 
Davies  &  Houston  1981;  Shutler  &  Weatherhead  1992;  Eason  &  Hannon  1994; 
Johnsson  et  al.  2000;  Johnsson  &  Forser  2002).  For  instance,  in  pumpkinseed  sunfish 
Lepomis  gibbosus  when  probable  losers  were  provided  with  more  food  (increasing 
the  expected  value  of  the  resource),  they  became  more  likely  to  attack  (Dugatkin  & 
Olsen  1990).  Thirdly,  small  individuals  may  attack  because  this  increases  the 
probability  that  they  win  the  fight.  Conflict  outcome  in  favour  of  the  initiator  has 
been  observed  in  a  number  of  species  (Jackson  1991;  Figler  et  al.  1995;  Hack  1997; 
Martin  et  al.  1997;  Taylor  et  al.  2001;  Roeder  et  al.  2002).  Finally,  small  individuals 
may  attack  because  they  have  few  alternative  opportunities  to  obtain  resources  (the 
`desperado  effect';  Grafen  1987).  Grafen  (1987)  pointed  out  that  any  convention  that 
leaves  a  group  of  individuals  unable  to  gain  access  to  a  resource  cannot  be 
evolutionarily  stable,  since  members  of  the  excluded  group  have  nothing  to  lose  by 
ignoring  the  convention.  Thus,  if  smaller  individuals  were  to  always  retreat  from  a 
resource  when  they  found  it  contested  by  a  larger  individual,  they  would  never  be 
able  to  obtain  such  resources,  and  so  aggression  by  small  individuals  might  be 
predicted. 
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Most  theoretical  models  of  animal  contests,  such  as  the  sequential  assessment  game 
(Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984),  do  not  predict  which  individual 
should  initiate  an  escalated  contest:  escalation  is  assumed  to  occur  simultaneously. 
Hurd  and  Enquist  (1998)  predicted  that  weaker  individuals  should  attack  larger 
opponents  when  they  have  few  alternative  options,  and  they  are  unaware  of  their 
opponent's  strength.  Otherwise,  weaker  individuals  are  predicted  to  retreat,  leaving 
the  stronger  to  claim  the  resource.  However,  Hurd  and  Enquist  (1998)  assumed  that 
the  stronger  individual  would  always  be  victorious  in  a  contest.  Mesterton-Gibbons 
(1994)  investigated  the  effect  of  variation  in  RHP  on  aggression,  and  found  that 
under  certain  limited  conditions,  a  low  RHP  individual  could  be  expected  to  become 
involved  in  an  escalated  contest  with  a  higher  RHP  opponent,  but  only  when  the 
difference  in  RHP  was  small.  Hurd  and  Enquist  (1998)  and  Mesterton-Gibbons 
(1994)  predict  equal  levels  of  aggression  from  low  and  high  RHP  individuals  despite 
asymmetries  in  RHP,  but  do  not  predict  that  low  RHP  individuals  should  be  more 
aggressive  than  their  opponents  of  higher  RHP. 
Although  body  size  has  been  found  to  be  a  good  surrogate  measure  of  RHP  (e.  g. 
Morris  et  al.  1995;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996),  the  larger  individual  may not  always 
be  successful  in  a  contest.  In  some  cases,  smaller  individuals  may  win,  as  other 
factors  may  contribute  to  fighting  ability  (e.  g.  Marden  &  Waage  1990;  Alcock  & 
Bailey  1997;  Brick  1999;  Hofmann  &  Schildberger  2001).  In  an  investigation  of 
ownership  priority  as  a  convention  for  settling  disputes  (bourgeois  behaviour)  in  the 
hawk-dove  game,  Eshel  and  Sansone  (2001)  found  that  ownership  priority  is 
replaced  by  strength  priority  (i.  e.  weak  individuals  give  way  to  stronger  ones)  when 
the  availability  of  territories  and  the  costs  of  fighting  decreases.  However,  when 
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resources  are  scarce  and  non-owners  suffer  from  a  high  death  rate,  smaller 
individuals  are  predicted  to  attack  opponents  that  are  not  much  larger  than 
themselves.  Where  one  individual  is  already  resident  at  a  resource,  stronger 
individuals  are  likely  to  accumulate  as  owners  (since  they  have  a  higher  probability 
of  winning  a  contest),  leaving  the  weaker  individuals  as  floaters.  Both  respect  for 
ownership  and  respect  for  strength  would  leave  these  individuals  in  a  desperado 
position  (Grafen  1987). 
Investigating  the  question  of  why  small  males  initiate  escalation  in  fights  in  the 
absence  of  resource  value  or  ownership  asymmetries,  Just  and  Morris  (2003) 
developed  a  model  where  individuals  estimate  their  probability  of  winning  a  fight, 
based  on  the  difference  in  RHP  between  them.  They  found  that  if  there  is  error  in  this 
estimation,  then  likely  losers  may  perceive  themselves  to  be  likely  winners,  and 
initiate  escalation,  while  likely  winners  may  not  always  attack  first.  But  is  it 
necessary  to  invoke  perception  errors  as  an  explanation  for  aggression  directed  from 
small  to  large  individuals,  or  is  limited  resource  availability  (Grafen  1987)  enough  to 
cause  small  individuals  to  initiate  fights  that  they  are  likely  to  lose?  We  investigate 
the  aggressive  behaviour  of  individuals  differing  in  RHP  when  there  is  no 
complicating  residency  asymmetry  (for  example,  contests  over  food  resources  rather 
than  territories),  and  ask  whether  aggression  should  be  initiated  by  the  small  or  large 
contestant,  when  both  competitors  are  aware  of  their  own  and  their  opponent's 
fighting  ability,  but  when  body  size  (or  RHP)  does  not  perfectly  determine  fighting 
outcome. 
53 Why  are  small  males  aggressive?  Chapter  3 
Model 
Two  individuals  that  differ  in  size  compete  for  access  to  a  resource.  Each  individual 
can  choose  one  of  three  behavioural  options:  it  can  attack  the  other  (A),  display  while 
waiting  for  its  opponent  to  attack,  and  then  retaliate  (if),  or  retreat  from  the  conflict 
(R).  Throughout,  capital  letters  (A,  W,  R)  refer  to  the  behavioural  choice  of  the  larger 
individual  and  lower-case  letters  (a,  w,  r)  to  the  behavioural  choice  of  the  smaller 
individual.  In  a  bimatrix  game,  where  the  payoffs  to  the  opponents  differ  due  to 
differences  in  their  RHP,  and  both  competitors  are  aware  of  their  own  and  their 
opponent's  RHP,  mixed  strategies  cannot  be  evolutionarily  stable  (Selten  1980; 
Crowley  2000),  and  thus  we  restrict  our  analysis  to  pure  strategies. 
The  smaller  individual  has  a  probabilityp  of  winning  a  contest  where  both 
individuals  choose  the  same  behavioural  option  (i.  e.  both  decide  to  attack  or  wait). 
We  assume  that  the  first  to  initiate  aggression  gains  an  advantage  in  the  fight  (e.  g. 
Figler  et  al.  1995).  Where  the  smaller  individual  chooses  to  attack,  and  the  larger 
individual  chooses  to  wait,  the  probability  of  the  smaller  individual  winning 
increases  by  a.  Likewise,  when  the  smaller  individual  chooses  to  wait,  and  the  larger 
individual  chooses  to  attack,  the  probability  that  the  smaller  individual  wins  the  fight 
decreases  by  a.  The  parameters  of  the  model  can  be  found  in  table  3.1. 
The  individuals  contest  a  resource  of  value  V.  If  one  individual  chooses  to  attack,  and 
the  other  to  display,  the  displaying  individual  will  retaliate,  and  a  fight  will  occur.  A 
fight  also  occurs  if  both  individuals  choose  to  attack.  In  either  case,  both  individuals 
pay  a  cost  cf.  If  both  choose  to  wait/display,  they  pay  a  cost  cd.  The  cost  of  displaying 
(cd)  is  lower  than  that  of  fighting  (cf).  If  one  individual  chooses  to  attack  while  the 
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other  chooses  to  retreat  (i.  e.  the  smaller  individual  chooses  a  and  the  larger 
individual  chooses  R,  or  the  smaller  individual  chooses  r  and  the  larger  individual 
chooses  A),  the  retreating  individual  pays  a  cost  83,  and  the  attacking  individual  pays 
a  cost  y.  Both  costs  ý8  and  yare  less  than  the  cost  paid  if  a  fight  occurs  (cf).  If  one 
individual  retreats,  the  other  gains  full  access  to  the  resource,  and  can  claim  the 
benefits  V.  If  one  or  both  individuals  retreat,  they  have  a  probability  F  (F<1)  of 
finding  an  uncontested  resource.  This  effectively  reduces  the  value  of  the  contested 
resource:  the  relative  resource  value  is  defined  as  V-FV. 
Table  3.1:  Parameters  and  variables 
Parameter  Description 
A  (a)  Strategy  of  high  (low)  RHP  individual  is  to  attack 
R  (r)  Strategy  of  high  (low)  RHP  individual  is  to  retreat 
W  (w)  Strategy  of  high  (low)  RHP  individual  is  to  display 
p  Probability  that  the  smaller  individual  wins  a  contest 
a  Increase  in  winning  probability  for  the  first  to  attack 
cf  Cost  of  fighting  (for  either  contestant) 
Cd  Cost  of  displaying 
V  Value  of  a  resource  item 
F  Probability  of  finding  an  uncontested  resource 
ß  Cost  of  being  attacked  while  retreating 
7  Cost  of  attacking  a  fleeing  opponent 
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Table  3.2  outlines  the  payoff  matrix  for  the  contest  for  the  smaller  (3.2a)  and  larger 
(3.2b)  individuals,  for  each  potential  combination  of  behavioural  options.  The  fitness 
of  an  individual  is  calculated  from  the  total  payoff  it  receives,  which  depends  on  the 
behavioural  choice  of  that  individual,  and  the  behavioural  choice  of  the  opponent. 
For  example,  if  both  individuals  choose  to  attack  (a  and  A),  the  payoff  to  the  smaller 
individual  is  pV-cf,  and  the  payoff  to  the  larger  individual  is  (1-p)  V-cj. 
Table  3.2:  Payoffs  to  (a)  the  smaller  individual  and  (b)  the  larger  individual  in  an 
interaction,  dependent  on  their  respective  behaviours. 
Strategy  choice  of  the  larger  individual 
AWR 
(a)  Strategy  a  pV-cf  (p+a)V-cf  V-y 
choice  of  the 
w  (p-a)V-cf  pV-cd  V 
smaller 
individual  r  FV-  ß  FV  FV 
(b)  Strategy  a  (1  p)V-cf  [1-(p+a)]V-cf  FV-  ß 
choice  of  the 
w  []-(p-a)]  V-cf  (I  -P)  V-  Cd  FV 
smaller 
individual  r  V-y  V  FV 
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We  derive  the  best  replies  to  the  strategy  of  the  opponent  in  the  following  way,  and 
summarise  these  in  table  3.3:  If  the  larger  individual  chooses  to  attack  (A),  the  small 
individual  should  reply  by  attacking  (a)  if  the  payoff  from  doing  so  is  greater  than 
the  payoff  from  either  displaying  (w)  or  retreating  (r).  Thus,  a  is  a  best  response  to  A 
if: 
pV-cf>(p-a)V-cf  (1) 
and 
pV-cf>FV-ß  (2) 
Inequality  (1)  is  satisfied  whenever  a>0,  that  is,  whenever  there  is  an  advantage  to 
initiating  aggression,  which  is  assumed  to  be  true,  and  inequality  (2)  is  satisfied 
when: 
F<p-cf  -,  6 
V 
(3) 
Displaying  (w)  is  the  best  response  to  A  when  it  pays  more  than  a  or  r,  which  occurs 
when  inequality  (1)  is  not  satisfied,  and  when: 
(p-a)V  -cf  >FV-,  g  (4) 
which  is  satisfied  when: 
F<(p-a)-Cf  -P  (5) 
As  a  is  always  positive,  inequality  (1)  is  always  satisfied,  and  thus  w  is  never  a  best 
response  to  A.  Retreating  (r)  is  the  best  response  to  A  when  it  pays  more  than  a  or  w, 
which  occurs  when  inequalities  (3)  and  (5)  are  both  not  satisfied.  By  observation,  this 
only  requires  that  inequality  (3)  is  not  satisfied.  The  conditions  for  the  best  responses 
to  A,  W,  R,  a,  w  and  r  are  summarised  in  table  3.3. 
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Table  3.3:  Conditions  and  responses  to  all  opponent  strategies. 
Opponent  Response  Conditions 
strategy 
A  a  cf-fl  F<  p-  (3) 
w  Never 
r  cf  -P  F>p-  (6) 
W  a 
a>cf 
-  cd  (7)andF<p+a-y  (8) 
W 
a<c1 
Cd  (9)  and  F<p-V  (10) 
r 
F>  p+a- 
y  (11)  andF>  p- 
V  (12) 
R  a  Never 
w  Always,  as  y>  0  and  F<1 
r  Never 
a  A  cf  ý 
F<(1-p)-  (13) 
V 
W  Never 
R  cf  ý 
F>(1-p)-  (14) 
V 
w  A  c  -c  c  d  (7)andF<1-(p-a)-  (15)  a>  f 
V 
W 
a< 
cf  -cd  (9)  andF  <(1-p)-  (16) 
R 
F>1-(p-a)- 
y  (17)  andF>  (1-p)-  V  (18) 
r  A  Never 
W  Always,  as  y>  0  and  F<1 
R  Never 
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We  can  now  proceed  to  specify  which  combinations  of  pure  strategies  are  candidate 
ESSs,  and  the  conditions  under  which  these  can  occur. 
1.  Both  attack  (A-a) 
Both  individuals  should  attack  when  inequalities  (3)  and  (13)  are  satisfied;  by 
observation,  satisfying  equation  (3)  guarantees  satisfaction  of  (13). 
2.  Both  display  (W-w) 
Both  individuals  should  choose  to  display  if  inequalities  (9),  (10)  and  (16)  are 
satisfied. 
3.  Both  Retreat  (R-r) 
Both  individuals  retreating  can  never  be  an  ESS,  since  retreating  is  never  the  best 
response  to  a  retreating  opponent. 
4.  Attack-display  (A-w)  and  Display-attack  (W-a) 
Attack-display  and  Display-attack  can  never  be  ESSs  because  waiting  is  never  the 
best  response  to  an  attacking  opponent,  because  the  payoff  from  attacking  an 
attacking  opponent  is  always  greater  than  the  payoff  from  displaying  to  an  attacking 
opponent  (tables  3.2  and  3.3).. 
5.  Retreat-attack  (R-a)  and  Attack-retreat  (A-r) 
Retreat-attack  and  Attack-retreat  can  never  be  ESSs,  since  the  cost  of  attacking  a 
retreating  opponent  means  that  it  is  always  better  to  display  to  it. 
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6.  Retreat-display  (R-w) 
The  larger  individual  should  choose  to  retreat  (R)  and  the  smaller  individual  should 
display  (w)  when  inequalities  (17)  and  (18)  are  satisfied. 
7.  Display-retreat  (W-r) 
The  smaller  individual  should  choose  to  retreat  (r)  and  the  larger  individual  should 
display  (W)  when  inequalities  (11)  and  (12)  are  satisfied. 
It  is  clear  by  inspection  that  W-w  cannot  coexist  with  W-r  or  R-w.  It  is  also  clear  that 
W-w  and  A-a  can  coexist  as  ESSs,  when  the  conditions  for  both  are  met.  A-a  can 
coexist  with  W-r  when:  p- 
cjV  0>p+a-L, 
which  occurs  when  aV<,  ß  (when  the 
additional  benefits  gained  by  attacking  first  are  less  than  the  costs  associated  with 
being  attacked  while  retreating),  and  the  conditions  necessary  for  both  are  satisfied. 
A-a  can  also  coexist  with  R-w  when  equations  (17),  (18),  and  (3)  are  all  satisfied.  R- 
w  and  W-r  can  coexist  as  ESSs  when  all  the  conditions  for  their  occurrence  are  met 
(equations  11,12,17  and  18).  By  inspection,  given  that  p<0.5,  the  value  of  F  needed 
to  satisfy  equation  (18)  is  greater  than  the  value  needed  to  satisfy  equation  (12). 
Thus,  W-r  and  R-w  will  coexist  when  the  conditions  for  R-w  are  satisfied,  but  W-r 
will  also  exist  in  parameter  space  where  R-w  does  not. 
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Results 
A  `Napoleon  ESS',  where  the  model  predicts  that  the  smaller  individual  is  more 
aggressive  than  the  larger  one,  occurs  where  the  smaller  individual  displays  and  the 
larger  individual  retreats  (R-w),  illustrating  greater  aggression  by  the  smaller 
individual.  This  occurs  when  the  probability  of  finding  an  uncontested  resource  is 
high  (larger  values  of  F)  and  the  probability  that  the  smaller  individual  wins  is  low 
(small  p),  and  always  coexists  with  an  alternative  ESS,  where  the  larger  individual 
displays  and  the  smaller  individual  retreats  (figure  3.1).  This  ESS  is  not  particularly 
sensitive  to  the  costs  of  fighting  (cf  figure  3.2).  The  alternative  ESS  (W-r)  also  exists 
over  a  much  wider  range  of  the  parameter  space  (figures  3.1  and  3.2),  and  is  the 
predominant  solution  to  the  game  when  RHP  accurately  determines  the  outcome  of 
fights  (p  =  0). 
The  model  predicts  equal  levels  of  aggression  by  both  individuals  (A-a)  when  the 
probability  that  the  smaller  individual  wins  is  high  (values  ofp  approaching  0.5)  and 
the  contested  resource  is  of  relatively  low  value  (low  V-FV,  high  values  of  F;  figure 
3.1).  This  also  occurs  when  the  costs  associated  with  fighting  are  low  (low  c,  figure 
3.2).  This  ESS  can  coexist  with  an  ESS  where  both  individuals  choose  to  display 
while  waiting  for  their  opponent  to  attack  (figure  3.1  a).  If,  however,  a> 
Cf 
V 
cd 
that  is,  the  advantage  gained  by  initiating  aggression  exceeds  the  relative  difference 
in  the  costs  of  the  two  fight  types  (fighting  and  displaying),  the  W-w  ESS  does  not 
coexist  with  A-a  (figure  3.1b).  In  this  case,  an  area  of  parameter  space  exists  where 
there  is  no  ESS,  when  ß<aV  (when  the  cost  of  being  attacked  while  retreating  is  less 
that  the  possible  gains  from  attacking  first). 
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Figure  3.1:  Effect  of  increasing  the  probability  that  the  smaller  individual  wins  the 
fight  (p),  and  relative  value  of  the  contested  resource  (V-FIS)  on  the  ESS  solutions  of 
the  game.  Parameter  values  used  a)  a=0.1,  cr0.3,  cd-=0.1,  ß0.05,  V=1,  b)  cr=0.1, 
cp0.1,  cd=0.1,,  &--0.05,  V=1. 
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Figure  3.2:  Effect  of  increasing  the  cost  of  fighting  (cf)  and  the  relative  value  of  the 
contested  resource  (V-FIS)  on  the  ESS  solutions  of  the  game.  Parameter  values  used: 
a=0.1,  p=0.3,  cd=0.1,  X0.05,  V=1 
To  investigate  the  behaviour  of  the  individuals  within  the  area  of  parameter  space 
where  there  is  no  ESS,  we  performed  simulations  of  the  responses  of  one  larger  and 
one  smaller  individual  to  the  behaviour  of  their  opponent.  We  began  by  randomly 
selecting  a  strategy  for  each  individual  (A,  W  or  R  for  the  larger  individual,  a,  w  or  r 
for  the  smaller  individual).  In  each  time  step,  each  individual  is  free  to  respond 
optimally  to  the  behaviour  of  the  other,  and  we  calculate  the  payoff  each  individual 
could  gain  from  each  response  using  the  payoff  matrices  in  table  3.2.  For  example,  if 
the  larger  individual  first  chooses  to  attack,  the  potential  payoffs  to  the  smaller 
individual  are  found  in  the  first  column  of  table  3.2a.  Each  individual  selects  the 
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behaviour  giving  the  highest  payoff  to  use  in  the  next  time  step.  We  assume  that  the 
individuals  respond  simultaneously  to  their  opponent's  behaviour  in  the  previous 
time  step,  for  t  time  steps.  Preliminary  simulations  covering  all  the  parameter  space 
showed  that  where  the  analytical  model  predicted  ESSs,  they  were  reached  quickly. 
Running  the  model  for  extended  populations  had  no  effect  on  the  ESSs  emerging 
from  the  simulation. 
In  the  area  of  parameter  space  where  no  ESS  was  predicted,  a  pattern  of  cycling 
between  strategies  by  each  individual  occurred,  illustrated  in  figure  3.3.  If  we  begin 
by  assuming  that  both  individuals  attack  (A-a,  marked  by  a  circle  in  figure  3.3),  the 
best  response  of  the  smaller  individual  is  to  retreat,  to  which  the  best  response  of  the 
larger  individual  is  to  attack.  In  the  next  step,  the  strategy  set  is  therefore  A-r.  The 
best  response  of  a  larger  individual  to  a  retreating  opponent  is  to  wait/display,  and 
the  best  response  of  the  low-RHP  individual  to  an  attacking  opponent  is  to  retreat, 
thus,  the  strategy  set  in  the  next  step  is  W-r.  Given  the  parameter  values,  the  best 
response  of  the  larger  individual  is  to  continue  waiting,  and  the  best  response  of  the 
smaller  individual  is  to  attack  (W-a).  The  cycle  is  completed  as  the  best  response  to 
this  is  for  both  individuals  to  attack  (A-a). 
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Figure  3.3:  Patterns  of  cycling  between  strategies  in  the  area  of  parameter  space 
where  there  is  no  ESS.  Solid  line:  choice  of  larger  individual,  dashed  line:  choice  of 
smaller  individual.  Parameter  values  used:  p=0.3,  F=0.25,  cr0.1,  cr0.1,  cd=0.1, 
,  ß=0.05,  V=1.  Circle  marks  the  start  of  the  cycling  pattern  described  in  the  text,  after 
the  cycling  has  stabilised  from  random  starting  strategies  for  both  individuals 
Discussion 
Both  attacking  (A,  a)  and  displaying  (W,  w)  can  be  considered  to  be  aggressive 
behaviours.  Displaying  represents  a  low  level  of  aggression,  and  attacking  a  high 
level,  as  it  results  in  an  escalated  fight.  Only  retreating  is  considered  to  be  a  non- 
aggressive  strategy  in  the  current  model.  Thus,  smaller  individuals  can  be  said  to  be 
aggressive  when  they  select  an  attack  (a)  or  display  (w)  strategy.  Our  model  predicts 
a  Napoleon  ESS,  where  the  Napoleon  strategy  is  defined  as  meaning  that  smaller 
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individuals  are  more  aggressive  than  their  larger  opponents,  when  smaller  individuals 
display  and  larger  ones  retreat.  This  occurs  when  the  smaller  individual  has  some 
chance  of  winning  a  contest  (values  of  p  approaching  0.5),  and  resources  are 
abundant  and  of  relatively  low  value  (large  values  of  F,  resulting  in  low  values  for  V- 
Fig).  Thus,  when  resources  are  freely  available,  and  contests  are  not  always  resolved 
in  the  favour  of  the  larger  individual,  it  can  benefit  the  larger  individual  to  retreat.  A 
possible  example  of  this  behaviour  may  occur  in  natural  populations  of  snow 
buntings  (Plectrophenax  nivalis)  where  older  males  retreat  in  response  to  aggression 
over  food  resources  from  younger  males  (Smith  &  Metcalfe  1997).  The  Napoleon 
ESS  coexists  with  an  alternative,  `common-sense',  ESS,  where  smaller  individuals 
retreat  when  challenged  by  a  larger  individual.  When  there  are  few  alternative 
options,  and  the  smaller  individual  has  little  chance  of  winning,  this  common-sense 
solution  becomes  the  only  ESS. 
Smaller  individuals  attack  if  resources  are  scarce  and  consequently  each  is  of  high 
relative  value  (low  values  of  F),  they  have  a  reasonable  chance  of  winning  the  fight 
(p  approaching  0.5),  and  the  costs  of  fighting  are  low  (low  cf).  Thus,  aggression  can 
be  expected  from  smaller  individuals  when  they  have  few  alternative  options,  and 
when  RHP  (or  body  size)  is  not  a  perfect  determinant  of  fight  outcome.  This  reflects 
the  findings  of  previous  models,  where  aggression  was  favoured  when  individuals 
have  similar  RHP  (Mesterton-Gibbons  1994),  and  when  individuals  gain  more  by 
fighting  than  they  would  by  giving  up  (Hurd  and  Enquist  1998).  Similarly,  Eshel  and 
Sansone  (2001)  predicted  that  high  levels  of  aggression  could  occur  in  smaller 
individuals,  particularly  towards  those  not  much  larger  than  themselves  (i.  e.  where 
they  have  some  chance  of  winning  in  a  fight),  when  resources  are  scarce. 
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In  our  model,  high  intensity  aggression  is  favoured  when  resources  are  scarce  and 
valuable,  and  fights  incur  low  costs  relative  to  the  value  of  the  resource.  These  cases 
have  both  been  noted  previously.  In  the  hawk-dove  game  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price 
1973;  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Parker  &  Knowlton  1980),  low  fight  costs  are 
more  likely  to  promote  aggression,  and  the  desperado  effect  (Grafen  1987)  predicts 
the  undermining  of  conventional  settlement  of  disputes  when  resources  are  scarce 
and  one  class  of  individuals  is  left  with  few  or  no  alternative  options.  Our  model 
suggests  that  under  the  conditions  that  favour  aggression  (i.  e.  low  fighting  costs  and 
scarce,  high  value  resources),  smaller  individuals  are  predicted  to  attack  even  when 
they  can  accurately  assess  their  chances  of  winning  in  a  fight,  so  long  as  body  size  is 
not  a  completely  accurate  predictor  of  fight  outcome.  Smaller  individuals  do  not  need 
to  consider  themselves  to  be  likely  to  win  in  order  to  act  aggressively,  as  proposed  by 
Just  and  Morris  (2003).  Such  an  outcome  has  been  observed,  for  instance,  in  the 
cichlid  fish  Aequidens  rivulatus,  where  behavioural  signals  indicating  which 
individual  is  likely  to  win  appear  to  be  perceived  accurately,  and  yet  escalated 
fighting  is  still  observed  (Maan  et  al.  2001). 
We  found  no  situations  where  the  smaller  individual  chose  an  attacking  strategy  (a) 
and  the  larger  individual  chose  to  display  (ii.  This  occurs  because  the  non-attacking 
individual  can  always  improve  its  fitness  by  attacking  back  (see  methods),  as  we 
assume  that  a  fight  always  occurs  if  one  competitor  chooses  to  escalate.  We  assume 
that  the  costs  of  fighting  are  equal  for  both  competitors,  but  extending  the  model  to 
incorporate  asymmetries  in  the  costs  between  competitors  or  fight  outcomes  may 
provide  a  wider  range  of  potential  ESSs.  For  example,  smaller  individuals  may  pay 
higher  costs  of  fighting  (Maan  et  al.  2001),  or  losing  may  be  more  costly  than 
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winning  (Chellappa  &  Huntingford  1989;  Neat  et  al.  1998),  or  display  intensity  may 
be  an  honest  signal  of  RHP  and  thus  more  costly  to  a  high  RHP  individual  (Zahavi 
1975,1977).  Although  for  simplicity  we  assumed  that  costs  (cf,  cd,  ß  and  are 
identical  for  the  two  competitors,  our  results  are  not  critically  dependent  on  this 
assumption.  If  the  cost  of  fighting  for  either  individual  was  unilaterally  increased,  we 
would  expect  that  their,  but  not  their  opponent's,  enthusiasm  for  aggression  to 
decrease,  leading  to  a  greater  area  of  parameter  space  where  the  individuals  do  not 
behave  identically,  but  retaining  areas  of  aggression  by  both. 
We  assume  that  the  first  individual  to  attack  has  an  advantage,  described  by  a.  As 
this  is  additive,  we  implicitly  assume  that  the  mechanism  providing  this  advantage  is 
unrelated  to  RHP.  For  example,  the  advantage  may  be  due  to  the  element  of  surprise, 
and  the  use  that  can  be  made  of  that  surprise  (for  example,  landing  a  blow  on  an 
unsuspecting  opponent)  is  independent  of  the  qualities  that  govern  victory  in  more 
symmetric  contests  (i.  e.  is  independent  of  RHP,  and  equal  for  both  competitors). 
However,  there  may  be  other  biological  situations  where  the  advantage  is  more 
closely  related  to  RHP,  and  in  this  case  it  would  be  more  appropriate  to  assume  a 
multiplicative  rather  than  additive  increment.  The  consequence  for  the  model  would 
be  that  the  absolute  benefits  of  attacking  are  greater  for  the  larger  individual,  and  we 
would  therefore  expect  to  see  lower  levels  of  aggression  by  the  smaller  individual. 
We  would  not,  however,  see  a  complete  lack  of  aggression  by  smaller  individuals, 
particularly  when  resources  are  scarce  and  valuable. 
Studies  of  fighting  behaviour  tend  to  focus  only  on  the  interactions  that  have 
occurred,  and  do  not  report  cases  where  one  individual  has  retreated  without  a  fight 
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(e.  g.  Hu  &  Morse  2004).  This  makes  it  difficult  to  explain  why  escalated  fights 
occur.  However,  escalated  encounters  have  been  reported  when  individuals  are 
closely  size  matched  (e.  g.  Ribowski  &  Franck  1993,  Smith  et  al.  1994;  Morris  et  al. 
1995),  suggesting  that  the  smaller  individual  has  some  chance  of  winning  in  fights 
(high  p,  close  to  0.5).  Where  there  are  large  differences  in  body  size,  aggression 
often  does  not  occur,  and  the  smaller  individual  retreats  from  the  larger  (e.  g.  Smith  et 
al  1994),  presumably  because  it  assesses  its  chances  of  winning  as  being 
prohibitively  low  (small  values  ofp). 
As  escalated  fighting  is  observed  much  more  frequently  in  experimental  systems  than 
in  nature  (Tinbergen  1968),  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  empirical  observation  that 
smaller  individuals  can  be  aggressive  may  be  an  artefact  of  experimental  design.  In 
experiments  on  fighting,  individuals  are  often  placed  in  artificially  symmetrical 
situations,  for  example,  if  residency  is  confused  (Waage  1988),  and  both  contestants 
consider  themselves  to  own  the  resource.  Escalated  fighting  occurs  in  these 
conditions  many  times  more  frequently  than  when  only  one  of  the  individuals 
considers  itself  owner  (reviewed  in  Kemp  &  Wiklund  2001).  Individuals  are  also 
given  few  alternative  options  to  obtain  resources  other  than  fighting.  When  losers  of 
fights  between  A.  rivulatus  were  able  to  withdraw  from  an  experimental  arena, 
conflicts  were  of  shorter  duration,  and  escalated  fighting  was  absent,  compared  to 
when  no  alternative  options  were  present  (Maan  et  al.  2001),  suggesting  that  the 
desperado  effect  (Grafen  1987)  may  be  a  frequent  cause  of  aggression  in 
experimental  situations. 
In  general,  there  seems  to  be  little  evidence  for  desperado  behaviour  in  natural 
populations.  In  red-winged  blackbirds  (Agelaius  phoeniceus,  Shulter  and 
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Weatherhead  1992),  and  Anolis  aeneus  lizards  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1995),  the  costs 
of  fighting  to  take  over  a  territory  appear  to  be  higher  than  the  costs  of  waiting  for  a 
vacancy,  and  aggressive  territorial  take-overs  rarely  occur.  Additionally,  naturally 
occurring  fights,  where  individuals  are  free  to  choose  opponents,  tend  to  be  size 
assortative:  individuals  avoid  contests  with  opponents  who  differ  greatly  in  size 
(Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Pratt  et  al.  2003),  but  retreating  from  an  opponent 
occurs  relatively  rarely  in  experiments  (Smith  et  al  1994;  Hu  &  Morse  2004).  The 
desperado  effect  therefore  needs  to  be  ruled  out  as  a  cause  of  aggression  in 
experimental  systems  before  the  evolution  of  aggressive  behaviour  can  be 
understood  (Maan  et  al.  2001). 
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CHAPTER  4 
ADAPTIVE  STRATEGIES  OF  TERRITORY  FORMATION 
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Abstract 
How  do  territorial  animals  gain  ownership  of  an  area?  Early  modelling  considered 
the  evolution  of  fighting  when  the  winner  can  claim  the  right  to  the  resource. 
Recently,  alternative  hypotheses  have  been  offered  where  repeated  interactions  lead 
to  division  of  space  through  `nagging'  instead  of  one  decisive  fight.  However,  these 
models  assume  that  animals  avoid  areas  in  which  they  have  taken  part  in  aggressive 
interactions,  but  do  not  consider  whether  avoidance  itself  is  adaptive.  We  aim  to 
bridge  this  gap  between  mechanistic  and  adaptive  explanations,  by  presenting  a  game 
theory  model  where  individuals  choose  whether  to  return  to  an  area  after  a  fight  with 
a  specific  outcome  (win,  loss,  draw).  We  show  that  avoidance  of  areas  where  fights 
have  occurred  can  be  adaptive,  but  only  if  the  benefits  of  access  to  the  area  are  low 
compared  to  the  costs  of  fighting.  Otherwise,  one  individual  (typically  the  winner) 
responds  by  returning  to  the  area,  and  the  other  (loser)  avoids  it.  In  such  cases,  space 
is  gained  by  winning  fights.  We  also  consider  the  role  of  conventions.  If  responses  to 
fights  were  purely  conventional,  paradoxical  strategies  where  losers  of  fights  gain 
ownership  would  be  equally  as  logical  as  common-sense  ones  where  winners  claim 
ownership.  Paradoxical  solutions  can  be  stable  but  only  when  there  is  little  difference 
in  fighting  ability  between  the  competitors,  when  individuals  adhere  very  strictly  to  a 
behavioural  rule  without  much  random  variation,  and  when  the  population  in  its 
ancient  state  used  a  paradoxical  strategy. 
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Introduction 
In  territorial  animals,  ownership  of  a  territory  is  usually  a  prerequisite  to  breeding, 
indicating  strong  selection  pressure  to  win  such  resources.  How  contests  over 
resources  are  resolved  was  the  first  question  that  brought  game  theory  to  the  attention 
of  biologists  (Maynard  Smith  1982).  Early  modelling  concentrated  on  `hawk-dove' 
games  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973;  Grafen  1979),  which  assume  that  only  one  of 
the  contestants  can  win  the  resource.  Such  games  often  include  an  asymmetry 
between  owners,  who  have  been  resident  before,  and  intruders,  who  have  not.  These 
models  have  been  modified  to  include,  for  example,  size  differences  (Crowley  2000) 
or  repeated  interactions  (Houston  &  McNamara  1991).  However,  existing  game 
theory  models  of  conflict  focus  on  winner-takes-all  fights  for  indivisible  space. 
Other  models  of  territorial  settlement  look  at  the  sequential  arrival  of  individuals, 
such  as  birds  at  a  nesting  area  or  males  at  a  lek.  These  models  focus  on  an 
individual's  timing  of  arrival  (Kokko  1999)  or  whether  it  should  contest  an  occupied 
site  or  settle  in  a  vacant  patch  (Broom  et  al.  1997),  rather  than  looking  at 
simultaneous  arrival  and  exploration  of  vacant  space.  However,  both  these  types  of 
model  are  inappropriate  for  modelling  territorial  settlement  if  aggressive  interactions 
lead  to  the  sharing  of  space  between  competitors  settling  in  the  same  area  (e.  g. 
juvenile  Anolis  aeneus  lizards,  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1995,1998).  In  this  case,  social 
interactions  during  territory  establishment  may  resemble  bargaining  and  negotiation, 
in  that  both  contestants  would  benefit  from  sharing  a  divisible  resource  rather  than 
risking  escalated  contests  (Maynard  Smith  1982). 
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Consequently,  an  alternative  approach  to  modelling  territory  acquisition  is  advocated 
by  Stamps  and  Krishnan  (1999,2001).  Based  on  observations  of  territorial  settlement 
in  the  lizards  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1997),  they  model  a  situation  in  which  no  single 
interaction  determines  the  winning  of  an  entire  indivisible  territory.  Instead, 
individuals  move  through  a  large,  suitable,  divisible  area  and  increase  the  use  of  sites 
that  appear  attractive  to  them.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  these  models,  all  sites 
within  the  habitat  are  of  equal  intrinsic  quality;  thus,  the  attractiveness  of  an  area 
relates  solely  to  the  experiences  an  individual  has  within  it.  Fights  involve 
punishment  that  reduces  the  attractiveness  of  an  area  for  both  individuals,  while 
entering  an  area  uncontested  increases  its  attractiveness.  Thus,  through  a  tendency  to 
avoid  areas  in  which  they  have  taken  part  in  aggressive  interactions,  regardless  of  the 
outcome,  and  only  returning  to  areas  where  positive  experiences  (increasing 
familiarity)  outweigh  negative  ones  (fights),  animals  can  gain  exclusive  use  of  space 
(Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999).  In  these  models,  the  gaining  of  territorial  areas  occurs 
through  frequent  `nagging'  instead  of  one  decisive  fight. 
Stamps  and  Krishnan's  (1999,2001)  models  reproduce  several  features  of  territorial 
systems  (Sih  &  Mateo  2001),  and  thus  are  a  clear  step  forward  in  developing  more 
realistic  models  of  territory  acquisition.  However,  they  differ  in  one  crucial  respect 
from  game  theory  models:  they  do  not  evaluate  the  adaptiveness  of  the  behaviour  on 
which  they  are  based.  In  particular,  one  should  investigate  whether  animals  benefit 
from  a  tendency  to  avoid  areas  where  they  have  previously  encountered  a  competitor 
regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the  encounter,  as  it  is  assumed  in  Stamps  and  Krishnan 
(1999,2001). 
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Here  we  develop  a  new  model  that  addresses  these  issues,  with  particular  reference 
to  two  questions.  Firstly,  we  investigate  whether  avoidance  behaviour  is  adaptive.  In 
other  words,  if  individuals  are  given  the  choice  of  not  returning  to  an  area,  or 
returning  less  frequently,  should  they  do  so  (Stamps  1994;  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999, 
2001),  or  attempt  to  gain  space  by  winning  fights,  as  dyadic  models  of  territorial 
contests  generally  suggest  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976)?  Secondly,  we  ask  why 
respect  for  ownership  can  become  established  in  territorial  systems.  Early  game 
theory  models  (e.  g.  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Maynard  Smith  1982)  suggest 
that  `paradoxical'  solutions  to  animal  conflict  -  where,  for  example,  owners,  or 
individuals  of  high  resource  holding  potential  (RHP)  simply  retreat  when  challenged 
-  can  theoretically  be  as  reasonable  as  the  common-sense  solutions,  in  which  high 
RHP  individuals  or  owners  are  more  willing  to  fight  than  intruders.  A  paradoxical 
evolutionary  stable  strategy  (ESS)  is  thus  an  evolved  behavioural  convention 
dictating  that  an  individual  of  lower  RHP,  or  less  to  gain  from  winning  a  contest 
(depending  on  the  asymmetry  under  consideration),  obtains  access  to  a  disputed 
resource  at  the  expense  of  a  more  able  or  motivated  contender  (Maynard  Smith  & 
Parker  1976;  Field  &  Hardy  2000;  Kemp  2000). 
Later  work  has  extended  the  basic  games,  limiting  the  conditions  under  which 
paradoxical  solutions  can  evolve  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1987;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992; 
Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  1998),  yet  in  the  majority  of  conflict  games, 
paradoxical  solutions  remain  a  feature  (Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982;  Parker  1984; 
Enquist  &  Leimar  1987;  Field  &  Hardy  2000).  For  example,  Mesterton-Gibbons 
(1992)  analysed  owner-intruder  games,  and  found  parameter  regions  where  a 
common-sense  `bourgeois'  (aggressive  owners)  strategy  prevailed.  This,  however, 
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required  an  a  priori  assumption  that  owners  are  more  likely  to  win  fights;  otherwise, 
the  paradoxical  `anti-bourgeois'  strategy  became  more  likely. 
Here,  we  consider  a  particular  case  of  paradoxical  versus  common-sense  strategies, 
one  of  crucial  importance  during  initial  settlement  of  previously  unoccupied  space:  if 
winners  and  losers  of  fights  behave  differently,  why  should  the  winner,  rather  than 
the  loser,  become  more  daring  in  future  fights  and  claim  ownership  of  an  area,  all 
else  being  equal?  If  the  loser  became  the  new  owner,  the  outcome  would  share 
features  of  other  paradoxical  solutions.  Such  an  outcome  appears  counterintuitive, 
yet  if  the  outcome  of  a  fight  is  a  simple  asymmetry  whose  outcome  is  largely 
determined  by  chance,  an  ESS  could  equally  well  dictate  one  or  the  other  experience 
(win  or  lose)  to  be  used  as  the  cue  that  makes  an  animal  retreat. 
Studies  have  shown  that  while  common-sense  solutions  (including  both  owners 
winning  and  larger,  or  higher  RHP,  individuals  winning)  are  common  in  many  taxa 
(fish:  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Chellappa  et  al.  1999;  birds:  Tobias  1997;  insects: 
Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Alcock  &  Bailey  1997;  crustaceans:  Jennions  &  Backwell 
1996;  mammals:  Barnard  &  Brown  1984),  paradoxical  solutions  are  (almost)  non- 
existent.  Maynard  Smith  (1982)  quotes  studies  (Burgess  1976)  on  Oecibus  civitas 
spiders  as  showing  potentially  paradoxical  behaviour.  Owners  of  webs  give  up  their 
webs  to  intruders,  leading  to  a  pattern  of  repeated  displacements.  We  are,  however, 
unaware  of  any  follow-ups  documenting  the  same  patterns  in  this  or  other  species 
(for  a  current  debate  concerning  butterflies,  see  Hernandez  &  Benson  1998;  Field  & 
Hardy  2000;  Kemp  2000).  Furthermore,  the  above  example  relates  to  owner-intruder 
asymmetry,  rather  than  winner-loser  asymmetries  which  are  relevant  when 
occupying  new  areas. 
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This  points  to  a  surprisingly  unresolved  question  in  the  first  application  of  game 
theory  to  the  study  of  animal  behaviour:  if  theory  continues  to  predict  paradoxical 
solutions  under  certain  conditions,  why  do  we  only  ever  observe  common-sense 
solutions  in  nature?  Our  game  theory  approach  to  the  problem  of  winning  space 
evaluates  the  stability  of  both  paradoxical  and  common-sense  solutions. 
Methods 
THE  MODEL:  BACKGROUND  INFORMATION 
Animals  compete  for  access  to  areas  containing  necessary  resources  such  as  food  and 
nest  sites.  We  can  imagine  a  situation  in  which  two  individuals  are  in  conflict  over 
such  a  space,  in  an  attempt  to  either  extend  their  current  territory  or  establish  a  new 
one.  Both  individuals  are  able  to  withdraw  from  the  contested  area  to  an  uncontested 
area  (for  example,  the  core  of  their  existing  territory).  We  aim  to  investigate  the 
strategies  that  individuals  might  use  in  the  course  of  this  pairwise  conflict. 
A  strategy  must  specify  precisely  the  behaviour  of  an  individual  in  every  possible 
situation  (von  Neumann  &  Morgenstern  1953;  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976; 
Broom  et  al.  1997).  A  fight  between  two  contestants  can  end  either  in  one  of  them 
winning,  or  in  a  draw,  after  which  each  individual  will  make  a  decision  on  how  likely 
it  is  to  return  to  the  location  of  the  fight  in  the  future.  This  combination  of 
probabilities  makes  up  an  individual's  strategy.  Thus,  we  define  a  strategy  S=  {Sw, 
SL,  SD),  where  Sw  is  the  probability  of  returning  to  the  fight  location  after  winning 
the  fight,  SL  is  the  probability  of  returning  having  lost,  and  SD  is  the  probability  of 
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returning  when  the  fight  has  ended  in  a  draw.  As  each  probability  can  take  any  value 
from  zero  to  one  the  strategy  set  is  continuous  (Parker  1984),  and  a  potentially 
infinite  number  of  strategies  can  be  used  (see  table  4.1  for  parameter  definitions). 
We  consider  situations  in  which  a  mutant  individual  using  a  strategy  S.  =  {Sm 
, 
SmL, 
SmD}  is  in  conflict  with  a  single  member  of  a  population  using  strategy  SPop  =  {Spw, 
SpL,  SpD}.  We  aim  to  investigate  which  population  strategies  are  evolutionarily  stable 
against  invasion  by  S.  by  calculating  a  measure  of  the  mutant  individual's  fitness 
when  Sm=  SPOP  and  when  S.  Spoil. 
In  terms  of  this  model,  a  common-sense  strategy  would  be  one  such  as  S=  {0.8,0.2, 
0.5),  where  the  animal  returns  more  frequently  when  it  has  won  than  when  it  has 
lost.  A  paradoxical  strategy  would  be  one  such  as  S=  {0.2,0.8,0.5)  where  the 
probability  of  returning  having  lost  is  greater  than  the  probability  of  returning  having 
won.  In  investigating  the  stability  of  paradoxical  strategies,  we  ask  whether  a 
strategy  in  which  the  probability  of  returning  after  losing  exceeds  the  probability  of 
returning  after  winning  can  ever  be  an  ESS. 
In  order  to  investigate  the  effect  of  different  return  strategies  on  the  mutant 
individual's  fitness,  we  need  to  consider  at  least  two  fights  between  the  contestants. 
For  simplicity,  we  restrict  our  analysis  to  a  contest  involving  exactly  two  fights,  the 
smallest  number  we  can  use  to  investigate  how  the  outcome  of  one  fight  affects  an 
individual's  behaviour  in  the  next.  Throughout,  `fight'  refers  to  a  single  aggressive 
interaction  between  two  individuals,  while  `contest'  refers  to  a  series  of  fights  (in  this 
case,  two). 
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Table  4.1:  Model  parameters  and  definitions  (see  the  text  for  detailed  descriptions  of 
each  parameter) 
Parameter  Definition 
S=  {Sw,  SL,  SD}  Strategy  used  by  an  individual,  composed  of  the  probability  that 
it  returns  to  the  contested  area  in  response  to  winning,  losing,  and 
the  fight  ending  in  a  draw 
a  Proportion  of  the  population  that  is  of  high  RHP 
T  Type  of  fight  (competitors  equal  or  differing  in  fighting  ability) 
a  Degree  of  asymmetry  between  the  two  classes  of  individuals  in 
the  population 
p  Probability  of  an  individual  winning  a  given  fight 
q  Probability  of  an  individual  losing  a  given  fight 
pd  Probability  that  a  fight  ends  without  a  winner  and  loser  (a  draw) 
v  Value  (benefit)  gained  from  an  unsettled  contest 
V  Value  (benefit)  gained  from  a  settled  contest 
cw  Cost  associated  with  winning  a  given  fight 
CL  Cost  associated  with  losing  a  given  fight 
CD  Cost  associated  with  participating  in  a  fight  which  ends  in  a  draw 
8  Amount  of  error  in  decision  making  (behavioural  variability) 
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We  consider  three  potential  outcomes  to  the  contest,  depending  on  which  of  the  two 
competing  individuals  chooses  to  return  to  the  contested  area.  The  mutant  individual 
may  not  return  after  the  second  fight,  in  which  case  it  gains  no  increase  in  fitness 
from  the  contest  (it  may  suffer  losses;  see  section  on  `costs'  below).  If  the  mutant 
individual  returns  but  the  opponent  does  not,  we  assume  that  the  contest  has  been 
settled,  and  the  individual  gains  a  large  fitness  benefit  from  becoming  the  sole 
occupier  of  the  disputed  space.  If  both  individuals  return,  we  assume  that  no  further 
aggressive  interaction  takes  place  and  the  space  is  shared  between  the  competitors. 
In  this  case,  we  consider  the  contest  to  be  unsettled,  and  a  smaller  benefit  is  gained 
by  each  contestant  from  the  use  of  the  space. 
To  investigate  the  effect  of  differences  in  fighting  ability  on  the  strategies  that 
individuals  use,  we  assume  that  the  population  consists  of  two  classes  of  individuals, 
those  of  good  fighting  ability  or  high  RHP,  and  those  of  lower  fighting  ability  or  low 
RHP.  We  assume  that  a  fraction  a  of  the  population  is  of  high  fighting  ability  (Type 
1  individuals;  type  0  individuals  are  those  of  low  fighting  ability).  In  such  a 
population,  TE  =  a2+(1-a)2  of  fights  will  occur  between  equal  individuals,  in  Ts  = 
a(1-(x)  of  cases,  the  mutant  individual  will  be  of  high  RHP  (Type  1),  fighting  against 
an  individual  of  poor  fighting  ability  (Type  0),  and  in  Tw  =  (1-a)a  of  cases,  it  will  be 
of  low  RHP,  fighting  against  a  good  fighter,  assuming  spatially  random  mixing  of 
individuals.  Thus,  when  calculating  individual  fitness  (see  below)  we  take  a  weighted 
mean  of  the  fitness  for  the  three  types  of  fight.  Throughout  this  paper,  we  use  a= 
0.5.  Testing  other  values  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  but  would  follow  the 
same  principles  as  described  here.  Individuals  are  assumed  not  to  know  their  own 
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fighting  ability.  They  can,  however,  observe  the  outcome  of  the  first  fight  and  adjust 
their  behaviour  accordingly. 
FIGHT  OUTCOMES 
As  described  above,  fights  may  end  up  in  wins,  losses  and  draws.  When  two  equally 
matched  competitors  meet,  it  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  probability  of  winning 
equals  the  probability  of  losing:  p=q;  additionally,  pd  describes  the  probability  of  a 
fight  ending  in  a  draw.  We  use  subscripts  such  as  `10'  to  denote  a  high-RHP 
individual  fighting  against  a  low-RHP  individual.  Where  two  high-RHP  players  (1), 
or  two  low-RHP  players  (0)  meet,  the  probabilities  of  winning,  pi  1  and  poo,  and  the 
probabilities  of  losing,  ql1  and  qoo,  are 
pii=poo=qii=qoo 
1-pd 
= 
2 
(1) 
In  fights  between  and  high-  and  low-RHP  players,  p>q  for  the  high  RHP  individual. 
For  simplicity,  and  to  allow  us  to  investigate  the  impact  of  varying  a  single  parameter 
on  the  ESS,  we  assume  that  a  fixed  proportion  of  fights  end  in  a  draw  for  each  set  of 
parameter  values.  The  limitations  of  this  assumption  are  discussed  later  (see 
Discussion).  The  probabilities  of  winning  and  losing  in  fights  that  occur  between 
individuals  of  differing  competitive  ability  are  calculated  from  the  asymmetry  in 
fighting  ability  between  individuals  in  the  population,  described  by  a.  This  parameter 
can  take  values  from  zero  to  one.  If  a  takes  a  value  of  1,  then  in  fights  between 
unequal  competitors  where  there  is  a  winner,  the  victor  will  always  be  the  individual 
that  is  of  higher  RHP.  In  asymmetrical  situations,  the  probability  that  an  individual 
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with  good  fighting  ability  wins  against  a  poor  fighter,  plo,  and  therefore  that  a  poor 
fighter  loses  to  high  RHP  individual,  qol,  is 
pro=qoi  =(1+aPd)  (2) 
Likewise,  the  probability  that  individual  with  high  RHP  loses  to  a  poor  player,  qlo, 
and  the  probability  that  an  individual  with  low  RHP  wins  over  a  good  player  poi,  is 
pot=qio= 
12a  (1-pa)  (3) 
In  the  special  case  where  a  takes  a  value  of  zero,  all  individuals  in  the  population  are 
identical  in  fighting  ability.  Note  that  when  a=0,  the  types  1  and  0  become  identical, 
and  the  model  produces  identical  results  regardless  of  the  value  of  a.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity  we  have  kept  a=0.5  for  these  cases  too.  At  any  other  value  of  a  the 
individuals  belonging  to  different  groups  have  true  differences  in  fighting  abilities, 
even  though  these  differences  may  be  slight. 
We  use  the  outcome  probabilities  above,  Sm,  and  Spoil  to  calculate  the  probability  of 
each  contest  outcome  (series  of  two  fight  outcomes;  table  4.2).  In  TE  fights,  where 
individuals  are  equal,  we  use  pI,,  poo,  qit  and  quo.  In  Ts  fights,  where  the  mutant  is 
stronger,  we  useplo  and  qio,  and  in  Tw  fights;  where  the  mutant  is  weaker,  we  usepol 
and  qol. 
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COSTS  OF  FIGHTING 
The  costs  associated  with  fighting  are  described  by  cw  (cost  of  winning  a  fight),  cL 
(cost  of  losing  a  fight)  and  cD  (cost  of  participating  in  a  fight  that  ends  in  a  draw).  To 
remain  biologically  meaningful,  we  assume  that  the  cost  of  losing  a  fight  must 
always  exceed  the  cost  of  winning.  We  will  consider  the  limitations  of  this 
assumption  in  the  Discussion.  As  studies  have  shown  that  the  costs  of  aggression  are 
positively  related  to  the  duration  or  intensity  of  aggressive  encounters  (e.  g.  Hack 
1997;  Neat  et  al.  1998a),  we  assume  that  all  encounters  ending  with  a  specific 
outcome  (win,  loss  or  draw)  are  equal  in  duration  and/or  intensity,  and  so  are  equally 
costly.  Where  competitors  are  unequal,  we  assume  that  the  costs  of  a  specific 
outcome  are  the  same  whether  the  individual  is  of  good  or  poor  fighting  ability.  We 
do  not  currently  include  an  asymmetry  in  the  ability  to  bear  the  costs  of  an  aggressive 
encounter. 
Contest  costs  are  calculated  from  the  cost  of  a  fight  outcome,  cw,  cL  or  cD,  multiplied 
by  the  probability  of  that  outcome  in  the  first  and  second  fights;  we  assume  that  the 
cost  of  successive  fights  are  independent  of  each  other.  The  likelihood  that  an 
individual  wins  one  of  the  two  fights  in  which  it  is  involved  (Pwl)  is  the  sum  of  the 
probabilities  of  winning  the  first  fight,  when  the  outcome  of  the  second  fight  was  a 
loss  or  a  draw,  or  one  or  both  of  the  competitors  did  not  return  for  the  second,  plus 
the  sum of  the  probabilities  of  winning  the  second  fight,  when  the  first  fight  ended 
with  a  loss  or  draw  for  the  individual  in  question  (table  4.2).  Thus: 
Pw,  =  Pwl  +P,,  d  +P￿e  +P.  +Pw  +Pd.  (4) 
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The  subscripts  w,  1,  d,  refer  to  an  outcome  of  a  win,  loss  or  draw  in  the  first  (first 
position)  or  second  (second  position)  fight.  In  the  case  where  the  opponent  does  not 
return,  we  use  the  subscript  e,  and  where  the  mutant  does  not  return,  a.  The 
probability  of  winning  both  fights  is  described  by  P,,,,  t,.  The  probabilities  of  losing  and 
drawing  in  one  and  both  fights  are  calculated  analogously  to  equation  (4)  and  P. 
The  total  costs  associated  with  fighting  are: 
C=  cw  (2P,,,,  +  Pwj)  +  CL  (2P￿  +  PLI)  +  CD  (2Pdd  +  PDI) 
(5) 
BENEFITS  OF  FIGHTING 
The  benefits  gained  from  ownership  of  the  disputed  territory  are  described  by  v  and 
V  for  unsettled  and  settled  contests,  respectively.  In  an  unsettled  contest,  both 
contestants  return  after  the  second  fight.  In  this  case,  the  mutant  has  access  to  a 
resource  of  value  v.  In  a  settled  dispute,  where  the  opponent  does  not  return  after  the 
first  or  second  fights  and  the  mutant  has  sole  use  of  the  disputed  territory,  the 
resource  has  a  value  of  V.  V  is  always  equal  to  or  greater  than  v.  The  actual  benefits 
gained  from  settled  contests,  BS,  are  calculated  from  the  probability  of  the  contest 
being  settled  (the  sum  of  table  4.3a)  multiplied  by  V.  Benefits  from  unsettled 
contests,  Bu,  are  calculated  from  the  probability  of  contests  where  both  the  mutant 
and  the  opponent  return  after  the  second  fight  (the  sum  of  table  4.3b),  multiplied  by 
v.  No  benefits  are  gained  when  the  mutant  does  not  return  after  the  first  or  second 
fight. 
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CALCULATING  FITNESS 
Fitness  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  benefits  of  using  the  space  and  the 
costs  paid  during  the  contest.  For  example,  we  can  imagine  a  situation  where  the 
population  is  using  strategy  SPop  =  {0.5,0.5,0.5},  and  a  mutant  individual  uses 
strategy  S.  =  {0.1,0.2,0.8}.  To  present  a  simple  example,  we  assume  that  in  this 
case  no  fights  end  in  a  draw  (pd=  0)  and  all  individuals  are  equal  with  respect  to  their 
fighting  ability  (a  =  0).  Other  parameters  are  set  as  v=1,  V=5,  cw  =  0.1,  cL  =  0.2 
and  cD  =  0.1.  We  calculate  the  costs  paid  by  the  mutant  when  fighting  members  of 
the  population  as  C=0.1613.  Unsettled  gains  BU  =  0.0056  and  settled  gains  Bs  = 
0.403  1.  Fitness  of  the  mutant,  W,  is  calculated  as: 
W=  Bu  +  Bs  -C  (6) 
and  thus  is  equal  to  0.2474. 
FINDING  TILE  ESS 
To  find  the  strategies  that  are  evolutionarily  stable,  we  check  whether  the  population 
strategy  can  be  invaded  by  a  mutant  using  a  different  strategy,  then  we  check  if  it  can 
be  invaded  by  another  mutant  strategy,  until  all  possible  mutants  have  been  checked. 
An  evolutionary  stable  strategy  occurs  when  all  mutants  deviating  from  the 
population  strategy  have  lower  fitness  than  the  population  strategy,  meaning  that  the 
population  strategy  can  not  be  invaded  by  an  alternative  strategy. 
Returning  to  the  previous  example,  we  can  calculate  whether  or  not  the  mutant 
strategy  S.  is  able  to  invade  a  population  that  is  using  strategy  SPoP.  We  calculate  the 
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fitness  of  a  random  member  of  the  population  (i.  e.  an  individual  using  Sp.  p)  against 
the  population  as  a  whole.  In  this  case,  W  for  Spop  equals  0.375.  Comparing  this  to 
the  fitness  of  the  mutant  using  S.  against  SpoP  (0.2474),  we  see  that  the  population 
member  has  higher  fitness  than  the  mutant,  and  thus  the  population  is  stable  against 
invasions  by  a  mutant  using  Sm. 
As  there  are  a  potentially  infinite  number  of  strategies  that  can  be  tested,  it  is 
impossible  to  test  them  all  in  the  manner  outlined  above.  Instead,  we  use 
convergence  techniques  (Houston  &  McNamara  1999)  to  find  ESSs.  A  standard 
technique  for  finding  an  ESS  in  a  dynamic  game  is  through  iteration  of  the  best 
response  map  (McNamara  et  al.  2000).  This  procedure  starts  with  an  arbitrary 
strategy  and  finds  the  sequence  of  strategies  where  each  strategy  is  the  best  response 
to  the  previous  strategy  in  the  sequence.  A  problem  of  this  method  is  that  the 
sequence  sometimes  oscillates  without  converging  towards  the  ESS.  By 
incorporating  errors  in  decision  making,  oscillation  can  be  eliminated.  `Errors'  here 
refer  to  the  biologically  realistic  assumption  that  individuals  do  not  always  use  the 
strategy  that  yields  them  highest  fitness,  especially  if  the  fitness  difference  between 
two  options  (e.  g.  return  or  do  not  return  to  an  area)  is  small.  By  including  errors,  it  is 
thus  assumed  that  the  probability  of  making  an  error  decreases  as  the  cost  of  making 
it  increases  (McNamara  et  al.  1997). 
As  a  strategy  S  consists  of  Sw,  SL  and  SD,  we  vary  each  in  turn  to  find  the  best 
response,  and  update  S.  We  calculate  fitness  for  an  animal  using  (in  the  first 
instance),  Sw  =1  or  Sw  =  0,  against  a  member  of  the  population  using  Sp.  p.  Denoting 
the  fitness  of  the  strategy  (1,  SL,  SD)  by  W1  and  that  of  (0,  SL,  SD)  by  Wo,  we  can 
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calculate  the  fitness  difference  between  using  Sw  =1  and  Sw  =0  as  d=  Wi  -  Wo.  The 
best  response  with  error  (behavioural  variability)  is  then  calculated  as 
1 
aSWn  = 
1'i  8-dlS 
(7) 
The  amount  of  error  is  indicated  by  the  parameter  S.  Increasing  8  means  more 
variability  in  behaviour:  if  8  is  small,  the  animal  is  highly  likely  to  choose  the  better 
option  even  if  the  fitness  difference  between  the  two  behavioural  options  is  small.  As 
8  approaches  infinity,  the  individual  chooses  either  action  with  a  probability  that 
approaches  1/2:  animals  become  increasingly  unable  to  differentiate  between  actions 
with  similar  consequences.  Using  this  method,  the  value  for  Sw￿  depends  on  the 
fitness  consequences  of  the  two  options  (Sw  =1  and  Sw  =0)  when  they  compete 
against  a  population  using  Sw￿_i.  Other  components  of  the  strategy  (SL  and  SD)  are 
calculated  analogously. 
The  iteration  then  proceeds  as  follows: 
1.  Choose  an  initial  population  strategy  So  =  {Swo,  Su,  SDO}. 
2.  Calculate  Swj  according  to  equation  (7). 
3.  Calculate  SLI  analogously  to  equation  (7). 
4.  Calculate  SDI  analogously  to  equation  (7). 
S.  Create  the  new  S1=  {SWt,  SLI,  SDI}. 
6.  Repeat  steps  2  to  5  to  find  the  new  population  strategy  S2. 
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Steps  2  to  6  are  repeated  over  n  time-steps.  This  quickly  produces  an  ESS  where  S.  = 
(  SWn,  SLn)  SDn 
f" 
Results 
By  altering  the  values  given  to  the  various  parameters,  we  investigated  the  ESS 
solutions  that  emerged  from  the  model  under  different  conditions. 
IS  AVOIDANCE  BEHAVIOUR  ADAPTIVE? 
First,  we  investigated  whether  it  is  adaptive  for  both  winners  and  losers  (or  for 
individuals  who  experienced  a  draw)  to  avoid  areas  of  conflict.  We  found  no 
situations  in  which  both  previous  winners  and  losers  avoided  the  contested  area 
completely.  However,  figure  4.1  shows  that  in  some  cases  (low  value  of  P), 
individuals  return  with  less  than  50%  probability  no  matter  what  the  outcome  of  the 
previous  fight.  This  confirms  that  avoidance  behaviour  is  indeed  sometimes 
beneficial  regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the  fight;  also  note  that  a  return  probability  of 
less  than  50%  guarantees  that  the  result  is  not  merely  due  to  errors  in  decision- 
making  (random  variation  in  behaviour),  but  that  staying  away  truly  generates  higher 
fitness  than  returning.  This  is  intuitive:  when  the  benefits  (P)  are  small  compared  to 
the  costs  of  meeting  an  opponent  and  fighting.  Likewise,  there  is  an  intuitive 
explanation  as  to  why  complete  avoidance  behaviour  (neither  competitor  ever  returns 
to  the  area  of  conflict)  nevertheless  does  not  evolve:  if  one  participant  (say,  the  loser) 
always  stays  away,  there  is  no  cost  for  the  other  (say,  the  winner)  to  return  and  claim 
the  reward  V. 
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Figure  4.1:  Evolutionarily  stable  return  probabilities  after  winning  (Sw,  solid  line), 
losing  (SL;  dashed  line)  and  after  a  draw  (SD;  dotted  line),  for  a  population  starting  its 
evolution  from  a  common-sense  strategy  Spop  =  {1,0,0.51.  Other  parameter  values 
used:  a=0.5,  v=1,  cw=2.5,  cL=5,  cD=2.5,  a=0,  pd=0.2,5=0.5;  value  of 
resource  V  as  indicated  on  the  x  axis.  In  some  cases  (when  the  value  of  monopolising 
the  resource,  V,  is  low),  both  winners  and  losers  avoid  the  contested  area  more  than 
half  the  time,  at  other  times,  winners  return  but  losers  avoid  the  area  (high  P). 
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COMMON-SENSE  VS.  PARADOXICAL  SOLUTIONS 
We  define  a  paradoxical  solution  as  one  where  the  probability  of  returning  having 
won  a  fight  is  lower  than  the  probability  of  returning  having  lost.  In  figure  4.1,  all 
solutions  were  derived  assuming  that  Spop  =  {1,0,0.5  }  was  the  ancestral  strategy 
from  which  evolution  starts.  This  strategy  is  common-sense,  and  it  is  therefore  not 
surprising  that  solutions  are  common-sense  too  (figure  4.1).  We  now  turn  to  the 
question  of  whether  common-sense  and  paradoxical  solutions  are  equivalent  in  the 
model.  In  other  words,  if  evolution  starts  from  a  common-sense  or  a  paradoxical 
strategy  (the  initial  population  strategy),  will  stable  solutions  turn  out  common-sense 
or paradoxical? 
If  solutions  are  entirely  based  on  conventions,  then  the  convention  `losers  return, 
winners  do  not'  is  as  logical  as  the  one  that  specifies  the  opposite.  However,  if  true 
fighting  ability  plays  a  role,  we  might  expect  that  winners  of  the  first  fight  (who  are 
more  likely  to  be  good  than  bad  fighters)  are  more  likely  to  win  the  latter  fight  too. 
Therefore,  they  suffer  lower  fighting  costs,  and  should  be  more  prone  to  return  than 
losers.  This  would  lead  to  the  evolution  of  a  common-sense  strategy  even  if  starting 
from  a  paradoxical  ancient  strategy. 
Figure  4.2  shows  how  8  (the  magnitude  of  behavioural  variability)  and  a  (the 
asymmetry  between  individuals)  affect  whether  both  paradoxical  and  common-sense 
strategies  can  be  stable,  or  whether  a  common-sense  strategy  evolves  irrespective  of 
whether  the  ancient  population  was  common-sense  or  paradoxical.  When  animals 
adhere  to  a  behavioural  rule  without  much  variation  (small  8),  both  types  of 
population  strategies  are  stable  regardless  of  the  asymmetry  between  individuals. 
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When  behaviour  is  more  variable  (large  8),  asymmetries  between  fighters  allow 
common-sense  solutions  to  evolve  from  paradoxical  population  strategies.  Thus, 
when  the  difference  between  good  and  poor  fighters  is  large,  paradoxical  strategies 
are  unlikely  to  be  stable,  except  when  behaviour  shows  little  random  variation. 
Figure  4.2  also  shows  how  the  stability  of  paradoxical  strategies  is  affected  by  the 
relative  costs  and  benefits  of  fighting.  Figure  4.2a  shows  that  when  both  costs  and 
benefits  are  high,  paradoxical  solutions  persist  over  much  of  the  parameter  space, 
evolving  to  common  sense  solutions  only  when  variability  8  and  asymmetries  in 
fighting  ability  a  are  high.  When  the  costs  of  fighting  are  reduced  (figure  4.2b), 
common  sense  solutions  evolve  from  paradoxical  ancestral  strategies  when  there  is 
less  variation  in  behaviour  (lower  S)  and  asymmetries  are  smaller  (lower  a).  A 
similar  pattern  is  seen  when  the  benefits  of  fighting  are  reduced  (figure  4.2c). 
Finally,  figure  4.2d  shows  that  when  both  the  costs  and  benefits  of  fighting  are  low, 
common  sense  solutions  prevail  over  the  majority  of  the  parameter  space. 
Paradoxical  solutions  are  only  stable  when  there  is  very  little  behavioural  variation 
(small  d)  and  animals  differ  only  slightly  in  their  fighting  ability  (small  a). 
Additionally,  paradoxical  solutions  are  stable  when  all  individuals  are  identical  with 
respect  to  their  fighting  ability  (a  =  0). 
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Figure  4.2:  Stability  of  common  sense  (C)  and  paradoxical  (P)  strategies  at  various 
values  of  behavioural  variability  (S)  and  population-wide  difference  in  fighting 
ability  (a).  Where  both  C  and  P  exist,  either  can  be  stable  depending  on  the  initial 
strategy  in  the  ancient  population.  Each  panel  shows  stabilities  for  different  values 
of  monopolising  the  resource,  V,  and  costs  of  fighting  cw,  cL  and  cD.  (a),  V=5,  cw  = 
3,  cL=6,  cD=3(b),  V=5,  cw=2,  cL=4,  cD=2(c),  V=2cW=3,  cL=6,  cD=3and 
(d)  V=2,  cw  =  2,  cL  =  4,  cD  =  2.  Other  parameter  values  used  for  all  panels:  a=0.5, 
v=1,  pd  =  0.2.  Ancient  strategies:  for  common  sense,  Spop  =  {1,0,0.5};  for 
paradoxical, 
Sp0P  =  (O,  1,0.5). 
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STRENGTH  OF  CONVENTIONS 
A  convention  is  a  rule  based  on  arbitrary  cues  that  allows  quick  resolution  of 
potentially  protracted  disputes  (Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  2003).  In  game  theory, 
`convention'  is  generally  used  to  describe  pure  strategies  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker 
1976;  Parker  1984),  however,  we  use  a  slightly  broader  meaning:  we  assume  that 
behaviour  can  vary  (McNamara  et  al.  1997),  and  thus  we  do  not  obtain  pure 
strategies.  We  have  therefore  used  `convention'  to  mean  a  situation  where  either  one 
of  two  possible  outcomes  (winning,  losing)  can  equally  well  function  as  the  cue  that 
makes  an  animal  to  return  to  the  contested  area,  and  it  is  sufficient  that  the  behaviour 
is  statistically  associated  with  the  cue. 
When  a  paradoxical  solution  is  stable,  it  means  that  animals  rely  on  a  convention  to 
settle  fights:  one  outcome  (losing)  determines  a  higher  probability  of  returning, 
which  could  lead  to  ownership  even  though  it  does  not  have  a  positive  relationship  to 
the  ability  to  defend  a  territory.  We  have  demonstrated  that  conventional  behaviour 
of  this  type  can  be  stable  if  fighting  ability  does  not  differ  much  between  individuals, 
and  they  follow  behavioural  rules  strictly  (figure  4.2). 
Figure  4.3a  shows  the  common-sense  solution  in  a  case  where  individuals  do  not 
differ  in  fighting  ability  at  all  (a  =  0).  Thus,  their  fate  in  the  first  fight  does  not  give 
them  any  information  about  their  fighting  ability;  if  they  nevertheless  adjust  their 
behaviour  according  to  the  fight  outcome,  it  must  be  due  to  a  convention.  The 
asymmetry  in  fight  outcome  is  the  only  factor  influencing  the  choice  of  strategy, 
equivalent  to  role  asymmetries  (such  as  owner  or  intruder)  determining  outcomes  in 
other  game  theory  models  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Maynard  Smith  1982; 
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of  returning  having  won,  dashed  line:  probability  of  returning  having  lost,  dotted 
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Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987).  Conventions  clearly  become 
stronger  when  the  costs  of  fighting  increase:  winner  and  loser  behaviour  becomes 
markedly  different  when  fighting  costs  are  large  (figure  4.3  a).  In  the  case  where  there 
are  true  differences  in  fighting  ability  (figure  4.3b),  losers  gain  information  about 
their  fighting  ability  in  the  first  fight,  and  they  consequently  avoid  the  area  even  if 
costs  of  fighting  are  low. 
Additionally,  as  the  value  of  sharing  the  resource,  v,  increases,  the  probability  of 
losers  returning  increases  (not  shown).  This  is  intuitive;  when  a  resource  is  worth 
sharing  (high  v),  it  makes  sense  for  both  winners  and  losers  to  return  to  claim  a  part 
of  it,  even  though  this  may  involve  further  aggressive  interactions. 
Discussion 
IS  AVOIDANCE  ADAPTIVE? 
Contrary  to  the  assumptions  of  some  models  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999,2001),  our 
results  suggest  that  a  tendency  to  avoid  areas  in  which  fights  have  occurred  is  not 
always  an  adaptive  strategy  for  territorial  animals.  In  some  cases,  however, 
avoidance  behaviour  is  beneficial,  no  matter  what  the  outcome  of  the  fight  (low 
values  of  V,  figure  4.1).  This  is  intuitive  when  the  benefits  (V)  of  fighting  are  small 
compared  to  the  costs  of  meeting  an  opponent  and  fighting. 
An  interesting  phenomenon  is  that  the  probability  of  returning  can  decrease  with 
increasing  value  (V)  of  the  resource.  This  happens  for  losers  of  fights  when  winners 
become  much  more  prone  to  return  after  fights,  which  in  turn  increases  the  costs  of 
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returning  to  losers  (figure  4.1).  At  large  values  of  V,  individuals  respond  to  winning 
by  returning  to  the  area.  When  losers  do  not  do  so,  winners  have  effectively  claimed 
ownership  of  the  area  (figure  4.1,  large  i/).  When  one  participant  (in  this  case,  the 
loser)  stays  away,  it  makes  sense  for  the  other  (the  winner)  to  return  to  the  contested 
area  and  claim  the  benefits  V.  As  it  is  unlikely  to  meet  the  loser  again,  there  are  no 
costs  associated  with  returning. 
In  their  model  of  territory  acquisition  by  unequal  competitors,  Stamps  and  Krishnan 
(2001)  found  that  individuals  suffering  lower  fighting  costs  acquire  larger  territories 
than  individuals  suffering  from  higher  fighting  costs.  In  the  current  model,  when  the 
benefits  are  higher,  winners  (who  suffer  lower  fight  costs)  have  a  higher  tendency  to 
return  to  the  contested  area  than  losers,  which  could  lead  to  the  establishment  of 
larger  territories.  Our  model  thus  also  supports  the  finding  that  the  costs  experienced 
by  an  individual  could  affect  their  final  territory  size  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  2001). 
Additionally,  our  findings  support  the  assumption  of  early  game  theory  models  that 
animals  can  win  space  by  winning  fights  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973;  Grafen 
1979;  Maynard  Smith  1982),  if  their  opponent  avoids  the  area  having  lost.  The  costs 
of  fighting  relative  to  the  benefits  of  winning  determine  whether  general  avoidance 
(as  in  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999,2001)  or  a  `winner-takes-all'  pattern  evolves. 
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COMMON-SENSE  VS.  PARADOXICAL  SOLUTIONS 
We  also  found  that  sometimes  paradoxical  (losers  have  a  higher  probability  of 
returning  than  winners)  and  common-sense  (winners  are  more  likely  to  return) 
solutions  both  exist  and  at  other  times,  only  common-sense  strategies  are  stable 
(figure  4.2).  This  reflects  the  findings  of  other  game  theory  models,  which  show  a 
limited  set  of  conditions  under  which  paradoxical  strategies  can  evolve  (Maynard 
Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987; 
Mesterton-Gibbons  1992).  Variation  in  fighting  ability,  a,  variability  in  behaviour,  S, 
and  the  costs  and  benefits  of  fighting  play  a  role  in  determining  whether  a 
paradoxical  ancestral  population  strategy  evolves  to  a  common-sense  or  paradoxical 
solution  in  the  current  game.  Why  is  this  the  case?  When  individuals  differ  little  in 
fighting  ability  (small  a),  an  individual  gains  little  information  on  its  own  RHP  from 
fighting.  Overly  high  fight  costs  can  then  be  avoided  simply  based  on  conventions, 
and  paradoxical  strategies  can  remain  stable.  When  there  are  large  differences  in 
fighting  ability  (large  a),  winners  of  the  first  fight  (likely  to  be  of  high  RHP)  are 
likely  to  also  win  the  second  fight,  suffer  lower  fighting  costs  and  be  more  likely  to 
return  than  losers.  This  leads  to  the  evolution  of  a  common-sense  strategy  even  when 
the  ancestral  strategy  is  paradoxical. 
However,  even  when  differences  in  fighting  ability  exist,  paradoxical  strategies  can 
be  stable  if  animals  adhere  strictly  to  behavioural  rules  (small  8).  This  means  that  an 
initial  convention  that  was  in  use  in  an  ancient  population  remains  stable.  But  when 
there  is  some  behavioural  variability  (large  8),  individuals  who  in  reality  are  better 
fighters  sometimes  return  to  contested  areas  even  if  the  initial  convention  dictates 
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they  should  not.  As  these  individuals  tend  to  win,  the  convention  is  broken  down, 
and  true  fighting  ability  takes  over  as  a  decisive  feature  of  the  system. 
When  the  costs  and  benefits  of  fighting  are  low,  paradoxical  solutions  are  no  longer 
stable,  and  evolve  to  common  sense  ESSs  (figure  4.2).  When  the  benefits  are  low, 
losers  can  no  longer  offset  the  high  costs  of  losing  by  returning  to  claim  the  resource, 
and  so  gain  higher  fitness  by  not  returning,  and  the  paradoxical  convention  is  broken 
down.  Conventions  also  tend  to  break  down  when  benefits  of  fighting  are  low.  This 
implies  that  the  fitness  difference  between  returning  and  avoiding  is  small.  The  cost 
of  making  errors  is  thus  small,  and  therefore  errors  occur  more  frequently 
(McNamara  et  al.  1997),  which  in  turn  implies  that  selection  does  not  strongly 
prevent  individuals  from  choosing  the  alternative  behaviour.  When  original  rules  of 
behaviour  are  not  strictly  followed,  the  signature  of  the  true  fighting  ability  can 
become  dominant,  and  a  common-sense  ESS  evolves. 
Our  finding  that  fighting  ability  plays  a  greater  role  in  settling  disputes  when  the 
asymmetry  in  fighting  ability  is  greater  is  not  surprising.  Many  empirical  studies 
show  that  body  size  (generally  an  indicator  of  fighting  ability)  plays  an  important 
role  in  determining  the  outcome  of  fights  (Jennions  &  Backwell  1996;  Beaugrand  et 
al.  1996;  Petersen  &  Hardy  1996;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999).  The  finding  that  conventions 
can  be  important  when  asymmetries  are  small  is  reflected  in  empirical  studies  where 
owners  tend  to  win  fights  against  intruders  when  their  fighting  ability  appears  to  be 
equal  to  or  lower  than  that  of  their  opponent  (Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Jennions  & 
Backwell  1996;  Alcock  &  Bailey  1997;  Chellappa  et  al.  1999;  Johnsson  et  al.  1999; 
Wenseleers  et  al.  2002). 
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However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  residents  tend  to  win  not  because  of  arbitrary 
conventions  but  because  they  have  greater  motivation  to  fight,  as  their  valuation  of 
the  resource  is  greater,  a  finding  supported  by  empirical  data  (birds,  Krebs  1982; 
Tobias  1997;  fish,  Neat  et  al.  1998b;  Johnsson  &  Forser  2002;  insects,  Alcock  & 
Bailey  1997;  crustaceans,  Edsman  &  Jonsson  1996).  Our  results  suggest  that 
conventions  are  not  necessarily  falsified  if  some  asymmetry  (e.  g.  in  resource-holding 
potential,  or  in  valuing  the  resource)  can  be  shown  to  exist.  While  avoidance 
behaviour  by  the  loser  is  stronger  when  asymmetries  exist  (figure  4.3b),  it  persists  in 
the  absence  of  asymmetries  too  (figure  4.3a). 
As  the  costs  of  fighting  increase,  strategies  where  winners  return  with  increasing 
probability  and  losers  with  decreasing  probability  become  stable  (figure  4.3).  This 
suggests  that  as  fighting  becomes  costly,  conventions  become  stronger  even  if 
strategies  are  common-sense  (note  that  the  information  content  gained  by  the  initial 
fight  does  not  change  when  costs  change).  If  fighting  is  costly,  then  it  would  benefit 
individuals  to  avoid  fighting  whenever  possible,  and  a  strategy  where  only  one  of  the 
contestants  would  return  would  allow  animals  to  avoid  a  second  fight  in  that  location 
but  enable  one  of  them  to  gain  the  benefits  associated  with  returning  to  it.  As  the 
benefit  associated  with  monopolising  the  resource,  V,  increases  (figure  4.1),  we  also 
see  an  increasing  difference  in  the  behaviour  of  winners  and  losers.  As  paradoxical 
strategies  are  stable  at  high  values  of  V  (figure  4.2),  this  suggests  that  conventions 
play  a  role  here,  too,  otherwise  we  would  expect  the  individual  of  greater  fighting 
ability  to  always  return  more  frequently  and  a  common-sense  solution  to  emerge. 
According  to  our  results,  the  fact  that  paradoxical  strategies  are  not  seen  in  nature 
probably  relates  to  the  fact  that  fighting  abilities  indeed  almost  always  vary  between 
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individuals,  and  there  usually  is  some  behavioural  variation  (as  in  almost  any 
biological  trait).  This  highlights  the  general  importance  of  not  assuming  that 
individuals  always  optimise  their  behaviour  in  every  single  instance  (McNamara  et 
al.  1997).  In  addition,  paradoxical  strategies  are  not  seen  when  the  costs  and  benefits 
of  fighting  are  low.  In  nature,  animals  probably  do  not  engage  in  extremely  costly 
fights  for  small  areas  of  extremely  valuable  space.  Instead,  low  cost  aggression,  such 
as  chases  and  displays,  rather  than  escalated  fights,  is  common  (butterflies,  Davies 
1978;  Hardy  1998;  damselflies,  Waage  1988;  spiders,  Riechert  1978;  lizards,  Stamps 
&  Krishnan  1997,1998).  Additionally,  the  patches  of  space  contested  may  be 
relatively  low  in  value  in  comparison  to  an  entire  territory,  for  example,  when 
individuals  are  contesting  small  areas  of  feeding  territories  rather  than  the  centre  of  a 
breeding  territory. 
LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  MODEL 
As  with  all  models,  we  have  made  some  assumptions  that  should  be  evaluated 
critically.  Individuals  in  our  model  only  gain  information  regarding  their  fighting 
ability  from  the  fights;  they  do  not  know  their  own  fighting  ability  beforehand.  A 
longer  series  of  fights  would  enable  an  individual  to  gain  more  accurate  information, 
as  each  fight  would  enable  them  to  update  the  information  they  possess  (Enquist  & 
Leimar  1983).  If  individuals  can  gain  more  accurate  information,  or  have  prior 
information  regarding  their  fighting  ability,  common-sense  solutions  would  be 
strengthened  as  individuals  would  be  able  to  more  accurately  assess  their  chances  of 
winning  or  losing  a  fight  and  participate  or  avoid  accordingly. 
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In  addition,  the  'winner  and  loser'  effect  (Dugatkin  1997;  Hsu  &  Wolf  1999;  2001) 
may  have  an  influence  on  the  behaviour  of  an  individual.  According  to  this  effect,  an 
animal  is  more  likely  to  win  (lose)  in  fights  following  a  fight  that  it  has  already  won 
(lost).  In  our  model,  winning  probabilities  themselves  do  not  change  as  a  result  of 
prior  experience.  However,  the  fact  that  winners  become  more  daring  in  terms  of 
returning  to  the  area  could  be  interpreted  as  similar  to  the  winner  effect.  Winner 
effects  clearly  have  the  potential  to  further  enhance  the  stability  of  common-sense 
solutions. 
In  the  model,  we  assume  that  the  parameters  describing  asymmetries  in  fighting 
ability,  a,  and  the  probability  that  fights  end  in  a  draw  (pd)  are  independent.  Although 
one  could  expect  that  draws  would  occur  more  frequently  when  individuals  are 
equally  matched  (possibly  with  draws  occurring  100%  of  the  time),  there  are  also 
situations  in  which  equally  matched  competitors  fight  until  there  is  a  clear  winner 
(Davies  1978;  Waage  1988;  Gribbin  &  Thompson  1991;  Kemp  &  Wicklund  2001), 
and  likewise,  there  are  situations  where  draws  occur  even  though  one  would  expect 
the  better  fighter  to  win  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1997).  It  is  important  to  note  that  the 
model  is  able  to  produce  solutions  for  any  given  combination  of  fight  outcome 
probabilities  that  may  occur  in  nature. 
We  assume  a  relationship  between  the  outcome  of  a  fight  and  its  cost,  namely  that 
losing  is  always  more  costly  than  winning.  A  limitation  of  this  assumption  is  that 
this  relationship  between  fight  outcome  and  associated  cost  does  not  hold  true  for  all 
species.  Experimental  studies  have  shown  that  while  in  some  cases,  losers  do  incur 
higher  costs  than  winners  (Chellappa  &  Huntingford  1989;  Neat  et  al.  1998a),  in 
other  cases  there  is  no  difference  in  the  costs  incurred  (Smith  &  Taylor  1992).  The 
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energetic  cost  spent  by  winners  may  even  exceed  that  of  losers  (Hack  1997),  which 
presumably  could  lead  to  a  wider  diversity  of  outcomes  than  we  have  derived.  For 
simplicity,  we  also  assume  that  all  fights  ending  in  the  same  outcome  carry  the  same 
cost.  This  can  be  viewed  as  an  average  cost,  as  an  aggressive  interaction  can  take 
many  different  forms,  ranging  from  threat  display  and  avoidance  to  escalated 
contests,  which  are  likely  to  carry  very  different  costs  to  both  the  winner  and  the 
loser  (Chellappa  &  Huntingford  1989;  Smith  &  Taylor  1992;  Brick  1998;  Neat  et  al. 
1998a). 
Experimental  findings  suggest  that  territory  owners  abandon  territory  defence  when 
the  costs  of  fighting  become  too  high  (Carpenter  1987;  Tricas  1989).  Fighting  costs 
in  the  experimental  studies  are  generally  associated  with  the  number  of  intruders  on 
the  territory  (e.  g.  Myers  et  al.  1979;  Carpenter  et  al.  1983;  Carpenter  1987;  Tricas 
1989;  Keeley  2000;  review  in  Adams  2001).  Our  model  considers  the  cost  of  each 
interaction,  rather  than  the  number  of  interactions,  so  that  there  is  scope  for  further 
study.  Considering  the  dynamics  of  space  use  when  there  are  multiple  intruders  and 
continuous  space,  while  evaluating  the  adaptive  value  of  strategies,  would  be  a  clear 
next  step  in  combining  the  spatially  explicit  approach  of  mechanistic  models  (Stamps 
&  Krishnan  1999;  2001)  with  the  evolutionary  aspects  of  game  theory  models  (see 
chapter  5). 
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CHAPTER  5 
BRIDGING  THE  GAP  BETWEEN  MECHANISTIC  AND 
ADAPTIVE  EXPLANATIONS  OF  TERRITORY  FORMATION 
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Abstract 
How  animals  divide  space  can  have  fundamental  implications  for  the  population 
dynamics  of  territorial  species.  It  has  recently  been  proposed  that  space  can  be 
divided  if  animals  tend  to  avoid  fight  locations,  rather  than  the  winner  of  fights 
gaining  access  to  exclusive  resources,  behaviour  that  generates  exclusive  territories 
in  two-dimensional  space.  A  game  theory  model  has  shown  that  this  avoidance 
behaviour  can  be  adaptive,  but  the  adaptiveness  has  not  been  investigated  in  a 
spatially  realistic  context.  We  present  a  model  that  investigates  potential  strategies 
for  the  acquisition  of  territories  when  two-dimensional  space  must  be  divided 
between  individuals.  We  examine  whether  exclusive  territories  form  when  animals 
avoid  all  encounters  with  others,  or  only  those  encounters  that  have  led  to  losing 
fights,  under  different  fighting  costs  and  population  densities.  Our  model  suggests 
that  when  fighting  costs  are  high,  and  the  population  density  is  low,  the  most 
adaptive  behaviour  is  to  avoid  fight  locations,  which  generates  well-defined, 
exclusive  territories  in  a  population  that  is  able  to  resist  invasion  by  more  aggressive 
strategies.  Low  fighting  costs  and  high  population  densities  lead  to  the  break-down 
of  territoriality  and  the  formation  of  large,  overlapping  home  ranges.  We  also 
provide  a  novel  reason  as  to  why  so-called  paradoxical  strategies  do  not  exist  in 
nature:  if  we  define  a  paradoxical  strategy  as  an  exact  mirror-image  of  a  common- 
sense  one,  it  must  respond  in  the  opposite  way  to  a  draw  as  well  as  to  wins  and 
losses.  When  this  is  the  case,  and  draws  are  common  (fight  outcomes  are  often  not 
clear-cut  in  nature),  the  common-sense  strategy  is  more  often  adaptive  than  a 
paradoxical  alternative. 
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Introduction 
Territory  ownership  is  a  major  determinant  of  fitness  in  territorial  animals,  and  the 
question  of  how  individuals  gain  territories  and  partition  space  can  have  important 
implications  for  the  dynamics  of  populations  (Gordon  1997;  Both  &  Visser  2003): 
exclusive  use  of  space  will  obviously  limit  the  number  of  individuals  capable  of 
breeding,  leading  to  density  dependent  effects  (e.  g.  Newton  1992;  Rodenhouse  et  al. 
1997;  Kokko  &  Sutherland  1998). 
A  large  body  of  work  considers  optimum  sizes  for  territories  in  an  economic 
framework.  These  models  assume  that  the  costs  (in  terms  of  numbers  of  intruders) 
and  benefits  (food  resources  available)  determine  territory  size,  and  make  predictions 
concerning  the  optimal  size  (e.  g.  Ebersole  1980;  Hixon  1980;  Schoener  1983; 
Schoener  1987).  These  qualitative  predictions  have  been  tested  in  a  range  of  taxa 
(Adams  2001).  However,  the  majority  of  economic  models  assume  that  animals  are 
free  to  adjust  their  boundaries  without  constraint  from  neighbouring  territories 
(Hixon  1980;  Schoener  1983;  Lima  1984;  Adams  2001).  In  reality,  contiguous 
territories  may  be  compressed  below  their  optimal  size  by  pressure  exerted  by 
neighbours  (Maynard  Smith  1974;  Hixon  1980;  Patterson  1985;  Adams  1998; 
Keeley  2000;  Adams  2001).  Clearly,  to  understand  territory  formation,  it  is  crucially 
important  to  understand  the  process  by  which  neighbours  influence  the  location  of 
the  boundary  between  territories.  Two  major  lines  of  thought  have  emerged: 
mechanistic  models,  and  models  based  on  adaptive  arguments. 
Mechanistic  models  demonstrate  the  effect  of  particular  rules  of  behaviour  (Adams 
2001).  Early  models  used  geometric  techniques  to  predict  where  boundaries  are 
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positioned,  and  suggest  that  neighbours  apply  pressure  against  each  other  and 
boundaries  are  formed  where  the  pressure  is  equal  (e.  g.  Maynard  Smith  1974; 
Buckley  &  Buckley  1977;  Patterson  1985;  Adams  1998;  for  a  review,  see  Adams 
2001).  More  recent  mechanistic  models  of  territoriality  are  based  on  animal 
movement  and  interactions  between  neighbours  or  neighbouring  groups  of  animals. 
Examples  include  models  of  movement  and  scent  marking  to  predict  spatial  patterns 
in  timber  wolves  (Canis  lupus;  Lewis  &  Murray  1993;  White  et  al.  1996),  and  the 
formation  of  territories  as  a  learning  process  governed  by  positive  and  negative 
experiences  in  different  locations  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999,2001).  Based  on 
observations  of  territorial  settlement  in  juvenile  Anolis  aeneus  lizards,  Stamps  and 
Krishnan  (1999,2001)  offer  a  hypothesis  where  repeated  interactions  lead  to  the 
division  of  space  through  `nagging'  (Sih  &  Mateo  2001).  They  model  a  situation  in 
which  the  attractiveness  of  an  area  to  an  individual  depends  on  the  experiences  the 
individual  has  within  it,  and  individuals  only  return  to  areas  in  which  positive 
experiences  (increased  familiarity  with  the  area)  outweigh  negative  ones  (fights), 
thus  showing  a  tendency  to  avoid  locations  where  they  have  been  involved  in  fights. 
These  models  reproduce  several  features  of  territorial  systems  and  have  much 
biological  realism  (Sih  &  Mateo  2001),  but  they  are  mechanistic  rather  than 
adaptationist,  and  do  not  analyse  the  costs  and  benefits  of  different  strategies. 
To  fully  evaluate  the  underlying  assumption  of  these  models  that  avoidance  leads  to 
exclusive  space  use  (Adams  2001;  Sih  &  Mateo  2001),  certain  factors  should  be 
considered.  Firstly,  models  need  to  be  spatially  explicit  in  two  dimensions. 
Additionally,  the  behaviour  of  other  individuals  in  the  population,  and  their  space  use 
needs  to  be  considered,  and  for  this,  game  theory  modelling  is  needed.  In  particular, 
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models  should  not  only  consider  the  behaviour  of  neighbours,  but  also  their  space 
use  and  its  effects  on  the  availability  of  space.  Few  models  exist  that  fulfil  all  these 
criteria.  Game  theory  models  of  territory  size  (e.  g.  Parker  &  Knowlton  1980)  tend  to 
be  spatially  implicit  -  territories  are  assumed  to  spatially  contiguous,  but  the  models 
do  not  specify  the  strategies  adopted  by  different  neighbours  (Adams  2001). 
Spatially  explicit  game  theory  approaches  to  the  division  of  space  generally  consider 
how  two  individuals  can  negotiate  the  division  of  a  line  into  two  territories  (Maynard 
Smith  1982,  Lewis  &  Moorcroft  2001;  Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  2003;  Pereira  et 
al.  2003,  Morrell  &  Kokko  2003;  chapter  4).  As  an  example  of  models  that  use 
adaptive  arguments  to  explain  territory  size  in  two-dimensional  space,  Both  and 
Visser  (2003)  modelled  the  circumstances  under  which  contiguous  and  non- 
contiguous  territories  centred  on  a  nest  site  should  be  formed.  However,  their  model 
fails  to  satisfy  the  criterion  that  individuals'  behaviour  should  influence  the 
availability  of  space  to  others:  an  individual  was  assumed  to  be  able  to  expand  its 
territory  to  a  specific  size  (T)  regardless  of  population  density,  although  doing  this 
was  costlier  at  higher  densities. 
Thus,  no  model  to  date  satisfies  all  our  criteria.  Perhaps  closest  to  achieving  this 
goal,  Adler  and  Gordon  (2003)  developed  a  spatially  explicit  model  of  territory  size 
in  harvester  ants,  solving  for  optimal  foraging  distances.  However,  the  model  by 
Adler  and  Gordon  (2003)  is  too  specific  to  serve  as  a  general  model  of  space  use  as  it 
is  strongly  focussed  on  the  behaviour  of  ant  workers  that  forage  for  their  colonies. 
Here,  we  develop  a  model  that  addresses  the  issues  of  multiple  competitors  and 
continuous,  two-dimensional  space,  while  investigating  the  adaptiveness  of  different 
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strategies  for  territory  acquisition.  Thus,  one  of  our  aims  is  to  combine  the  spatially 
explicit  approach  of  mechanistic  models  with  some  of  the  evolutionary  aspects  of 
game-theory  models,  in  order  to  understand  the  process  by  which  boundaries  can 
form  between  neighbouring  territories. 
Model 
BACKGROUND 
We  consider  a  situation  in  which  a  number  of  individuals,  N,  arrive  in  a  previously 
unoccupied  area  of  habitat  that  can  potentially  be  divided  into  territories.  The  aim  of 
the  model  is  to  determine  how  the  individuals  can  partition  the  habitat  into  separate 
territories  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999,2001),  rather  than  investigate  the  decision  to 
contest  an  existing  territory  or  settle  in  an  unoccupied  one  (e.  g.  Mesterton-Gibbons 
1992;  Broom  et  al.  1997).  Modelling  was  performed  using  MATLAB,  and  an  outline 
of  the  model  code  can  be  found  in  the  Appendix.  The  habitat  area  consists  of  a 
number  of  lattice  squares,  totalling  a2  squares,  where  a  is  the  linear  size  of  one 
dimension  (i.  e.  the  total  number  of  squares  along  one  edge)  of  the  two-dimensional 
area.  We  assume  that  all  squares  in  the  habitat  area  are  of  the  same  intrinsic  quality, 
that  is,  we  assume  that  every  square  has  the  same  potential  effect  on  individual 
fitness.  The  space  used  by  an  individual  will  consist  of  more  than  one  of  the  squares, 
and  the  total  habitat  area  is  large  enough  to  support  the  territories  of  multiple 
individuals.  To  avoid  boundary  effects,  the  area  is  wrapped  such  that  each  square 
has  exactly  four  neighbouring  squares,  and  we  assume  that  individuals  moving  over  a 
boundary  arrive  back  into  the  habitat  area  from  the  opposite  side.  This  is  a  standard 
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assumption  in  spatially  explicit  individual-based  modelling  (e.  g.  Slatkin  &  Anderson 
1984;  Bascompte  &  Sole  1997;  Ruckstuhl  &  Kokko  2002). 
TERRITORY  EXPANSION  AND  MOVEMENT 
We  assume  that  the  initial  spatial  distribution  of  individuals  is  random.  Each 
individual  therefore  begins  at  a  specific  ('arrival')  location,  (Q),  allocated  at  random, 
and  chosen  from  all  the  lattice  squares  (i.  e.  1ia,  1j  a).  Individual  k's  use  of 
space  in  square  (i,  J)  at  time  t  is  denoted  by  A(i,  j,  k,  t).  This  quantity  reflects  the 
individual's  occupancy  of  the  area,  and  takes  values  between  0  and  1.  Although 
'occupancy'  could  be  taken  to  imply  ownership  or  exclusive  use,  we  simply  mean  that 
this  parameter  reflects  an  accumulation  of  an  individual's  responses  to  experiences  in 
the  area.  An  individual  uses  a  square  if  A(i,  j,  k,  t)  >0  in  that  square;  note  that  we  do 
not  exclude  the  possibility  that  two  or more  individuals  use  the  same  square.  Initially, 
A  at  an  individual's  arrival  location  (i,  j)  is  set  equal  to  1,  and  zero  elsewhere.  The 
values  of  A  for  each  individual  develop  according  to  the  individual's  evolutionary 
strategy,  which  dictates  the  rules  of  habitat  use  in  previously  unfamiliar  habitat,  as 
specified  below.  Within  one  unit  of  time,  individuals  move  through  all  the  space  they 
occupy,  visiting  every  square  in  which  A  exceeds  zero.  Movement  continues  until  the 
end  of  the  settlement  period,  tmax" 
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EXPLORATION  OF  EMPTY  SPACE 
The  individual's  strategy  defines  how  it  reacts  to  encounters  with  others.  Before  we 
proceed  to  describing  these  reactions,  we  specify  how  individuals  encounter  each 
other  in  the  first  place.  In  order  to  expand  their  initial  territory  of  a  single  square  (see 
above),  explore  new  space  and  eventually  meet  other  individuals,  we  assume  an 
intrinsic  tendency  for  an  individual  to  increase  the  space  that  it  uses.  During  each 
time  unit,  for  each  individual  k,  we  take  each  location  (i,  j)  in  which  A(i,  j,  k,  t)>O, 
and  assume  that  the  surrounding  squares  (i-1,  j),  (i+l,  j),  (i,  j-1),  (i,  j+l)  all  increase 
their  value  of  A  by  the  amount  EA(i,  j).  The  rate  e  is  equivalent  to  animals  exploring 
unknown  areas  outside  those  with  which  they  are  familiar,  in  order  to  expand  their 
home  range  or  territory.  To  keep  the  model  simple,  we  assume  that  c  is  equal  for  all 
individuals,  is  fixed  and  does  not  evolve.  We  ensure  that  for  each  individual,  A  does 
not  exceed  1,  by  resetting  the  value  of  A  to  1  if  the  addition  of  c  takes  it  above  this 
value 
EXPERIENCES  WITHIN  THE  TERRITORY 
We  next  describe  the  rules  of  habitat  use  that  depend  on  an  individual's  strategy.  We 
assume  that  during  each  visit  to  a  square,  individuals  can  have  either  an  aggressive  or 
a  non-aggressive  experience.  Aggressive  interactions  between  individuals  occur 
wherever  their  space  use  overlaps.  Thus,  a  time  unit  t  is  defined  as  being  long  enough 
such  that  individuals  can  be  involved  in  multiple  fights  (in  different  squares)  within 
one  time  unit.  Our  time  unit  thus  corresponds  to  the  time  to  independence,  a  concept 
that  is  used  in  home  range  studies  to  describe  the  time  it  takes  an  individual  to  use  all 
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of  its  home  range  (Swihart  &  Slade  1985,  Swihart  et  al.  1988,  Kernohan  et  al.  2001). 
Each  individual  may  fight  with  several  others,  and/or  several  times  with  the  same 
individual  in  different  squares  in  the  habitat  area.  During  one  time  unit,  a  fight 
between  individuals  kl  and  k2  will  occur  wherever  A(i,  j,  k1,  t)  >0  and  A(i,  j,  k2,  t)  >  0. 
We  make  the  assumption  that  fights  occur  wherever  space  use  overlaps  for 
simplicity,  and  to  ensure  that  the  resulting  territories  are  spatially  contiguous. 
Aggressive  encounters  (fights)  can  end  with  a  win,  a  loss  or  a  draw  for  each 
individual.  We  assume  that  all  individuals  have  equal  fighting  abilities;  following 
from  this,  we  also  assume  that  all  fights  end  with  a  random  outcome,  such  that  a 
proportion  d  of  fights  will  end  with  a  draw.  Fights  that  do  not  end  with  a  draw  end 
with  a  clear  winner  and  loser,  with  equal  probability  of  winning  and  losing  for  each 
individual:  (1-d)/2. 
A  non-aggressive  experience  occurs  when  an  individual  k  visits  a  square  in  which 
A(i,  j,  k,  t)  >  0,  but  does  not  encounter  another  individual.  This  occurs  when  a  square 
used  by  the  individual  is  not  used  by  any  other  individuals  (i.  e.  A(i,  j)  =0  for  all 
other  individuals  at  time  t).  Thus,  in  total,  there  are  four  potential  outcomes  for  an 
individual's  visit  to  any  given  square:  a  win,  a  loss,  a  draw,  or  the  individual  can  find 
the  space  empty.  We  assume  that  animals  react  in  different  ways  to  these  four 
outcomes  (dictated  by  their  strategies),  but  a  single  individual  always  reacts  in  the 
same  way  to  the  same  outcome;  individuals  are  fixed  in  this  aspect  of  their  behaviour 
(`behavioural  types',  Sih  et  al.  2004).  A  reaction  is  an  increase  or  decrease  in  A  in 
each  square,  for  each  individual.  After  each  time-step,  a  change  in  A  of  8  is  added  to 
or  subtracted  from  each  individual's  A  in  each  area,  according  to  the  outcome  of  the 
visit  and  the  individual  strategy.  Again,  we  ensure  that  the  value  of  A  always  remains 
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between  0  and  1  by  resetting  the  value  to  0  if  it  becomes  negative,  and  resetting  to  1 
if  it  exceeds  this  value.  An  individual's  strategy  is  composed  of  its  reaction  to  each  of 
the  four  potential  outcomes  of  a  visit  to  a  particular  square. 
STRATEGIES  FOR  TERRITORY  ACQUISITION 
There  are  potentially  a  large  number  of  strategies,  and  considering  every  one  is  not 
feasible  in  our  spatially  explicit  approach.  We  therefore  consider  four  biologically 
interesting  strategies,  which  differ  in  the  way  an  individual  using  the  strategy 
responds  to  the  outcome  of  a  fight,  or  finding  a  square  empty.  The  strategies  differ  in 
their  aggressiveness,  defined  by  the  behaviour  of  an  individual  after  a  fight:  if  an 
individual  reacts  positively  to  a  fight  (i.  e.  the  outcome  causes  an  increase  in  the 
occupancy  value  A),  then  the  individual  responds  aggressively  to  that  outcome. 
Strategy  1:  Cautious  (Ca):  For  individuals  using  this  strategy,  fights  have  a 
negative  effect  on  an  individual's  occupancy  of  the  area,  A,  regardless  of  the  outcome 
of  the  fight  (that  is,  whether  it  won,  lost  or  drew  in  the  fight).  Finding  the  space 
empty  results  in  an  increase  in  A  (after  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999,2001).  Cautious  is 
the  least  aggressive  strategy  we  investigate. 
Strategy  2:  Common-sense  (CS):  Losing  or  drawing  in  a  fight  has  a  negative  effect 
on  occupancy,  A,  for  common-sense  individuals.  Winning  a  fight  and  finding  the 
space  empty  have  a  positive  effect  on  A.  This  is  similar  to  the  'winner-takes-all' 
strategy  of  early  game  theory  models,  and  is  a  more  aggressive  strategy  than 
cautious. 
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Strategy  3:  Paradoxical  (P):  Positive  effects  on  A  result  from  losing  or  drawing  in  a 
fight;  winning  and  finding  the  space  empty  have  a  negative  effect.  Individuals  using 
the  paradoxical  strategy  thus  behave  in  exactly  the  opposite  way  to  common-sense 
individuals.  This  strategy  implies  that  intruders  gain  access  to  territories  while  the 
owners  retreat.  While  deeply  counterintuitive,  it  automatically  emerges  as  a  stable 
solution  in  many  game  theory  models  of  contests  over  indivisible  space  (Maynard 
Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987; 
Mesterton-Gibbons  1992). 
Strategy  4:  Daring  (D):  Only  losing  a  fight  has  a  negative  effect  on  A.  All  other 
experiences  have  a  positive  effect.  This  strategy  is  thus  more  aggressive  than 
cautious  or  common-sense,  as  individuals  are  more  likely  to  repeatedly  encounter 
opponents. 
Two  strategies  compete  at  one  time,  such  that  a  proportion  f  of  individuals  use 
strategy  SI  and  (1-J)  use  S2.  We  aim  to  investigate  the  fitness  consequences  of  using 
different  strategies  (the  calculation  of  fitness  is  defined  below).  We  are  interested  in 
two  basic  events:  whether  a  single  individual  using  strategy  Si  can  invade  a 
population  using  S2,  and  once  this  strategy  has  invaded,  whether  it  can  maintain  a 
superior  or  equal  fitness  level  as  its  numbers  increase. 
HOME  RANGE  SIZE  AND  EXCLUSIVITY 
The  home  range  of  an  individual  is  the  total  number  of  squares  for  which  A(i,  j,  k, 
t,  ￿)  >  0,  at  the  end  of  the  settlement  period,  tm.  We  also  calculate  the  number  of 
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squares  used  exclusively  by  each  individual.  For  individual  ki,  this  is  the  number  of 
squares  for  which  A(i,  j,  kl,  tm)  >  0,  but  A(i,  j,  k2  Not)=O. 
INDIVIDUAL  FITNESS 
The  costs  associated  with  fighting  are  represented  by  c.  We  assume  that  all  fights 
carry  equal  costs,  regardless  of  the  outcome  of  the  fight.  Thus,  the  outcome  of  a  fight 
itself  rather  than  the  costs  experienced  by  an  individual  determines  the  individual's 
response  to  the  fight.  We  make  this  assumption  to  make  the  model  as  symmetrical  as 
possible,  allowing  us  to  investigate  the  paradoxical  strategy  as  an  alternative  to  the 
common-sense  strategy.  If  we  nevertheless  find  that  paradoxical  strategies  cannot 
persist,  the  absence  of  paradoxical  solutions  in  nature  is  better  explained  than  had  we 
made  assumptions  that  possibly  bias  outcomes  towards  common-sense  strategies. 
We  assume  that  there  is  no  cost  associated  with  finding  a  square  empty  of  other 
individuals.  Total  contest  costs  for  each  individual,  Ck,  are  calculated  cumulatively  at 
each  time-step.  An  individual  pays  the  costs  associated  with  the  outcome  it 
experiences  in  each  square  in  each  time-step  (see  the  Appendix).  The  benefits 
gained  by  each  individual,  Bk,  are  calculated  at  the  end  of  the  territory  settlement 
period,  tnax.  Each  individual  gains  benefits  Bk  from  each  square  it  occupies,  scaled  by 
its  occupancy,  A,  in  that  square,  and  the  sum  of  A  in  the  area  for  all  individuals  using 
the  area.  Thus,  for  individual  kl  : 
B  __ 
A(i,  j,  k1,  tmax  ) 
kl  N 
A(i,  j,  k,  tm  ) 
k=1 
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The  square  root  represents  a  diminishing  returns  relationship  between  the  number  of 
squares  occupied  by  an  individual  and  the  benefits  it  gains  from  that  area.  This  is  a 
generally  accepted  relationship  between  the  size  of  a  territory  and  the  benefits  that 
can  be  gained  from  it.  For  a  central  place  forager,  for  example,  an  increase  in 
territory  size  increases  the  food  available  to  the  territory  owner,  but  increases  the 
time  taken  to  transport  it  to  the  nest  or  retreat  (Both  &  Visser  2003).  For  territories 
used  purely  for  feeding,  there  is  a  maximum  food  intake  above  which  fitness  no 
longer  increases  (Gill  &  Wolf  1975;  Schoener  1983). 
The  fitness  of  individual  k,  Wk,  depends  multiplicatively  on  the  benefits  gained  (Bk) 
from  the  space  it  uses  and  the  costs  it  pays  (Ck)  during  fighting,  scaled  such  that 
increasing  costs  lead  to  fitness  approaching  zero: 
Wk=Bke  Ck 
The  multiplicative  form  indicates  that  territories  are  necessary  to  gain  fitness,  and  an 
individual  that  uses  none  of  the  available  space,  gaining  no  benefits  (B  =  0)  will  have 
no  fitness  (but  will  remain  extant),  but  neither  will  an  individual  whose  costs  of 
fighting  are  so  high  that  survival  is  very  improbable  (CC).  This  form  also  ensures 
that  fitness  (a  relative  concept)  never  becomes  negative.  The  negative  exponential 
function  indicates  that  each  fight  reduces  the  fitness  benefits  that  can  be  gained  by 
the  same  proportion.  Strategy  fitness  Ws  is  estimated  as  the  mean  fitness  of  all 
individuals  using  strategy  S  after  20  iterations  of  the  model. 
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EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY  OF  STRATEGIES 
We  investigated  whether  a  population  of  each  of  the  strategies  is  stable  against 
invasion  by  a  single  mutant  individual  using  one  of  the  alternative  strategies  (f  = 
1/N).  We  investigate  whether  populations  are  stable  against  mutants  under  different 
levels  of  costs  (c)  and  population  density  (N).  The  details  of  the  algorithm  are 
provided  in  the  Appendix.  If  a  strategy  is  susceptible  to  invasion  by  a  mutant,  we  can 
investigate  whether  the  mutant  strategy  gains  higher  or  lower  mean  fitness  than  the 
population  when  its  numbers  increase  (f  =  0.5).  Here  we  consider  only  a  single 
generation:  a  potentially  fruitful  avenue  of  further  research  would  be  to  allow  the 
frequency  of  individuals  using  a  certain  strategy  to  evolve  over  many  generations. 
The  model  also  allows  us  to  compare  the  fitness  of  populations  of  a  single  strategy, 
and  the  territories  they  gain.  Since  our  model  is  stochastic,  the  stability  of  a 
population  has  to  be  interpreted  in  the  following  conservative  way:  A  mutant  is  able 
to  invade  a  population  if  its  fitness  is  equal  to  or  greater  than  the  mean  strategy 
fitness  of  the  population  (solid  lines  in  figures  5.3  and  5.4,  `Y'  in  table  5.2).  A 
mutant  cannot  invade  a  population  if  the  population  has  greater  mean  fitness  than  the 
mutant  (dashed  lines  in  figures  5.3  and  5.4,  `x'  in  table  5.2).  Invadability  was 
investigated  using  paired  t-tests;  p-values  were  Bonferroni  corrected  (Rice  1989) 
within  a  set  of  parameter  values.  Under  some  parameter  values,  either  the  mutant,  or 
the  population,  or  both,  gain  fitness  of  zero  (when  both  the  invader  and  the 
population  gain  zero  fitness,  it  shown  by  a  dotted  line  in  figures  5.3  and  5.4),  and 
thus  cannot  invade  or  resist  invasion. 
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PRELIMINARY  SIMULATIONS 
Preliminary  investigations  of  the  simulation  model  revealed  that  spatially  contiguous 
territories  were  established  for  each  individual,  and  that  100  time-steps  (t,  ￿  =  100) 
were  sufficient  for  space  use  to  approach  equilibrium.  At  equilibrium,  when  space 
was  divided,  there  was  variation  between  individuals  in  the  number  of  squares  used, 
even  when  all  individuals  were  equal  and  using  the  same  strategy. 
Results 
POPULATION  PERFORMANCE 
We  first  compare  the  performance  of  strategies  in  isolation  from  each  other.  When 
all  individuals  in  the  population  are  using  the  same  strategy,  a  population  of  cautious 
individuals  displays  the  highest  mean  fitness,  followed  by  populations  of  common- 
sense  individuals.  Populations  of  daring  (D)  and  paradoxical  (P)  individuals  gain 
very  low  fitness,  much  lower  than  that  of  cautious  (Ca)  and  common-sense  (CS) 
individuals  when  the  costs  associated  with  fighting  are  low  (figure  5.1,  open  bars). 
This  pattern  also  exists  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  intermediate,  although  fitness 
values  are  lower  when  costs  are  higher,  and  common-sense  does  not  differ  from 
paradoxical  and  daring  strategies  (figure  5.1,  filled  bars).  At  high  fighting  costs, 
fitness  values  are  very  low  for  all  populations  (not  shown).  Thus,  in  a  `good  for  the 
species'  point  of  view  that  ignores  invasibilities,  the  least  aggressive  strategies  that 
show  avoidance  behaviour  perform  best. 
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Figure  5.1:  Mean  (+  SD)  fitness  gained  by  individuals  using  each  strategy  when  all 
individuals  in  the  population  are  using  the  same  strategy,  for  low  costs  (c  =  0.0001, 
open  bars:  ANOVA:  F3,76=  1613.15,  p<0.001,  Tukey's  B  post-hoc  test  revealed  that 
Cautious  (Ca)  and  common-sense  (CS)  strategies  differ  from  one  another,  and  also 
differ  from  the  paradoxical  (P)  and  daring  (D)  strategies)  and  intermediate  costs  (c  = 
0.001,  filled  bars,  ANOVA:  F3,76  =  223.54,  p<0.001.  Tukey's  B  post-hoc  test 
revealed  that  P,  D  and  CS  have  similar  fitness,  but  C  gained  higher  fitness). 
Parameter  values  used:  N=  10,  a=  15,  d=0.8,6  =  0.1,  E=0.1,  tn,;,  x  =  100.  The 
model  was  run  20  times  for  each  strategy. 
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Figure  5.2:  Mean  (+  SD)  number  of  lattice  squares  occupied  exclusively  by  one 
individual  (filled  bars;  ANOVA:  F3,76  =  4114.26,  p<0.001,  Tukey's  B  post-hoc  test 
revealed  Ca  >  CS  >P  and  D,  abbreviations  as  figure  5.1)  and  total  number  of  squares 
used  by  each  individual,  including  those  occupied  exclusively  (open  bars;  ANOVA: 
F3,76=  431010.65,  p<0.001.  Tukey's  B  post-hoc  test  revealed  P  and  D>  CS  >  Ca), 
when  all  individuals  in  the  population  use  the  same  strategy.  Parameter  values  used: 
N=  10,  a=15,  d=0.8,6=0.1,  E=0.1,  c=0.0001,  t,,,  ax=100.  The  model  was  run 
20  times  for  each  strategy. 
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An  important  question  to  ask  in  a  discussion  of  territoriality  is  whether  the  strategies 
under  consideration  can  divide  space  and  form  stable  territories.  When  all 
individuals  in  the  population  are  using  the  same  strategy,  and  draws  occur  relatively 
often  (d  =  0.8),  a  population  of  cautious  individuals  gains  the  most  exclusive  space 
(figure  5.2,  filled  bars),  followed  by  a  population  of  common-sense  individuals. 
Populations  of  individuals  using  the  daring  or  paradoxical  strategies  do  not  get  any 
exclusive  space,  instead,  all  individuals  share  overlapping  home  ranges  (figure  5.2, 
open  bars). 
EVOLUTIONARY  STABILITY:  CAUTIOUS,  COMMON-SENSE  AND  DARING 
In  an  evolutionary  setting,  the  important  question  is  whether  a  population  using  a 
particular  strategy  is  stable  against  invasion  by  a  single  mutant  individual  using  a 
different  strategy,  and  how  this  is  affected  by  different  costs  of  fighting  and 
population  density.  We  compare  three  of  our  four  strategies,  cautious,  common-sense 
and  daring,  representing  increasing  aggressiveness  in  individuals  using  the  strategies. 
We  will  consider  the  success  of  the  paradoxical  strategy  in  a  separate  section  below. 
Increasing  the  costs  of  fighting  alters  the  ability  of  strategies  both  to  invade  and  resist 
invasion  by  other  strategies  (figure  5.3).  At  low  costs  of  fighting  (c=0.0001), 
cautious  strategies  are  unable  to  invade  or  resist  invasion  by  either  of  the  more 
aggressive  strategies,  but  as  the  costs  increase  to  an  intermediate  level  (c  =  0.001), 
cautious  is  able  to  invade  a  common-sense  population,  and  resist  invasion  by  both 
common-sense  and  daring  strategies.  When  the  costs  of  fighting  are  high  (c  = 
0.005),  cautious  continues  to  invade  common-sense,  but  can  once  again  be  invaded 
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by  common-sense.  This  is  due  to  the  extremely  low  fitness  gained  by  individuals 
both  types  of  individuals  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  high. 
Common-sense  populations  are  resistant  to  invasion  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are 
low,  but  increasing  costs  means  that  they  can  be  invaded,  first  by  the  cautious 
strategy  (intermediate  costs)  and  then  by  the  daring  strategy  (high  costs;  figure  5.3). 
Both  common-sense  and  cautious  strategies  are  unable  to  invade  a  daring  population 
regardless  of  the  costs  of  fighting.  When  fighting  costs  are  high,  fitness  can  decline 
to  zero  for  both  the  invader  and  invaded  strategy.  Daring  is  a  relatively  ineffective 
strategy  as  an  invader:  a  single  daring  individual  can  only  invade  cautious 
populations  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  low,  and  common-sense  populations  when 
the  costs  are  high.  It  is,  however,  stable  against  invasion  by  both  common-sense  and 
cautious  individuals,  regardless  of  the  costs  of  fighting. 
Increasing  the  number  of  individuals  present  in  the  habitat  area  also  influences 
whether  individuals  using  one  strategy  can  invade  a  population  using  a  different 
strategy  (figure  5.4).  In  general,  increasing  the  density  of  individuals  increases  the 
likelihood  that  the  more  aggressive  strategies  are  successful  as  invaders.  At  low 
population  density  (N  =  5),  cautious  can  invade  common-sense  populations,  but  all 
other  invasions  are  unsuccessful.  Increasing  the  density  to  N=  10  results  in  cautious 
populations  no  longer  being  stable  against  invasions  from  common-sense  and  daring 
individuals,  and  further  increasing  to  N=  15  means  that  common-sense  populations 
can  now  be  invaded  by  daring  individuals,  whereas  under  lower  population  densities 
these  populations  are  stable  against  invasion. 
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Figure  5.3:  The  effect  of  increasing  the  costs  of  fighting  on  the  ability  of  an 
individual  using  each  strategy  to  invade  populations  using  each  alternative  strategy. 
Solid  arrows  indicate  that  an  invader  using  the  strategy  at  the  foot  of  the  arrow  is 
able  to  invade  a  population  of  individuals  using  the  strategy  at  the  head  of  the  arrow. 
Dashed  lines  indicate  that  invasion  of  the  population  at  the  is  not  possible,  and 
dotted  lines  indicate  that  both  the  invader  and  the  population  gain  zero  fitness  when 
invasion  into  the  population  at  the  is  attempted,  based  on  20  runs  for  each  invasion. 
Abbreviations  used:  Ca  =  cautious,  CS  =  common-sense,  D=  daring.  Parameter 
values  used:  low  costs:  c=0.0001,  intermediate  costs:  c=0.001,  high  costs:  c= 
0.005,  N=10,  a=15,  d=0.8,  tmax  100,5=0.1,  c=0.1, 
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Figure  5.4:  The  effect  of  increasing  population  density  on  the  ability  of  individuals 
using  each  strategy  to  invade  populations  using  each  alternative  strategy,  based  on  20 
runs  for  each  invasion.  Abbreviations  and  arrows  figure  5.3.  Parameter  values  used:  c 
=  0.000  1,  a=  15,  d=0.8,  r-100,8=0.1,  c=0.1 
LONG  TERM  INVASION  POTENTIAL 
Once  an  individual  using  a  different  strategy  has  invaded  a  population,  it  may 
reproduce  and  increase  in  number.  Thus,  we  can  investigate  the  effect  of  an 
increased  frequency  of  the  invading  strategy  (increasing  f  of  strategy  S1).  We  chose 
as  an  example  to  investigate  the  effect  of  equal  numbers  of  each  of  the  two  strategies 
present  in  the  population  (f  =  0.5),  for  one  of  the  population  densities  considered 
above  (N  =  10).  When  the  daring  strategy  is  present  in  the  population  at  f=0.5, 
those  individuals  always  gain  higher  mean  fitness  than  the  cautious  or  common-sense 
individuals  they  share  the  habitat  with  (table  5.1).  This  suggests  that  even  if 
common-sense  or  cautious  individuals  are  able  to  invade  a  daring  population,  their 
numbers  are  unlikely  to  increase. 
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Table  5.1:  Relative  fitness  when  strategies  are  equally  common  in  the  population, 
showing  the  strategy  that  gains  higher  fitness,  for  different  levels  of  fighting  costs. 
Abbreviations  used:  Ca  =  cautious,  CS  =  common-sense,  D=  daring.  Low  costs:  c= 
0.0001;  intermediate  costs:  c=0.001;  high  costs:  c=0.005.  Other  parameters  used: 
N=10,  a=  15,  d=0.8,  t=100,5=0.1,  c=0.1,20  runs  for  each  parameter  and  strategy 
combination. 
Costs 
Strategy  Pair  Low  Intermediate  High 
Cautious  Common-sense  CS  CS  Ca 
Cautious  Daring  D  D  D 
Common-sense  Daring  D  D  D 
In  populations  consisting  of  5  individuals  using  the  common-sense  strategy  and  5 
individuals  using  the  cautious  strategy,  the  individuals  using  the  common-sense 
strategy  gain  highest  fitness  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  low  (c  =  0.0001)  or 
intermediate  (c  =  0.001),  but  the  cautious  individuals  gain  higher  fitness  when  the 
costs  of  fighting  are  high  (c  =  0.005).  At  low  fighting  costs,  a  common-sense 
individual  can  invade  a  cautious  population  (figure  5.3),  and  its  fitness  is  also  higher 
when  it  makes  up  50%  of  the  population  (table  5.1).  At  intermediate  costs,  a 
cautious  individual  can  invade  a  common-sense  population  (figure  5.3),  but  it  gains 
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lower  fitness  than  the  common-sense  individuals  when  they  are  equal  in  number 
(table  5.1).  When  fighting  costs  are  high,  both  cautious  and  common-sense 
individuals  can  invade  populations  of  the  other  strategy  (figure  5.3),  but  at  50%,  the 
cautious  strategy  prevails  (table  5.1).  Thus,  under  high  fighting  costs,  cautious 
individuals  have  the  potential  to  invade  common-sense  populations  over  a  longer 
time  period,  but  common-sense  individuals  do  not  have  the  potential  to  invade 
cautious  populations. 
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  DRAWS  -  COMMON  SENSE  AND  PARADOXICAL  STRATEGIES 
We  now  investigate  whether  an  individual  using  the  common-sense  or  paradoxical 
strategy  can  invade  populations  using  other  strategies,  when  draws  occur  either 
commonly  (d  =  0.8)  or  less  commonly  (d  =  0.2).  When  draws  are  common,  there  is  a 
clear  difference  between  the  common-sense  and  paradoxical  strategies:  a  single 
paradoxical  individual  can  invade  a  daring  population,  but  a  common-sense 
individual  cannot  (table  5.2).  However,  when  draws  are  less  common,  both 
common-sense  and  paradoxical  strategies  can  invade  daring  populations,  and  also 
invade  populations  of  each  other,  and  in  this  way,  behave  identically  (table  2). 
We  also  compare  the  fitness  and  territories  gained  by  common-sense  and  paradoxical 
populations  (i.  e.  the  population  performance,  see  above),  and  investigate  the  effect  of 
changing  the  probability  of  a  draw.  When  draws  are  common  (d  =  0.8),  the  common- 
sense  strategy  gains  more  exclusive  space  (figure  5.2)  and  higher  fitness  than 
paradoxical  when  the  costs  of  fighting  are  low  (c  =  0.0001;  figure  5.1).  When  draws 
occur  only  less  frequently  (d  =  0.2),  the  fitness  of  common-sense  individuals 
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decreases  (mean  fitness  ±2S.  E  =  1.46*  10"7±  3.57*  10"9,  d=0.2,  other  parameter 
values  as  fig.  1).  Common-sense  territories  decrease  from  5.65  ±  4.226  (mean  ±2 
S.  E)  exclusive  squares  when  draws  are  common,  to  no  exclusive  squares  when  draws 
are  less  common  (d  =  0.2,  other  parameter  values  as  fig.  2).  Paradoxical  individuals 
gain  no  exclusive  space  in  either  case.  Thus,  when  draws  occur  less  commonly, 
common-sense  individuals  become  much  more  similar  to  paradoxical  individuals 
than  when  draws  are  a  common  outcome  of  fights. 
Table  5.2:  The  ability  of  common-sense  (CS)  and  paradoxical  (P)  strategies  to 
invade  populations  using  each  alternative  strategy,  for  two  different  probabilities  that 
the  fight  ends  without  a  clear  winner  and  loser.  Abbreviations  as  table  5.1,  plus:  Y= 
mutant  can  invade,  x=  mutant  cannot  invade.  Parameter  values  used:  c=0.001, 
N=10,  a=15,5=0.1,  s=0.1,  t=100,20  runs  for  each  invasion. 
d=0.8  d=  0.2 
Mutant  CS  P  CS  P 
Population 
C  xx  xx 
CS  -x  -Y 
D  xy  YY 
P  x-  Y- 
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Discussion 
Our  modelling  clearly  shows  that  spatial  division  is  a  more  complicated  issue  than  a 
strategy's  success  in  contests  over  one  resource  item  would  predict.  Models  such  as 
hawk-dove  games  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973;  Grafen  1979;  Houston  & 
McNamara  1991;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992;  Crowley  2000),  concentrate  on  what 
happens  when  two  contestants  have  already  met,  and  a  fight  ensues.  Other 
approaches  assume  that  space  can  only  be  gained  as  the  result  of  winning  contests 
(Maynard  Smith  1982,  Pereira  et  al.  2003).  This  ignores  the  possibility  that 
individuals  may  gain  space  simply  by  being  `cautious',  that  is,  be  deterred  from 
space  that  is  contested,  and  seek  other  empty  spaces  instead  (Stamps  &  Krishnan 
1995,1998,1999,2001).  To  find  out  the  success  of  such  a  strategy,  it  is  necessary  to 
realise  that  a  strategy  can  have  positive  fitness  even  if  it  loses  ownership  of  one 
particular  location;  in  other  words,  a  spatially  explicit  treatment  is  needed. 
Morrell  and  Kokko  (2003;  chapter  4)  showed,  in  a  simple  one-dimensional  three- 
compartment  model,  that  `cautious'  type  strategies  can  be  successful  if  the  value  of 
monopolisation  of  a  resource  item  is  low,  for  example,  when  the  contest  is  over  a 
moderately  small  expansion  of  a  territory,  rather  than  territory  ownership  itself. 
Lewis  and  Moorcroft  (2001)  have  likewise  shown,  in  a  model  inspired  by  scent- 
marking  wolf  packs,  that  strategies  that  yield  minimal  conflict  with  neighbours  can 
be  evolutionarily  successful.  Here  we  have  shown  that  this  idea  holds  in  a  general 
setting,  with  interactions  that  resemble  hawk-dove  encounters  of  early  game  theory 
models,  but  interpreted  in  a  spatially  explicit  framework  that  allows  assessment  of 
whether  territories  form,  validating  some  of  our  earlier  findings  (Morrell  &  Kokko 
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2003;  chapter  4).  When  fighting  costs  are  high  relative  to  the  value  of  the  resource, 
evolutionarily  stable  behaviour  generates  well-defined,  exclusive  territories,  either 
through  `cautious'  or  `common-sense'  behaviour,  due  to  avoidance  following 
aggressive  encounters.  By  contrast,  if  costs  of  fighting  are  low  compared  to  resource 
value,  territoriality  breaks  down  and  evolution  proceeds  to  the  formation  of  large, 
overlapping  home  ranges,  where  avoidance  of  fight  locations  does  not  occur.  That 
increasing  costs  favour  strategies  that  avoid  conflict  is  well  known  from  early  game 
theory  (Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973;  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1974;  Parker  & 
Knowlton  1980),  and  costly  conflicts  can  lead  to  the  evolution  of  exclusive  territories 
in  ant  colonies  (Adler  &  Gordon  2003). 
In  our  model,  high  fight  costs  lead  to  the  formation  of  territories  through  avoidance 
behaviour.  However,  once  territories  are  established,  interactions  between 
neighbours  tend  to  be  of  low  intensity  and  low  cost,  compared  to  interactions 
between  territory  owners  and  intruders  (the  `dear  enemy  phenomenon';  Getty  1987; 
Ydenberg  et  al.  1988;  Temeles  1994).  Such  reduced  aggression  emerges  as  the  result 
of  increasing  familiarity  between  individuals  that  interact  frequently  (e.  g.  Morris  et 
al.  1995;  Höjesjö  et  al.  1998;  Utne-Palm  &  Hart  2000),  after  the  settlement  period 
considered  in  the  model.  In  the  case  of  overlapping  home  ranges  and  very  low  fight 
costs,  one  should  note  that  the  terms  `fighting  costs'  and  `aggressive'  may  become 
misleading;  a  better  interpretation  of  a  `fight'  in  such  a  case  is  a  low-cost  interaction 
between  individuals  who  share  space,  e.  g.  through  resource  depletion  without  overt 
aggression.  The  evolutionarily  stable  behaviour  in  such  a  case  is  the  most  aggressive 
behaviour,  `daring',  and  it  simply  describes  any  non-territorial  species,  for  which  the 
costs  of  sharing  space  with  conspecifics  are  not  sufficient  to  deter  any  individual 
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from  using  any  particular  region  of  the  area,  and  which  responds  in  an  optimistic  way 
to  interactions  with  others. 
We  assume  that  all  fights  carry  the  same  cost,  regardless  of  the  outcome.  In  some 
cases,  winners  and  losers  pay  equal  costs  (Smith  &  Taylor  1992).  In  others,  losers 
incur  higher  costs  than  winners  (Neat  et  al.  1998a),  while  in  some  cases,  the 
energetic  cost  of  winning  may  even  exceed  that  of  losing  (Hack  1997).  One  might 
expect  an  individual  to  respond  more  strongly  to  fights  that  carry  greater  costs,  for 
example,  an  individual  using  a  cautious  strategy  might  be  less  likely  to  return  to  a 
location  in  which  it  has  suffered  high  fight  costs  (perhaps  through  losing)  than  one  in 
which  it  has  suffered  lower  costs  because  it  won  the  fight  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  2001). 
Our  assumption  that  all  fights  are  equally  costly  and  have  an  equal  magnitude  of 
effect  allows  us  to  investigate  the  effect  of  the  fight  outcome  itself  rather  than  a 
response  to  the  costs  paid  as  a  result  of  the  fight. 
In  addition  to  investigating  the  costs  of  fighting,  our  spatially  explicit  treatment  also 
allows  us  to  consider  effects  of  population  density.  Clearly,  being  `cautious'  only 
pays  if  there  is  sufficient  empty  space  available  to  be  won.  In  denser  populations, 
common-sense  strategies  can  prevail,  and  in  the  densest  populations,  territoriality 
breaks  down.  This  pattern  fits  in  well  with  the  ideas  of  economic  defensibility  of 
territories  (Brown  1964;  Adams  2001;  Both  &  Visser  2003),  and  with  game  theory 
findings  that  increasing  density  favours  individuals  that  act  more  aggressively  (e.  g. 
Parker  &  Knowlton  1980;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992). 
The  costs  and  benefits  of  territory  maintenance  have  commonly  been  found  to 
change  with  intruder  pressure  (e.  g.  Iguchi  &  Hino  1996;  Praw  &  Grant  1999;  Adams 
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2001),  and  there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  population  density  affects  territorial 
behaviour.  In  lizards,  individuals  gain  more  exclusive  home  ranges  at  low  densities 
than  at  high  densities  (Stamps  &  Krishnan  1998).  In  juvenile  salmonid  fish, 
territorial  behaviour  occurs  only  at  low  population  densities;  at  high  densities, 
individuals  share  space,  and  little  aggression  occurs  (Kallenberg  1958).  However,  in 
the  funnel-web  spider  Agelenopsis  aperta,  the  costs  of  maintaining  territories  in 
habitats  near  saturation  is  higher  than  that  in  habitats  where  space  is  more  readily 
available,  but  territorial  behaviour  does  not  appear  to  vary  (Riechert  1979,1981), 
perhaps  due  to  external  constraints  such  as  gene  flow  (Hammerstein  &  Riechert 
1988). 
A  limitation  of  our  model  is  that  population  density  is  a  parameter  that  can  take 
different  values,  rather  than  be  a  consequence  of  the  population  dynamics  that  the 
individual  behaviour  generates  (Eshel  &  Sansone  1995;  Mylius  &  Diekmann  1995; 
Kokko  &  Lundberg  2001).  However,  our  results  are  consistent  with  other  work  in 
this  area.  Considering  territorial  turnover  in  a  setting  with  a  fixed  number  of  breeding 
spots,  Dunham  et  al.  (1995)  showed  that  a  non-aggressive  `waiting'  strategy 
prevailed  when  injury  rate  was  high  and  if  territory  owners  had  a  high  death  rate. 
Both  factors  have  the  effect  of  lowering  population  density,  lending  support  to  the 
idea  that  life  histories  that  lead  to  much  vacant  space  in  the  environment  allow 
spatial  strategies  with  relatively  non-aggressive  behaviour  to  prevail  in  a  population, 
with  ownership  fully  respected.  At  a  higher  density  individuals  may  get  more 
`desperate'  (sensu  Grafen  1987). 
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ON  THE  ABSENCE  OF  PARADOXICAL  STRATEGIES  IN  NATURE 
Theoretical  models  often  produce  paradoxical  solutions  to  contests  over  the 
acquisition  of  indivisible  space  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Hammerstein  & 
Parker  1982;  Maynard  Smith  1982;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987;  Mesterton-Gibbons 
1992),  so  that  owners  retreat  when  challenged  by  intruders.  Such  solutions  are  found 
when  asymmetries  in  resource  holding  potential  are  small  or  absent  (RHP;  Parker 
1974a),  yet  they  rarely  occur  in  nature  (but  see  Burgess  1976;  Fernet  &  Smith  1976; 
Peeke  et  al.  1998).  Our  model  provides  a  novel  explanation  for  the  absence  of 
paradoxical  strategies  in  nature  that  does  not  rely  on  RHP  asymmetries.  If  a  large 
proportion  of  fights  end  without  a  clear  winner  or  loser  (Bleistein  et  al.  1994;  Stamps 
&  Krishnan  1994a,  b,  1997,1998;  Adams  1998;  Stamps  1999;  Draud  et  al.  2004), 
then  the  common-sense  strategy  wins  over  the  paradoxical  alternative  because  it 
responds  more  adaptively  to  draws.  The  common-sense  strategy  behaves  cautiously 
after  a  draw.  The  paradoxical  strategy's  response  resembles  that  of  `daring',  with  the 
associated  benefits  and  costs:  it  can  invade  `daringly',  but  is  not  able  to  form  stable 
territories  and  persist  on  its  own  if  repeated  encounters  are  costly. 
Had  we  defined  the  paradoxical  strategy  as  different  from  the  common-sense  one 
with  respect  to  responses  to  wins  and  losses  only,  we  would  not  have  found  the 
above  asymmetry  in  the  outcome  (this  would  correspond  to  swapping  the  labels 
`win'  and  `loss',  without  paying  attention  to  the  biological  meaning).  Under  such  a 
definition,  any  fitness  difference  between  the  paradoxical  and  common-sense 
strategies  would  have  to  arise  through  other  mechanisms  (e.  g.  Mesterton-Gibbons 
1992,  Morrell  &  Kokko  2003).  However,  our  fitness  comparisons  rely  on  cognitive 
`rules  of  thumb':  behavioural  mechanisms  dictate  that  one  is  likely  to  find  correlated 
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responses  to  situations  that  resemble  each  other.  Since  both  `loss'  and  `draw'  entail 
not  acquiring  the  desired  resource,  swapping  the  response  to  one  outcome  is  likely  to 
influence  the  decisions  made  in  another  situation  too. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To  summarise,  our  model  has  shown  that  it  is  possible  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
spatially  explicit,  two-dimensional,  mechanistic  models  of  territory  formation  and 
adaptive  models  of  animal  conflict.  Our  model  also  shows  that  avoidance  of  high 
fighting  costs  easily  results  in  solutions  where  individuals  settle  and  agree  on 
boundary  locations  even  though  some  individuals  end  up  with  much  smaller  spaces 
than  others  -  despite  every  individual  being  equal  in  our  model.  In  our  model,  the 
space  was  uniform,  with  no  habitat  gradients  or  landmarks  that  could  serve  as 
territorial  boundaries. 
An  interesting  case  for  future  development  is  the  inclusion  of  landmarks:  arbitrary 
features  of  the  landscape  that  can  be  used  as  conventions  dictating  the  boundaries  of 
territories,  and  therefore  reduce  the  frequency  of  aggressive  encounters  (Eason  et  al. 
1999;  LaManna  &  Eason  2003;  Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  2003).  In  a  two-player 
setting  with  a  one-dimensional  (linear)  territory,  landmark  use  has  been  found  to  be  a 
stable  convention  (Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  2003),  even  if  it  significantly 
reduces  territory  sizes  for  the  owner  of  the  smaller  territory.  Investigating  the  limits 
of  such  conventions  in  a  spatially  realistic  setting,  and  examining  its  population 
consequences,  would  be  a  fruitful  avenue  of  further  research. 
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Appendix:  Model  of  spatial  division 
The  following  steps  outline  the  simulation  model  of  spatial  division. 
1.  Define  the  strategies  and  other  parameters  used  in  the  model.  Select  the  two 
strategies  Sl  and  S2  to  be  tested  against  each  other. 
2.  N  individuals  are  each  allocated  one  of  the  two  selected  strategies.  The  number 
of  individuals  allocated  each  strategy  is  determined  by  the  parameter  f.  For  a 
single  invading  mutant,  f=  1/N.  The  first  )?  V  individuals  are  allocated  strategy  S1, 
and  the  remainder,  strategy  S2 
3.  The  N  individuals  arrive  in  a  grid  of  squares  measuring  a  squares  by  a  squares. 
The  grid  of  squares  is  wrapped  such  that  each  square  has  exactly  4  neighbouring 
squares.  The  initial  location  of  each  individual  (i,  j)  is  determined  randomly,  and 
is independent  of  the  location  of  all  other  individuals. 
4.  A  for  each  individual  (k)  is  set  to  1  in  the  initial  location  square  (i,  j),  such  that 
A(i,  j,  k,  t1)  =  1.  A  in  all  other  squares  is  set  to  zero. 
5.  For  each  individual,  A  in  all  squares  surrounding  its  initial  location  increase  by 
sA  (which  in  this  case  is  equal  to  c). 
6.  Each  individual  uses  all  squares  in  which  A(i,  j,  k,  t)  >  0.  For  each  individual,  kl 
to  kN,  we  compare  the  location  identities  of  all  squares  in  which  A(i,  j,  k,  t)  >0 
with  the  location  identities  of  all  other  individuals. 
7.  For  each  possible  pair  of  individuals,  we  record  the  location  where  both  A(i,  j,  k1, 
t)  >0  and  A(i,  j,  k2,  t)  >  0.  At  this  location,  a  fight  takes  place. 
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8.  The  outcome  of  the  fight  is  determined  randomly,  with  a  probability  d  that  the 
fight  ends  in  a  draw.  If  a  number  drawn  from  a  random  number  distribution  is 
less  than  (1-d)/2,  we  record  that  individual  kl  won  the  fight,  and  individual  k2 
lost.  If  the  random  number  is  between  (1-d)/2  and  d,  we  record  a  loss  for 
individual  kt  and  a  win  for  individual  k2.  Otherwise,  we  record  a  draw  for  both 
individuals.  This  step  is  repeated  for  all  possible  pairs  of  individuals  in  all 
locations  where  both  A(i,  j,  k1,  t)  >0  and  A(i,  j,  k2,  t)  >  0. 
9.  For  each  fight,  the  costs  to  the  each  of  the  participants  is  recorded,  and  added  to 
any  existing  costs  already  paid  by  the  individual  from  other  fights  in  the  same  or 
previous  time-steps. 
10.  As  a  result  of  the  outcome  of  fights,  A(i,  j,  k,  t)  changes  in  accordance  with  the 
individual  strategy,  by  a  value  S.  For  each  fight  recorded  above,  we  determine 
how  A  will  change  as  a  result  of  the  value  of  8  and  the  strategy  used  by  the 
individuals  involved  in  that  fight.  These  changes  (some  of  which  are  positive 
and  some  negative)  are  recorded  for  each  square  for  each  individual. 
11.  If  there  is  no  fight  in  a  particular  square  for  a  particular  individual,  A  changes  in 
accordance  to  their  response  to  finding  the  space  empty.  Combining  steps  10  and 
11  gives  a  change  in  A  for  each  square,  for  each  individual. 
12.  When  all  the  changes  as  a  result  of  the  fights  have  been  recorded,  they  are  added 
to  the  original  A  value  for  each  square.  Any  A  values  which  then  exceed  1  or  are 
below  zero  are  set  to  1  and  0  respectively. 
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13.  At  each  location  (i,  J)  in  which  A(i,  j,  k,  t)>O,  the  surrounding  squares  (i-1,  j), 
(Q-1),  (i,  j+l)  all  increase  their  value  of  A  by  the  amount  EA(i,  j). 
14.  Steps  6  to  13  are  repeated  for  tm,,,,  times.  After  this,  the  simulation  ends. 
15.  At  the  end  of  the  simulation,  individual  fitness,  home  range  size  and  number  of 
squares  used  exclusively  are  calculated,  and  grouped  according  to  the  strategy 
used  by  the  individual.  Strategy  means  are  then  calculated  and  collected. 
16.  The  entire  simulation  is  repeated  20  times. 
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CHAPTER  6 
ARE  BEHAVIOURAL  TRADE-OFFS  ALL  THEY  SEEM? 
COUNTER-INTUITIVE  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  CONFLICT 
BETWEEN  TWO  BEHAVIOURS 
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Abstract 
The  understanding  of  trade-offs  between  behaviours  is  fundamental  to  the  study  of 
animal  behaviour.  Individuals  may  often  be  faced  with  the  choice  of  which  of  two 
mutually  incompatible  behaviours  to  perform.  Here,  I  present  a  model  investigating 
the  trade-off  between  two  behaviours,  where  one  of  the  behaviours  is  crucial  to  the 
success  of  the  other.  I  illustrate  the  results  with  examples,  considering  particularly  a 
trade-off  between  territorial  defence  and  courtship.  I  investigate  how  the  ability,  of 
an  individual  to  perform  the  behaviours  changes  the  time  or  energy  allocated  to  each 
behaviour.  Intuition  suggests  that  the  time  invested  in  performing  a  behaviour 
should  decline  as  the  individual's  ability  to  perform  the  behaviour  increases. 
Explicit,  quantitative  modelling  suggests  that  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Instead,  we 
see  a  pattern  where  investment  in  one  of  the  behaviours  at  first  increases  and  then 
decreases  as  the  ability  to  perform  the  behaviour  increases.  This  finding  has 
implications  for  the  empirical  study  of  trade-offs  between  behaviours,  since  it  could 
appear  that  individual  ability  has  no  effect  on  the  trade-off  under  consideration.  I 
discuss  potential  methods  for  distinguishing  whether  time  allocation  changes  in  a 
counter-intuitive,  non-monotonic  way  with  increasing  individual  ability,  or  whether 
there  is indeed  no  effect. 
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Introduction 
Animal  behaviour  can  be  thought  of  as  the  outcome  of  a  series  of  trade-offs  between 
the  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  performing  various  actions.  A  central  tenet  of 
behavioural  ecology  is  that  animals  are  expected  to  maximise  net  benefits,  leading  to 
optimal  behaviour  (but  see  Roff  1992).  The  study  of  trade-offs  is  thus  fundamental 
to  our  understanding  of  animal  behaviour.  Behavioural  trade-offs  can  occur  within  a 
single  behaviour,  for  example,  the  decision  to  defend  a  territory  involves  trading  off 
the  costs  of  defending  territories  against  the  benefits  gained  from  monopolisation  of 
the  resources  they  contain  (e.  g.  Hixon  1980;  Schoener  1983;  reviewed  in  Adams 
2001).  Behavioural  trade-offs  may  also  occur  between  two  or  more  behaviours, 
when  individuals  are  faced  with  a  choice  of  mutually  incompatible  behaviours  they 
can  perform. 
When  presented  with  the  option  of  selecting  one  of  two  behaviours  to  perform,  the 
optimal  behaviour  for  an  individual  will  depend  on  the  fitness  consequences  of 
different  potential  actions.  However,  if  the  benefits  of  performing  one  behaviour 
were  significantly  greater  than  the  benefits  of  the  other,  one  would  imagine  that  an 
individual  would  abandon  the  second  behaviour  in  favour  of  the  first.  Here,  I  present 
a  general  model  that  investigates  the  trade-off  decision  faced  by  an  individual  when 
allocating  time  or  energy  to  two  behaviours.  Specifically,  I  ask  how  much  of  their 
available  time  (or  energy  resources)  individuals  should  invest  in  each  activity  when 
their  ability  to  perform  the  necessary  behaviours  varies.  Intuition  suggests  that  as  an 
individual  becomes  increasingly  able  to  successfully  perform  a  behaviour,  the  time  it 
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needs  to  invest  in  doing  so  would  decrease,  as  its  efforts  are  likely  to  be  more 
effective,  allowing  more  time  to  be  invested  in  the  other  activity. 
As  illustrative  examples,  I  discuss  potential  trade-offs  between  territory  defence  and 
courtship  of  potential  mates,  and  between  these  behaviours  and  predator  avoidance. 
In  territorial  animals,  courtship  and  defence  behaviours  may  be  in  conflict  (i.  e.  they 
cannot  be  performed  simultaneously).  Empirical  studies  investigating  the  question  of 
a  trade-off  between  territory  defence  and  mate  courtship  have  found  that  both 
sticklebacks  (Gasterosteus  aculeatus;  Sevenster  1961;  Wilz  1972;  Candolin  1997) 
and  beaugregory  damselfish  (Stegastes  leucostictus;  Santangelo  et  al.  2002)  invest 
less  time  or  effort  in  courtship  when  both  potential  mates  and  competitors  are  present 
compared  to  when  only  potential  mates  are  present.  This  suggests  that  the  two 
behaviours  cannot  be  performed  simultaneously  and  a  decision  must  be  made  as  to 
how  to  allocate  time  or  energy  to  these  behaviours. 
In  this  example,  the  fitness  trade-off  could  be  as  follows:  if  the  benefits  gained  from 
retaining  a  territory  exceed  those  gained  from  a  given  mating  opportunity  (e.  g.  if 
territories  are  scarce  and  carry  long  term  benefits),  a  male  should  ignore  a  potential 
mate  and  concentrate  instead  on  ensuring  his  territory  is  adequately  defended. 
Alternatively,  if  the  benefits  from  gaining  a  mating  are  significantly  greater  than  the 
benefits  of  defending  a  territory,  one  would  imagine  that  territorial  males  would 
abandon  defence  in  favour  of  courting  a  female.  If,  however,  territories  are  essential 
for  breeding,  abandoning  territory  defence  in  favour  of  courtship  would  bring  no 
benefits. 
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Both  territorial  defence  and  mate  searching  can  increase  exposure  to  predators  (Daly 
1978;  Alatalo  et  al.  1988a;  Reynolds  &  Gross  1990;  Crowley  et  al.  1991;  Pruett- 
Jones  1992),  and  have  been  found  to  alter  as  the  risk  of  predation  increases  (e.  g. 
Berglund  1993;  Hedrick  &  Dill  1993;  Godin  &  Briggs  1996;  Jennions  &  Petrie  1997; 
Candolin  &  Voigt  1998;  Koga  et  al.  1998).  For  example,  courtship  displays 
involving  conspicuous  behaviours  are  reduced  when  courting  individuals  perceive  a 
greater  risk  of  predation  (e.  g.  Endler  1987;  Sih  et  al.  1990;  Fuller  &  Berglund  1996; 
Godin  1995).  Thus,  territorial  defence  behaviour,  courtship  and  mate  search 
behaviour  appear  to  trade-off  both  with  each  other  and  with  predator  avoidance  and 
vigilance  behaviour.  If  we  imagine  a  population  in  which  predation  risk  is  intense, 
and  vigilance  is  thus  very  important,  it  is  clear  that  abandoning  vigilance  in  favour  of 
defensive  or  courtship  behaviours  would  have  no  benefits:  an  individual  devoting  all 
its  time  to  courtship  would  be  unable  to  avoid  predation,  and  would  be  quickly  eaten. 
The  same  effect  is  not  true  of  the  reverse,  however.  An  individual  choosing  to  be 
vigilant  rather  than  court  mates  or  defend  a  territory  would  survive  to  the  following 
breeding  season,  where  it  would  have  the  opportunity  to  mate  again.  Under  such 
conditions,  the  study  of  trade-offs  may  become  more  complex,  compared  to  a 
situation  where  the  behaviours  have  equal  importance. 
In  a  quantitative  genetic  model  of  life-history  trade-offs,  Worley  et  al.  (2003)  showed 
that  trade-offs  can  be  masked  when  the  allocation  of  resources  to  different  traits 
occurs  in  a  'nested'  fashion,  i.  e.  when  a  fraction  of  resources  is  allocated  to  one  trait 
and  the  remainder  subdivided  between  other  traits  (Worley  et  al.  2003).  In  a 
behavioural  context,  Houston  et  al.  (2003)  showed  that  differences  in  individual 
quality  can  produce  counter-intuitive  patterns  of  optimal  behaviour,  when  fitness  is  a 
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product  of  the  benefits  gained  from  the  two  behaviours  (and  they  are  therefore,  in  a 
sense,  of  equal  importance).  Here,  I  incorporate  the  possibility  that  behaviours  are 
nested:  it  is  crucial  that  one  of  the  behaviours  (for  example,  vigilance  or  territorial 
defence)  is  performed  before  the  other  (e.  g.  courtship)  can  be  successful.  Fitness  can 
result  from  performing  the  more  crucial  behaviour  (vigilance)  in  the  absence  of  the 
other,  but  not  vice  versa,  or  from  a  combination  of  both.  Additionally,  I  incorporate 
the  possibility  that  an  individual  may  not  be  equally  ranked  in  its  ability  to  perform 
two  behaviours.  For  example,  the  most  dominant  individuals  may  not  necessarily  be 
the  most  attractive  (Qvarnström  &  Forsgren  1998).  The  results  of  the  model  suggest 
that  the  relationships  between  two  behaviours  are  not  as  simple  the  verbal  arguments 
above  might  imply.  Given  the  counter-intuitive  patterns  suggested  by  this  and  other 
models,  it  may  (erroneously)  appear  that  a  trade-off  between  two  behaviours  is  not 
affected  by  ability  in  a  particular  study  system.  Thus,  I  make  suggestions  as  to  how 
it  would  be  possible  to  determine  whether  there  is  indeed  no  effect,  or  the  pattern  is 
counter-intuitive  due  to  the  interaction  of  differences  in  quality  (ability  to  perform  a 
certain  task)  and  allocation. 
Model 
The  model  assumes  that  an  individual  animal  has  a  certain  amount  of  time  or  energy 
that  is  not  devoted  to  maintenance  activities  such  as  resting  or  foraging,  and  that  this 
is  fixed  and  does  not  vary  between  individuals.  This  time  or  energy  (not  used  in 
maintenance  activities)  can  be  divided  between  the  mutually  exclusive  behaviours  A 
and  B.  I  assume  that  both  behaviours  can  potentially  be  performed,  but  that  B  cannot 
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be  successful  in  the  absence  of  A,  although  A  can  be  successful  in  the  absence  of  B, 
and  ask  how  an  individual  should  divide  its  available  time  between  them.  Examples 
of  the  behaviours  to  which  the  model  applies  are  found  in  table  6.1. 
An  individual  spends  a  proportion  of  time  to  performing  behaviour  A,  leaving  a 
proportion  tB=1-tA  available  to  invest  in  behaviour  B.  The  time  invested  in 
performing  a  behaviour  directly  affects  the  probability  that  the  behaviour  will  have  a 
successful  outcome.  An  individual  investing  nothing  in  behaviour  A  will  gain  zero 
benefits  from  that  behaviour,  while  an  individual  investing  all  its  time  in  behaviour  A 
will  obtain  maximum  benefits  from  it.  An  individual  which  is  effective  at 
performing  behaviour  A  will  need  to  invest  less  time  in  doing  so  than  one  who  is  less 
effective  to  gain  the  same  benefits,  and  is  likely  to  obtain  higher  maximum  benefits. 
For  example,  in  the  context  of  a  trade-off  between  courtship  and  defence,  a  territory 
owner  that  was  able  to  repel  intruders  quickly  would  need  to  spend  less  time  in 
territory  defence  than  one  that  spent  longer  in  aggressive  interactions  (all  intruders 
are  considered  equal  in  the  model),  and  would  be  more  successful  in  retaining  the 
territory.  A  curvilinear  function  with  diminishing  returns  gives  an  appropriate 
description  of  this  relationship  between  time  or  energy  invested  in  a  behaviour,  and 
probability  that  the  outcome  of  the  behaviour  is  successful.  Therefore,  given  an 
individual's  current  investment  in  behaviour  A,  tA,  the  probability  of  a  successful 
outcome  from  that  behaviour,  pA,  is  well  described  by  the  simple  expression: 
PA  -SA  l+e-0`ýý 
-0.5  (1) 
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where  a  describes  the  ability  of  an  individual  performing  behaviour  A;  it  takes  values 
in  the  range  1  to  an  a,,,  where  1  describes  low  ability  and  amax  describes  high  ability 
in  the  individual.  The  parameter  8A  and  the  constant  0.5  serve  to  scale  the  benefits 
between  zero  and  1,  where  SA  =  1+(a/amax),  such  that  the  highest  quality  individuals 
are  most  successful.  The  probability  of  a  successful  outcome  from  performing 
behaviour  B,  PB,  is  well  described  by  an  analogous  expression: 
PB  -  SB 
1l+ 
e-ßte 
-  0.5  (2) 
where  ß  describes  the  ability  of  the  individual  to  perform  behaviour  B.  P  takes 
values  from  1  to  Pmax,  1  describes  a  low  ability  to  perform  behaviour  B,  and  ßmax  a 
high  ability.  Again,  SB  =  1+(ß/(3,,,  ).  For  example,  an  attractive  male  or  one  able  to 
easily  perform  necessary  courtship  behaviours  should  need  to  spend  less  time 
persuading  a  female  to  mate  with  him  than  an  unattractive  male  or  one  who  is  less 
able  to  perform  the  courtship  behaviours,  given  that  all  females  are  equally  receptive 
to  courtship. 
The  model  applies  to  situations  where  behaviour  A  is  of  value  in  the  absence  of  B, 
but  B  has  no  value  without  A.  For  example,  if  territories  are  a  prerequisite  to 
breeding,  courtship  (B)  has  no  value  in  the  absence  of  territory  defence  (A)  as  the 
male  would  lose  his  territory  and  thus  not  be  able  to  breed  successfully.  Individual 
fitness,  W,  depends  on  the  probabilities  of  successful  outcomes  of  the  two 
behaviours.  Some  fitness  is  gained  when  both  behaviours  are  performed  successfully 
(for  example,  when  a  territory  owner  successfully  retains  the  territory  and  attracts  a 
mate  to  breed),  and  additional  fitness  is  gained  when  the  individual  successfully 
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performs  only  behaviour  A  (for  example,  when  the  individual  retains  the  territory  but 
fails  to  attract  a  mate;  see  also  table  6.1  and  the  Discussion  for  examples).  Thus: 
ý'=PAPB+PA(1-PB)Y  (3) 
The  second  component  of  fitness  is  scaled  by  the  relative  benefits  of  performing  only 
behaviour  A,  y.  The  value  of  y  is  fixed  in  the  population  and  does  not  vary  between 
individuals.  High  values  of  y  (close  to  1)  indicate  that  the  fitness  benefits  of 
performing  only  behaviour  A  are  relatively  high,  and  low  values  (closer  to  zero) 
suggest  that  behaviour  A  is  of  little  worth  unless  combined  with  behaviour  B.  In  the 
courtship  versus  defence  example,  y  describes  the  value  of  owning  a  territory  without 
attracting  a  female  to  breed,  an  aspect  of  species  ecology  that  does  not  vary  between 
individuals  or  territories.  High  values  of  y  suggest  that  territories  have  high  value  in 
the  absence  of  successful  reproduction  (for  example,  they  may  be  used  for  feeding 
and  thus  be  essential  for  survival).  Low  values  of  y  suggest  that  territories  may  be 
solely  for  breeding  purposes,  and  thus  have  little  value  if  the  owner  fails  to  attract  a 
mate. 
A  individual's  optimum  investment  in  behaviour  A  (tA*)  versus  B  (tB*)  is  the 
proportion  of  time  invested  in  behaviour  A,  tA,  that  maximises  his  fitness,  W,  for  a 
given  set  of  parameter  values.  Optimum  investment  was  calculated  using  a  computer 
simulation  as  analytical  solutions  were  not  available. 
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General  Results 
A  number  of  intuitive  results  immediately  emerge  from  the  model.  Higher  abilities 
when  performing  behaviour  A  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  time  spent  doing  so,  relative 
to  lower  abilities  (figure  6.1).  Reduced  investment  in  behaviour  A  at  high  abilities  is 
seen  for  a  wide  range  of  parameter  values.  When  performing  behaviour  A  has  a  high 
impact  on  fitness  in  the  absence  of  behaviour  B  (high  y),  investing  time  in  A  becomes 
more  important  (figures  6.1  and  6.2).  Additionally,  when  behaviour  A  is  extremely 
valuable  in  the  absence  of  behaviour  B,  individuals  should  invest  all  their  time  or 
energy  in  A,  especially  when  their  ability  to  do  so  is  low  (y  =  0.8,  a<2,  figure  6.1). 
An  interesting,  counter-intuitive  result  emerges  when  the  ability  to  performing 
behaviour  B  increases.  One  might  expect  individuals  more  able  to  perform 
behaviour  B  to  invest  less  time  in  doing  so,  as  shown  for  increasing  a  (figure  6.1). 
This  is because  individuals  can  gain  the  same  benefits  from  reduced  time  investment 
if  their  ability  to  perform  the  behaviour  is  higher.  Indeed,  this  is  what  occurs,  but 
only  when  considering  moderate  (intermediate  values  of  ß)  to  high  (approaching 
ßßx)  ability  to  perform  behaviour  B  does  an  increase  in  ability  lead  to  a  decrease  in 
time  invested  in  B  (figure  6.2).  When  the  ability  to  perform  B  is  low,  any  increase  in 
ability  (ß)  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  time  spend  engaged  in  behaviour  B.  Thus, 
optimal  time  or  energy  investment  in  B  first  increases  and  then  decreases  when  the 
ability  parameter  (ß)  is  increased.  This  pattern  is  robust  to  changes  in  both  y  and  a, 
and  is  more  pronounced  when  A  is  valuable  in  the  absence  of  B  (high  y;  figure  6.2a), 
and  when  ability  to  perform  A  is  low  (low  a;  figure  6.2b).  Possible  explanations  for 
this  effect  are  discussed  below. 
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Figure  6.1:  The  effect  of  increasing  the  ability  to  perform  behaviour  A,  a,  on  the 
optimal  proportion  of  time  or  energy  devoted  to  behaviour  A,  to  *.  Results  are  plotted 
for  four  values  of  y,  the  value  of  performing  behaviour  A  and  not  behaviour  B.  (y  = 
0.2,  solid  line;  y=0.4  dashed  line;  y=0.6,  dotted  line;  y=0.8,  dash-dot  line).  In  all 
cases,  ß=5,06maz  1O" 
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Discussion 
Table  6.1  outlines  several  examples  of  pairs  of  behaviours  that  could  be  in  conflict 
and  thus  form  the  basis  of  a  trade-off  in  terms  of  time  or  energy.  I  will  now  discuss 
the  findings  and  limitations  of  the  model  with  reference  to  several  of  these  examples. 
I  discuss  also  the  implications  of  the  findings  for  the  study  of  trade-offs  between 
behaviours. 
The  patterns  seen  when  the  ability  parameter  a  and  the  value  of  performing  A  in  the 
absence  of  B  (y)  increase  are  as  intuition  suggests.  In  the  example  of  a  trade-off 
between  territory  defence  and  female  courtship  discussed  in  the  Introduction,  this 
suggests  that  as  a  male  becomes  increasingly  able  to  defend  his  territory  (increasing 
a),  the  time  he  invests  in  doing  so  (tA)  decreases.  In  this  example,  y  describes  the 
relative  value  of  retaining  a  territory  without  attracting  a  female  to  breed  on  it.  When 
territories  hold  high  value  without  females,  males  invest  more  time  in  defending  their 
territory,  due  to  the  survival  benefits  outside  the  breeding  season.  When  territories 
are  used  solely  for  reproduction,  more  time  is  invested  in  courtship,  although  defence 
is  still  important  since  the  territory  must  be  retained  in  order  to  gain  matings  and 
raise  offspring. 
The  parameter  y  describes  only  the  value  of  performing  one  behaviour  in  the  absence 
of  another,  (in  the  above  example,  the  relative  values  of  territories  with  and  without 
females  present).  Thus,  territories  (or  foraging  sites,  etc.  )  are  all  assumed  to  be  of 
equal  intrinsic  quality.  In  reality,  territory  quality  is  likely  to  vary  amongst 
individuals,  and  this  is  likely  to  impact  on  the  trade-off  between  defence  and  other 
behaviours.  High  quality  territories  may  attract  increased  numbers  of  intruders 
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(reviewed  in  Adams  2001),  impacting  on  a  male's  ability  to  successfully  defend  his 
territory.  Territoriality  may  also  act  as  a  surrogate  for  courtship,  as  females  could 
obtain  information  on  male  quality  by  observing  his  defensive  ability,  reducing  the 
need  for  additional  courtship  behaviour  (e.  g.  Gronstol  1996).  Females  may  also  be 
attracted  to  high  quality  territories,  allowing  males  to  invest  more  in  defence  (Real 
1991,  Reynolds  1993),  or  females  may  be  attracted  to  a  mixture  of  both  territory 
quality  and  male  courtship  (e.  g.  Uy  et  al.  2001;  Candolin  2003).  Additionally,  these 
aspects  may  be  correlated:  a  high  quality  male  may  possess  a  high  quality  territory 
(Heg  et  al.  2000),  and  males  on  high  quality  territories  may  show  increased  mating 
success  (e.  g.  Trivers  1976;  Howard  1978;  Borgia  1979;  Alatalo  et  al.  1986). 
Courtship  rates  may  also  be  an  indicator  of  territory  quality  (Itzkowitz  and  Haley 
1999;  Santangelo  et  al.  2002).  Many  factors  may  thus  correlate  with  territory  quality, 
and  the  causal  relations  are  not  always  clear,  as  outlined  above,  and  may  indeed  be 
species  specific.  The  assumption  that  all  territories  are  of  equal  intrinsic  quality 
allows  investigation  of  the  parameters  describing  an  individual's  ability  in  the 
absence  of  the  complications  described  above,  and  increases  the  generality  of  the 
model  and  its  applicability  to  different  behaviours. 
The  model  assumes  that  behaviour  A  has  value  in  the  absence  of  B,  but  B  has  no 
value  in  the  absence  of  A,  and  therefore  never  predicts  that  individuals  should 
abandon  A  in  favour  of  B,  although  B  may  be  abandoned  in  favour  of  A.  For 
example,  if  an  individual  were  choosing  between  predator  vigilance  (A)  and  courting 
a  potential  mate  (B),  abandoning  vigilance  could  result  in  death  through  predation, 
but  abandoning  courtship  may  allow  the  individual  to  survival  to  the  next  breeding 
season,  where  they  would  have  a  further  opportunity  to  court  mates,  depending  on 
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the  value  of  surviving  without  breeding  (y)  in  a  particular  breeding  season  (see  table 
6.1  for  further  examples).  The  model  focuses  on  selecting  optimal  behaviour  during 
the  course  of  a  single  breeding  season,  and  this  behaviour  may  not  be  optimal  if 
performed  over  the  course  of  several  seasons.  For  example,  an  individual  that  is 
constantly  vigilant  and  does  not  breed  in  a  season  can  gain  positive  fitness  as  it  can 
potentially  survive  and  reproduce  next  season.  However,  if  it  behaved  in  the  same 
way  in  subsequent  breeding  seasons,  it  would  never  breed,  and  so  would  have  no 
fitness.  The  value  of  surviving  without  breeding  (y)  would  therefore  be  effectively 
lower  than  if  it  had  invested  less  in  vigilance,  and  the  consideration  of  multiple 
breeding  seasons  and  the  long  term  reproductive  potential  of  individuals  would  be  a 
valuable  extension  of  this  model. 
It  is  possible  that  behaviour  B  could  be  of  some  value  in  the  absence  of  behaviour  A. 
For  example,  an  individual  investing  nothing  in  territorial  defence  (and  existing  as  a 
floater)  may  be  able  to  reproduce  by  courting  females  already  mated  to  territorial 
males,  as  they  may  potentially  gain  offspring  as  an  extra-pair  mate  to  the  female  (e.  g. 
Dunn  et  al.  1994).  Where  behaviour  A  is  fundamental  to  survival  (for  example, 
foraging  or  predator  vigilance,  see  table  6.1),  an  individual  investing  only  in 
behaviour  B  may  be  able  to  gain  a  little  reproductive  success  before  death.  However, 
so  long  as  this  chance  is  small  compared  to  the  reproduction  of  individuals  investing 
more  in  A,  the  results  of  the  model  are  likely  to  remain  valid. 
The  most  interesting  finding  is  that,  under  some  conditions,  increasing  an 
individual's  ability  to  perform  behaviour  B,  ß,  can  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  time 
spent  performing  B,  rather  than  the  decrease  that  one  might  expect.  An  explanation 
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for  this  effect  is  that  when  individuals  are  less  able  to  perform  a  behaviour,  they  gain 
greater  benefits  by  investing  little  time  in  that  behaviour  and  concentrating  instead  on 
performing  the  other  behaviour.  For  example,  if  an  individual  must  choose  between 
predator  vigilance  and  an  aggressive  behaviour  such  as  territorial  defence,  and  is  of 
low  fighting  ability  (for  example,  a  younger  or  smaller  animal),  it  would  gain  greater 
benefits  from  increased  predator  vigilance.  As  the  individual  becomes  better  able  to 
fight  (for  example,  older  or  larger),  fights  are  more  likely  to  be  successful  (Jennions 
&  Backwell  1996,  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996,  Petersen  &  Hardy  1996,  Johnsson  et  al. 
1999),  and  so  more  time  can  be  invested  in  aggression.  As  the  individual's  fighting 
ability  increases  further,  its  success  in  fighting  or  defence  increases  further  (it  could, 
for  example,  win  a  fight  more  quickly,  as  it  is  relatively  larger  than  its  opponent  (e.  g. 
Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976,  Enquist  &  Leimar  1983,  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996, 
Hack  1997,  but  see  Taylor  &  Elwood  2003)  and  consequently,  less  time  needs  to  be 
invested  in  defensive  behaviour. 
When  considering  the  trade-off  between  courtship  and  survival  (scanning  for 
predators),  Houston  et  al.  (2003)  found  a  similar  counter-intuitive  pattern  of  optimal 
courtship  with  increasing  male  quality,  where  quality  influenced  male  survival.  In 
the  current  model,  the  ability  parameters  describe  different  aspects  of  quality.  This 
allows  for  the  possibility  that  a  male  which  is  highly  ranked  in  one  behaviour  may 
not  necessarily  be  highly  ranked  in  another.  For  example,  dominant  males  who  are 
highly  aggressive  may  not  necessarily  be  the  most  attractive  to  females  (Qvarnström 
&  Forsgren  1998).  The  current  model  also  assumes  that  one  of  the  behaviours  can 
only  occur  in  the  presence  of  the  other;  one  of  the  behaviours  is  crucial  (behaviour  A) 
prior  to  the  success  of  the  other  (behaviour  B).  Importantly,  the  counter-intuitive 
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pattern  is  seen  only  when  the  ability  of  an  individual  to  perform  the  less  crucial  of 
the  behaviours  (ß)  changes,  otherwise,  the  changes  are  as  intuition  suggests. 
The  current  model  considers  the  optimal  choices  of  a  single  individual.  Incorporating 
the  influence  of  other  members  of  the  population  on  the  optimal  time  allocation 
decisions  of  an  individual  would  be  a  potentially  fruitful  avenue  of  further  research. 
For  example,  the  courtship  success  of  a  male  may  depend  not  only  on  his  own 
courtship  effort  but  also  on  the  courtship  effort  of  his  competitors  (Reynolds  1993; 
Houston  et  al.  2003;  Morrell  &  Kokko  2004,  chapter  7).  A  game-theoretic  treatment 
would  be  needed  in  such  an  extension  of  the  current  model. 
WHAT  DO  THE  FINDINGS  MEAN? 
Few,  if  any,  published  studies  of  behavioural  trade-offs  seem  to  have  looked  at  how 
behaviours  change  with  ability,  and  thus  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  for 
behaviours  showing  this  pattern.  This  suggests  that  such  trade-offs  may  need  to  be 
studied  more  closely,  and  variation  in  abilities  considered,  in  order  to  understand 
fully  how  time  invested  in  two  different  behaviours  varies  with  the  fitness  trade-off 
associated  with  each  behaviour  under  consideration. 
The  counter-intuitive  resolution  of  the  conflict  between  behaviours  found  in  this  and 
other  studies  (Houston  et  al.  2003)  suggests  that  it  may  be  difficult  to  determine 
whether  or  not  a  trade-off  is  occurring  between  two  behaviours  in  empirical  systems. 
An  empirical  investigation  designed  to  seek  a  change  in  time  allocation  behaviour 
may  find  no  change  as  a  result  of  the  response  patterns  predicted  by  models.  For 
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example,  in  a  study  of  courtship  and  defence  in  the  beaugregory  damselfish,  no 
differences  were  found  in  the  time  allocation  to  the  two  behaviours  when  territory 
quality  was  changed  (Santangelo  et  al.  2002).  The  authors  of  that  study  suggested 
that  territory  quality  may  influence  an  individual's  courtship  and  defensive 
behaviours.  In  terms  of  the  current  model,  territory  quality  may  have  influenced  the 
parameters  a  and  P.  Thus,  if  courtship  ability  (ß)  is  affected  by  territory  quality,  the 
lack  of  an  observed  change  in  the  time-allocation  behaviour  could  be  explained  by 
the  model's  predictions. 
The  model  may  also  apply  to  trade-offs  involving  energy  rather  than  time.  If  limited 
energy  is  available  to  invest,  an  individual  must  decide  how  to  allocate  that  energy, 
and  its  ability  to  invest  is  likely  to  affect  that  trade-off  in  the  same  way  that  the 
ability  to  perform  a  behaviour  affects  the  time  invested  in  that  behaviour.  For 
example,  energy  could  be  invested  in  either  fecundity,  or  parental  care,  or  a 
combination  of  both  (Badyaev  &  Ghalambar  2001).  Fecundity  may  be  limited  by 
body  size  (Reiss  1989),  and  parental  care  could  be  limited  by  the  parents'  ability  to 
find  food  for  the  offspring  (Whittingham  &  Robertson  1994,  Turner  &  McCarty 
1998).  Studies  investigating  the  trade-off  between  fecundity  and  parental  care  may 
mistakenly  conclude  that  the  trade-off  is  not  affected  by  the  parents'  ability  to  care,  as 
a  result  of  the  counter-intuitive  patterns  predicted  by  the  model. 
Although  empirical  studies  investigating  the  effect  of  individual  ability  or  quality  on 
the  trade-off  between  behaviours  may  find  no  apparent  effect,  awareness  of  a 
potentially  counter-intuitive  resolution  of  the  conflict  may  be  beneficial  to 
understanding  the  trade-off.  The  current  results  suggest  that  further  investigation 
may  be  warranted,  to  discover  whether  there  is  truly  no  effect,  or  a  more  subtle 
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pattern  is  present.  Closer  examination  of  individual  behaviour  could  reveal  that 
ability  to  perform  the  behaviour  alters  under  different  experimental  conditions. 
Beaugregory  damselfish  increase  the  rate  at  which  they  perform  aggressive  and 
courtship  behaviours  when  on  high  quality  territories  (Santangelo  et  al.  2002). 
Territory  quality  may  also  affect  ability  to  perform  a  behaviour  if,  for  example, 
predation  was  higher  on  a  low  quality  territory  (Itzkowitz  &  Haley  1999),  or  territory 
quality  is  determined  by  food  resources.  Thus  both  the  change  in  the  external 
environment  and  the  effect  this  may  have  on  the  individual  should  be  considered. 
Although  it  may  be  difficult  in  practice  to  alter  the  ability  to  perform  one  behaviour 
while  leaving  the  ability  to  perform  the  other  behaviour  unmanipulated,  and  ability 
itself  may  be  a  difficult  concept  to  measure,  such  work  could  provide  valuable 
insight  into  trade-offs  between  behaviours.  A  potential  method  for  this  would  be  to 
manipulate  the  ability  of  individuals  through  learning  (e.  g.  Brown  &  Laland  2003), 
endurance  training  (e.  g.  Kolok  1999;  Plaut  2001),  or  prior  experience  (Hsu  &  Wolf 
1999)  such  that  groups  of  individuals  trained  to  different  levels  can  be  compared. 
Additionally,  external  environmental  factors  (e.  g.  resource  availability,  territory 
quality)  could  be  manipulated  where  these  are  known  to  affect  the  ability  of 
individuals  (Humphries  et  al.  1999;  Santangelo  et  al.  2002;  Houston  et  al.  2003).  The 
model  suggests  that  when  factors  influencing  ability  (e.  g.  territory  quality)  are 
manipulated,  the  use  of  two  groups  (i.  e.  high  and  low)  may  not  reveal  complete 
information  regarding  the  trade-off  between  two  behaviours.  Instead,  a  number  of 
groups  encompassing  a  range  of  abilities  should  be  considered  to  reveal  whether 
counter-intuitive  patterns  exist  in  a  particular  study  system.  For  example,  if  food 
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availability  or  territory  quality  is  known  to  influence  ability,  several  different  levels 
of  availability  or  quality  should  be  investigated. 
Consideration  of  other  factors  that  may  affect  individual  quality  or  ability,  such  as 
predation  risk,  valuation  of  a  disputed  resource  and  motivation  to  perform  a 
behaviour,  may  also  be  necessary.  The  complexity  of  behavioural  trade-offs  may 
make  it  difficult  to  tease  apart  the  behaviours  noted  in  natural  systems,  but  this  and 
other  models  (Houston  et  al.  2003)  suggest  one  potential  explanation  for  situations 
where  the  trade-off  between  two  behaviours  is  not  as  predicted  by  verbal  reasoning. 
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CHAPTER  7 
HOW  THE  BOWERBIRD  LOST  ITS  JEWELLERY: 
CAN  TOO  STRONG  FEMALE  CHOICE  DETERIORATE 
MALE  ORNAMENTATION? 
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Abstract 
Competition  for  limited  resources  can  have  fundamental  implications  for  population 
dynamics.  However,  the  effects  of  resource  depletion  have  rarely  been  discussed  in 
the  context  of  sexual  selection,  even  though  mate  choice  typically  favours  males  who 
outperform  others  in  securing  access  to  some  limited  resource.  Here,  we  develop  a 
model  to  investigate  the  question  of  resource  competition  as  a  form  of  male-male 
competition  in  the  context  of  male  sexual  displays.  We  phrase  our  model  in  terms  of 
male  bowerbirds  either  searching  for  or  stealing  resources  (ornamental  objects) 
valued  by  females,  and  compare  the  model  findings  to  published  studies  of  time 
allocation  to  various  activities  in  different  species  of  bowerbirds.  The  basic  idea  of 
the  model,  however,  extends  to  cases  where  the  resource  is  used  less  directly  for  the 
development  of  sexual  ornamentation,  such  as  males  excluding  others'  access  to 
food.  We  show  that  if  males  compete  for  resources  used  in  sexual  displays,  intense 
female  preference  for  high  quality  displays  can  lead  to  poorer  prospects  for  efficient 
choice  by  females.  This  is  because  males  benefit  from  excluding  others'  access  to 
resources  used  in  displays,  damaging  the  overall  efficiency  of  resource  use  in  the 
population,  and  the  accuracy  with  which  females  can  judge  male  ability  to  gain  such 
resources.  The  evolution  of  female  choice  may  therefore  have  a  self-limiting  nature 
when  it  poses  a  selection  pressure  on  male  resource  acquisition. 
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Introduction 
Animals  regularly  find  themselves  in  competition  for  limited  resources,  and  such 
contests  can  have  fundamental  implications  for  population  dynamics.  When 
competing  for  a  resource  that  takes  effort  to  locate,  animals  have  two  choices:  to 
search  for  it  themselves  or  to  steal  the  resource  from  others.  For  example,  in  the 
context  of  foraging,  the  decision  to  steal  the  resource  from  others  leads  to 
kleptoparasitism,  which  encompasses  a  range  of  behaviours,  from  the  raiding  of  food 
hoards  through  to  aggressively  gaining  access  to  a  food  resource  (reviewed  in 
Giraldeau  &  Caraco  2000).  The  term  kleptoparasitism  is  technically  used  to  refer  to 
interspecific  food  stealing  (Brockmann  &  Barnard  1979;  Ha  &  Ha  2003),  but  the 
range  of  behaviours  applies  equally  to  intraspecific  theft. 
The  question  of  whether  individuals  should  invest  in  selfish  kleptoparasitism  or 
intraspecific  theft  versus  unselfish  searching  for  a  food  resource  has  been  considered 
extensively  in  producer-scrounger  games  (e.  g.  Barnard  &  Sibly  1981;  Vickery  et  al. 
1991,  Giraldeau  &  Beauchamp  1999;  Giraldeau  &  Caraco  2000).  In  these  games, 
individuals  can  either  search  for  food  (producers)  or  search  for  other  individuals  that 
have  located  food  (scroungers)  but  cannot  do  both  simultaneously  (Barnard  &  Sibly 
1981;  Vickery  et  al.  1991).  An  increase  in  the  frequency  of  scroungers  in  the 
population  decreases  the  rate  at  which  food  can  be  discovered,  and  hence  decreases 
the  benefits  that  can  be  gained  by  an  individual  (Parker  1984).  The  benefits  gained 
from  the  producer-scrounger  game  are  thus  frequency  dependent,  and  high  levels  of 
interference  through  scrounging  appear,  in  population  terms,  to  be  highly  detrimental 
(see  Krause  &  Ruxton  2002). 
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While  such  interference  has  been  extensively  studied  in  the  context  of  foraging,  the 
effects  of  kleptoparasitism  have  rarely  been  discussed  in  contexts  of  sexual  selection. 
An  interesting  example  is  `prostitution'  in  Adelie  penguins,  where  males  allow  extra- 
pair  females  to  steal  nesting  material  if  they  gain  extra-pair  copulations  (Hunter  & 
Davis  1998).  Obviously,  such  exchange  of  limited  resources  (in  the  case  of  penguins, 
stones  used  to  build  nests)  is  not  beneficial  to  the  overall  productivity  of  the  colony. 
Here,  we  investigate  the  broader  question  of  producing  versus  scrounging  in  the 
context  of  male  sexual  displays.  We  shall  show  that  if  males  compete  for  resources 
that  are  used  in  such  displays,  intense  female  preference  for  high-quality  displays  can 
-  paradoxically  -  lead  to  poorer  prospects  for  efficient  choice.  This  is  because 
when  sexual  competition  is  intense,  males  benefit  from  tactics  that  selfishly  elevate 
their  displays  at  the  expense  of  others.  When  such  behaviour  spreads,  resources 
available  to  generate  high-quality  displays  become  diminished. 
We  phrase  our  model  in  terms  of  male  bowerbirds  searching  for  resources 
(ornamental  objects)  valued  by  females.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  basic 
idea  of  the  model  extends  to  cases  where  the  resource  is  used  for  ornament 
development  less  directly,  such  as  males  excluding  others'  access  to  food,  or  to  cases 
where  males  compete  to  provide  females  with  nuptial  gifts.  Males  of  15  of  the  19 
species  of  bowerbird  build  more  or  less  elaborate  ornamental  bowers  (Marshall  1954; 
Cooper  &  Forshaw  1977;  Chaffer  1984;  Borgia  1986),  which  are  decorated  with 
coloured  items  from  the  surrounding  habitat,  such  as  feathers,  fruits,  flowers,  bones, 
shells  and  manmade  items  (Marshall  1954;  Cooper  &  Forshaw  1977;  Chaffer  1984; 
Borgia  1985,1986;  Diamond  1987).  Females  use  bower  quality  and  the  number  of 
decorations  present  on  the  bower  as  indicators  of  male  quality,  and  thus  bower 
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quality  is  an  important  determinant  of  mating  success  in  bowerbirds  (Borgia  1985; 
Borgia  &  Mueller  1992;  Borgia  1995;  Madden  2003;  but  see  Lenz  1994).  Bower 
owners  can  obtain  decorations  in  two  ways,  similar  to  the  producing  and  scrounging 
methods  of  foraging:  they  can  search  for  new  items  (producer),  or  raid  other  males' 
bowers  (scrounger).  The  fact  that  males  steal  decorations  has  long  been  known 
(Marshall  1954  and  references  therein).  The  large  numbers  of  decorations  present  on 
bowers  (e.  g.  Borgia  1986;  Hunter  &  Dwyer  1997),  however,  indicates  that  searching 
plays  a  major  role  in  determining  the  number  of  decorations  on  the  bower,  and 
therefore  the  mating  success  of  the  bower  owner. 
The  dilemma  faced  by  bowerbirds  differs  from  producer-scrounger  games.  Not  only 
are  the  benefits  of  producing  (searching)  or  scrounging  (raiding)  frequency 
dependent,  in  the  sense  that  the  total  number  of  items  gathered  depends  on  the 
behaviour  of  others  (as  items  can  be  stolen  by  competitors),  but  the  benefit  gained 
from  those  items  is  also  frequency  dependent.  Unlike  scrounging  in  foraging  games, 
the  benefits  gained  by  stealing  are  both  direct  and  indirect.  The  direct  benefit  is  an 
increase  the  quality  of  the  stealer's  own  bower.  However,  since  female  bowerbirds 
select  mates  on  the  basis  of  the  quality  of  the  bower  and  its  decorations  (Borgia 
1985;  Borgia  1995;  Uy  et  al.  2001),  a  given  bower's  power  to  attract  females  will 
depend  on  the  quality  of  the  bowers  of  other  males  in  the  area.  Clearly,  bowerbirds 
face  a  double  temptation  to  raid  other  males'  bowers,  as  raiding  not  only  increases 
the  quality  of  a  males'  bower,  it  also  has  the  indirect  benefit  of  decreasing  the  quality 
of  his  competitors'  bowers,  increasing  his  ability  to  attract  mates  and  therefore  gain 
offspring.  However,  if  raiding  becomes  common,  then  a  male  needs  to  spend  more 
time  on  his  bower  in  order  to  protect  it  from  theft.  Both  raiding  and  bower  defence 
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therefore  conflict  with  time  spent  searching  for  new  decorations.  Additionally,  a 
male  must  be  present  on  his  bower  in  order  to  mate  with  females,  and  this  also 
therefore  conflicts  with  the  time  spent  searching  for  new  items,  but  allows  a  male  to 
defend  the  bower  against  intruders. 
If  the  conflicts  between  the  costs  and  benefits  of  raiding  and  remaining  on  the  bower 
lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  time  available  for  searching,  this  poses  the  question  of  why 
the  bowerbird  mating  system  does  not  collapse  into  selfish  raiding  and  no  searching. 
Here,  we  develop  a  game  theory  model  to  determine  the  evolutionary  stable 
allocation  of  time  to  raiding,  searching  and  remaining  on  the  bower,  and  ask  how  this 
allocation  influences  the  quality  of  the  bower  as  a  sexual  ornament.  Thus,  we  can 
investigate  the  impact  of  male-male  competition  for  resources,  and  the  influence  of 
female  choice  on  the  quality  of  male  sexual  ornaments.  We  can  imagine  two 
potential  scenarios:  bower  quality  increases  with  the  intensity  of  female  choice  as 
males  strive  to  produce  the  best  bower,  or  alternatively,  bower  quality  declines  when 
females  become  choosier,  as  males  increasingly  raid  each  others'  bowers  in  order  to 
maximise  the  difference  between  their  bower  and  those  of  their  opponents. 
The  Model 
A  male  bower-owner's  strategy  consists  of  the  way  he  divides  his  available  time 
between  three  mutually  exclusive  activities:  being  in  residence  at  the  bower,  B, 
searching  the  surrounding  habitat  for  new  decorations  or  other  materials  to  improve 
the  quality  of  his  bower,  S,  and  raiding  the  bowers  of  other  males  in  order  to  steal 
decorations,  R  (see  table  7.1  for  parameters  and  definitions).  Being  in  residence  at 
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the  bower  allows  a  male  to  tend  and  defend  the  bower  and  also  allows  him  to  observe 
the  surrounding  habitat  for  the  presence  of  male  intruders  or  females.  The  aim  of  the 
current  model  is  to  determine  the  evolutionarily  stable  proportion  of  time  spent  in 
these  three  activities  (the  evolutionarily  stable  strategy,  ESS),  where  the  strategy 
used  by  the  population  {Bp,  Sp,  Rp}  cannot  be  invaded  by  a  more  successful 
alternative  mutant  strategy  {Bm,  Sm,  R,  ￿},  Throughout,  we  use  the  subscripts  p  and  m 
to  refer  to  the  population  and  the  mutant  respectively. 
Table  7.1:  Model  parameters  and  definitions 
Parameter  Definition 
B  Time  invested  in  tending  the  bower 
S  Time  invested  in  searching  for  decorations 
R  Time  invested  in  raiding  other  bowers 
a  Efficiency  of  searching  compared  to  tending 
Efficiency  of  raiding  compared  to  tending 
y  Female  discrimination 
s  Deterioration  of  bower  quality  over  time 
Q  Quality  of  bower. 
W  Fitness  of  mutant  bower  owner 
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Bower  quality,  Q,  ranges  from  zero  to  one,  where  one  refers  to  the  highest  possible 
quality  bower  and  zero  the  lowest.  Bower  quality  increases  through  three  processes. 
Firstly,  bower  quality  increases  through  tending  the  bower  (for  example,  maintaining 
the  bower  walls  or  arranging  newly  acquired  decorations),  at  a  rate  proportional  to 
the  time  spent  at  the  bower,  B.  Bower  quality  also  increases  when  the  owner  searches 
for  and  finds  new  items  or  successfully  raids  other  individuals'  bowers.  The  rate  of 
acquiring  new  items  by  either  of  these  activities  is  denoted  by  A. 
Total  increase  in  bower  quality  depends  multiplicatively  on  A  and  B,  as  both  tending 
the  existing  bower  decorations  and  bower  structure  and  searching  for  new 
decorations  are  necessary  to  maintain  quality  (for  example,  newly  acquired  items 
will  not  improve  the  quality  of  the  bower  if  the  amount  spent  tending  is  zero). 
Furthermore,  bower  quality  cannot  increase  indefinitely,  because  of  structural 
constraints.  We  therefore  assume  that  the  best  possible  bower  is  indicated  by  its 
quality  equalling  1,  and  any  increase  in  bower  quality  is  proportional  to  the  scope  for 
improvement  of  the  bower,  (1  -  Q).  Bower  quality  therefore  improves  at  a  rate  AB 
(1-Q),  which  counteracts  the  natural  decay  through  deterioration  over  time.  This  rate 
of  natural  deterioration  is  assumed  constant,  8.  Additionally,  bowers  decline  in 
quality  when  they  are  raided,  and  we  now  proceed  to  specify  these  rates. 
We  assume  that  raiding  is  only  successful  when  the  owner  of  the  bower  being  raided 
is  not  present  on  the  bower  (1-B).  If  the  owner  is  present,  we  assume  that  he  can 
successfully  defend  his  bower,  which  makes  raiding  attempts  unsuccessful.  We 
assume  that  males  cannot  predict  whether  an  particular  bower  owner  will  be  present 
when  choosing  to  visit  a  bower.  For  example,  bowers  may  be  located  such  that  a 
given  male  is  unable  to  view  his  neighbours  bowers.  The  benefits  gained  from 
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raiding  are  also  proportional  to  the  quality  of  the  bowers  being  raided,  Qp:  it  is 
impossible  to  gain  any  decorations  from  bowers  that  lack  them  in  the  first  place. 
Thus,  for  the  population,  the  bower  quality  gain  from  searching  and  raiding  is: 
Ap  =[aSp+PRp(l-Bp)Qp  (1) 
The  loss  of  quality  due  to  other  males  raiding  the  focal  bower  is  similarly  -pRp(1- 
Bp)Qp" 
Here,  a  describes  the  efficiency  of  searching  as  a  method  of  increasing  bower  quality 
in  relation  to  tending  the  bower  (that  is,  the  increased  amount  by  which  bower 
quality  can  increase  per  unit  time  spent  searching,  compared  to  the  potential  increase 
from  being  present  on  the  bower),  and  ß  describes  the  efficiency  of  raiding  in 
relation  to  tending  the  bower.  Thus,  for  ß=3,  an  individual  will,  all  other  factors 
being  equal,  gain  three  times  as  much  bower  quality  through  one  time  unit  spent 
raiding  compared  to  one  time  unit  spent  tending  the  bower.  Of  course,  all  other 
factors  may  not  be  equal,  such  as  the  quality  of  the  bowers  available  for  raiding  (if 
large,  this  makes  raiding  relatively  more  rewarding);  these  are  included  in  the 
equations  as  specified  above. 
For  the  mutant,  the  benefits  of  searching  and  raiding  are  described  by: 
A￿  =[aSm  +ßRm(1-Bp)Qp]  (2) 
We  can  now  proceed  to  specify  the  equilibrium  conditions  for  bower  quality.  For  the 
population,  the  change  in  bower  quality  over  time  is: 
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dQP 
dt  =  ApBp(1-Qp)-[S+,  ßRp(1-Bp)Qpý  (3) 
Solving  for  dQp/dt  =  0,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  bower  quality  in  the  population: 
1  (s+,  oip  -1)2Rp  +aBpSp  -, 
/D  (4) 
Qp 
2ß(Bp 
-1)BpR 
p 
where 
D=  -4aß(Bp  -1)Bp2RPSP  +  (5  +  f3(Bp  -1)2 
Rp  +  aBPSp2)  (5) 
For  the  mutant,  changes  in  bower  quality  are  described  analogously  to  equation  3: 
dQ; 
t=A,, 
Bm(I-Qm)-[8+ßRm(I-BP)Qp]  (6) 
And  the  equilibrium  bower  quality  for  a  mutant  in  a  population  using  strategy  {Bm, 
Sm,  Rm}  is: 
` 
Bm  (ß(Bp 
-1)QpRm  -  asm) 
(7)  Qm 
8+N(BmQpRm 
-BmBpQpRm  +Rp  -BmRp)+aBmS. 
We  still  need  to  make  assumptions  about  the  benefits  of  having  a  bower  of  specific 
quality.  In  bowerbirds,  females  choose  males  to  mate  with  following  assessment  of 
the  quality  of  several  bowers  (Uy  et  al.  2000,2001).  Thus,  fitness  of  a  bower  owner 
depends  on  the  quality  of  the  bower  relative  to  other  bowers  in  the  population. 
However,  species  or  populations  might  vary  in  the  choosiness  of  females.  If  females 
are  very  choosy,  they  will  presumably  mate  with  the  owner  of  the  best  bower  even  if 
the  male  is  not  available  at  the  bower  much  of  the  time,  whereas  if  mating  is  random, 
`passive  attraction'  (sensu  Parker  1983)  to  males  who  are  available  will  determine 
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mating  success.  These  effects  can  be  incorporated  in  a  single  equation  if  we  assume 
the  following  fitness  for  the  mutant  bower  owner,  W: 
QY  (8) 
Here,  y  describes  how  discriminating  females  are.  If  y  is  high,  females  pay  a  great 
deal  of  attention  to  bower  quality,  mating  only  with  males  who  have  good  quality 
bowers  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  population;  females  are  thus  extremely  choosy.  If  y 
is  zero,  females  pay  no  attention  to  bower  quality,  and  mate  randomly  with  any  male 
who  is  present  on  his  bower. 
In  order  to  find  the  optimal  allocation  in  three  different  tasks  {B,  S,  R},  we  perform  a 
numerical  search.  Beginning  with  a  randomly  selected  population  strategy,  we  test  all 
mutant  strategies  where  one  of  the  components  (B,  S  or  R)  is  increased  or  decreased 
by  1%  compared  to  the  population  strategy.  The  resulting  strategy  is  then  normalised 
so  that  B+S+R  =  1.  The  mutant  strategy  giving  the  highest  fitness  becomes  the 
population  strategy  for  the  next  generation.  We  iterate  for  2000  generations  until  an 
ESS  is  reached.  The  above  procedure  only  yields  one  ESS  at  a  time;  however, 
starting  from  different  randomly  chosen  values  for  the  population  strategy,  we  never 
found  a  case  of  alternative  ESSs. 
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Results 
We  investigate  the  effect  of  varying  the  efficiency  of  searching  (a)  and  raiding  (ß), 
the  natural  rate  of  deterioration  of  bowers  (S)  and  the  degree  to  which  females 
discriminate  between  bowers  of  different  qualities  (y).  This  allows  us  to  ask,  for 
example,  how  much  time  males  should  devote  to  searching  and  raiding  as  opposed  to 
remaining  on  the  bower,  waiting  for  females  and  carrying  out  bower  maintenance 
activities,  when  raiding  can  be  an  ESS,  and  whether  males  should  ever  abandon  the 
creation  of  bowers.  We  can  also  investigate  how  the  quality  of  bowers  can  vary  with 
these  parameters. 
Firstly,  as  the  efficiency  of  searching  for  new  items,  a,  increases,  the  ESS  time  spent 
searching  for  new  items  decreases  slightly,  whereas  bower  quality  increases  (figure 
7.1  a).  This  increase  is  more  pronounced  when  bowers  deteriorate  more  quickly  (8  = 
0.5,  figure  7.1b).  As  the  time  spent  searching  decreases,  there  is  a  corresponding 
increase  in  the  time  spent  on  or  near  the  bower.  Unsurprisingly,  increasing  the 
efficiency  of  raiding  (ß)  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  time  invested  in  raiding,  and  a 
corresponding  decrease  in  the  time  spent  searching  (figure  7.2).  Raiding,  however,  is 
not  beneficial  to  bower  quality  in  the  population.  As  raiding  increases  in  efficiency 
and  therefore  frequency,  bower  quality  declines.  At  high  values  of  raiding  efficiency, 
bowers  are  of  extremely  low  quality. 
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Figure  7.1:  The  effects  of  increasing  the  efficiency  of  searching  (a)  on  the  ESS 
probabilities  of  a  male  remaining  on  his  own  bower  (B,  dashed  line),  searching  (S, 
dotted  line)  and  raiding  (R,  dash-dot  line),  and  the  ESS  quality  of  bowers  in  the 
population  (Q,  solid  line),  for  two  rates  of  bower  deterioration  (S):  a)  8=0.1  b)  8= 
0.5.  Other  parameter  values  used:  ß=1,  y=1 
In  many  cases  (figure  7.1)  raiding  is  absent  from  the  population.  For  raiding  to 
occur,  it  needs  to  be  a  much  more  efficient  way  to  obtain  ornate  objects  than 
searching,  but  even  when  raiding  efficiency  greatly  exceeds  that  of  searching  (figure 
7.2),  it  still  occurs  very  infrequently.  Males  spend  less  than  6%  of  their  time  raiding 
even  when  it  is  100  times  more  effective  as  a  method  of  improving  bower  quality 
than  searching  and  tending  the  bower  (figure  7.2,  a=  1).  Potential  explanations  for 
the  scarcity  of  raiding  are  considered  in  the  discussion. 
171 Can  too  strong  female  choice  deteriorate  male  ornamentation?  Chapter  7 
1.0 
2' 
0.8 
U 
t0 
O 
0.6 
N 
wýp 
O 
0.4 
a> 
E 
0  0.2 
c 
O 
a 2  0.0 
----------------------------- 
1.0 
0.8 
0.8, 
is 
o' 
0.4  3 
0 
co 
0.2 
0.0 
0  20  40  60  80  100 
Efficiency  of  raiding,  ß 
Figure  7.2:  The  effects  of  increasing  the  efficiency  of  raiding  (ß)  the  bowers  of  other 
males  on  the  ESS  probabilities  of  a  male  remaining  on  his  own  bower  (B,  dashed 
line),  searching  (S,  dotted  line)  and  raiding  (R,  dash-dot  line),  and  the  ESS  quality  of 
bowers  in  the  population  (Q,  solid  line).  Other  parameters  used:  a=1,  y=1,8  =  0.1. 
When  bowers  naturally  deteriorate  more  rapidly,  males  spend  increased  time 
searching  for  new  decorations.  Raiding,  however,  does  not  become  more  common  in 
the  population  with  increasing  deterioration.  Instead,  males  in  a  population  without 
raiding  (figure  7.3  a)  invest  more  time  in  searching  in  this  case.  Males  in  a  population 
where  raiding  occurs  (figure  7.3b)  maintain  approximately  the  same  level  of  raiding 
regardless  of  the  rate  of  deterioration,  again,  searching  increases.  Thus,  male 
behaviour  can  compensate  for  changes  in  the  external  environment.  As  deterioration 
increases  further,  bower  quality  decreases  (figure  7.3a),  as  the  decline  in  bower 
quality  through  deterioration  is  not  offset  by  the  increased  time  spent  searching. 
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When  raiding  occurs  in  the  population  (figure  7.3b),  bower  quality  is  low  regardless 
of  the  rate  of  deterioration.  These  results  also  indicate  that  male  behaviour  (searching 
versus  raiding)  is  a  more  important  determinant  of  bower  quality  than  the  external 
rate  of  deterioration,  and  highlights  the  importance  of  studying  male-male 
interactions. 
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Figure  7.3:  The  effects  of  increasing  the  rate  of  natural  bower  deterioration  (S)  on 
the  ESS  probabilities  of  a  male  remaining  on  his  own  bower  (B,  dashed  line), 
searching  (S,  dotted  line)  and  raiding  (R,  dash-dot  line),  and  the  ESS  quality  of 
bowers  in  the  population  (Q,  solid  line),  for  two  different  raiding  efficiencies  (ß):  a) 
ß=  10,  b)  ß=  50.  Other  parameters  used:  a=1,  y  =1. 
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Finally,  and  most  interestingly,  we  investigated  the  effect  of  female  discrimination 
on  male  time  investment  and  bower  qualities.  When  females  mate  indiscriminately 
with  whichever  male  is  present  on  his  bower  (figure  7.4),  males  should  spend  all 
their  time  waiting  at  the  bower  and  no  time  searching  or  raiding.  In  this  case,  bower 
quality  is  zero  and  males  should  abandon  bower  building  altogether.  As  females 
become  increasingly  discriminatory,  males  spend  more  time  searching  for  new  items 
and  less  time  waiting  on  the  bower.  Bower  quality  rises  sharply  even  with  low  levels 
of  female  discrimination,  and  then  declines,  as  females  become  even  more 
discriminating  (figure  7.4).  This  is  an  important  and  counterintuitive  result: 
increasing  female  discrimination  can  lead  to  a  decline  in  bower  quality. 
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Figure  7.4:  The  effects  of  increasing  discrimination  by  females  are  (y)  on  the  ESS 
probabilities  of  a  male  remaining  on  his  own  bower  (B,  dashed  line),  searching  (S, 
dotted  line)  and  raiding  (R,  dash-dot  line),  and  the  ESS  quality  of  bowers  in  the 
population  (Q,  solid  line).  Other  parameters  used:  a=1,  ß=  10,8  =  0.1. 
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Discussion 
Two  main  results  emerge:  Firstly,  our  model  makes  a  number  of  predictions 
regarding  time  allocation  in  bowerbirds,  and  we  compare  these  predictions  with 
published  results  from  a  number  of  bowerbird  species.  Secondly,  we  discuss  the 
predictions  regarding  the  impact  of  female  choice  on  male-male  competition,  and  the 
potential  effect  of  this  competition  on  male  ornamentation. 
THEFT  AND  BOWERBIRD  TIME  BUDGETS 
Our  model  predicts  that  breeding  males  should  spend  a  large  proportion  of  their  time 
at  the  bower  (around  70%  or  more,  figures  7.1-7.3).  However,  observations  of 
bowerbird  populations,  indicate  substantial  variation  in  the  time  spent  at  the  bower, 
ranging  from  3  to  73%  (table  7.2).  Our  prediction  is  high  due  to  our  assumption  that 
males  must  be  present  at  the  bower  in  order  to  protect  their  bower  from  raids  and  to 
find  females  (we  assumed  that  females  ignore  bowers  with  no  male  present). 
Deviations  from  these  assumptions  may  explain  some  of  the  discrepancy.  The  time 
spent  at  the  bower  may  relate  to  the  risk  of  being  raided,  as  it  does  in  our  model: 
when  raiding  is  more  common,  bower  residence  is  predicted  to  be  higher  (figure  7.2). 
Although  a  `common  occurrence'  (Lenz  1994;  Pruett-Jones  &  Pruett-Jones  1994), 
raiding  does  not  occur  frequently  in  bowerbirds;  studies  suggest  that  a  given  bower  is 
raided  once  every  4  days  or  less  (Lenz  1994;  Borgia  &  Gore  1986;  Borgia  &  Mueller 
1992;  see  table  7.2),  or  males  spend  only  a  small  proportion  of  time  engaged  in 
raiding  activities  (Frith  &  Frith  1994). 
175 Can  too  strong  female  choice  deteriorate  male  ornamentation?  Chapter  7 
vi 
U 
N 
Yr 
0 
0 
U 
aA 
wo 
bß 
b 
4.4 
0 
U 
U 
U 
U 
O 
b 
N 
3 
0 
.n  () 
"o 
a) 
v 
a) 
a) 
a 
N 
N 
Gý 
.  fl 
H 
_ 
ö  w 
C% 
1 
a 
a  00  00 
0 
Ö 
v00 
00 
a, 
y 
.Ä 
p 
A 
\C 
00 
-4 
p 
t7 
- 
ýr 
'ý 
t4 
Oý 
-ä 
u 
9) 
p 
w 
a, 
ci 
00 
1-° 
CA 
0 
> 
> 
le  "O 
pq 
CD 
N 
9 
et 
c\ 
Q' 
ºý 
ä 
cu  10 
3 
a) 
5 
iz 
v 
-0 
ö  ö 
CL) 
fi 
91 
ö 
p 
c02 
ö 
c 
00 
E 
Z 
cam, 
E 
E 
c 
y 
00 
.o  N 
a) 
d' 
vQ 
Q 
,r 
y 
Gý 
C 
y 
Ir 
C 
V'1 
p 
A 
: 
"Ci 
le 
C 
N 
ý 
p 
- 
0 
i.  M 
4) 
i.  M 
CL)  v  ff) 
N 
N 
V 
Ö 
( 
N 
S 
ry 
00  M 
a) 
.2  ei 
v0 
-0 
3 
= 
r. 
vD 
to2 
`i 
ti 
u 92 
14ö 
Z 
ýY 
b 
-0 
e 
E-ý 
to2 
12 
y 
o 
-ICJ 
ß. 
0 
ö 
Z 
Q) 
14 
C7 
-2 
r2 
U 
.5 
ö 
- 
a 
bý 
rn 
2 
L 
-% 
U 
3 
rs: 
>  r3 
176 Can  too  strong  female  choice  deteriorate  male  ornamentation?  Chapter  7 
The  assumption  regarding  female  behaviour  may  explain  the  remaining 
discrepancies.  Of  the  three  species  with  comparable  measures  of  raiding,  Regent 
bowerbirds  Sericulus  chrysocephalus  suffer  the  highest  rate  of  theft,  yet  spent  the 
least  amount  of  time  on  the  bower  (table  7.2).  However,  this  species  differs  from 
others  in  that  courtship  begins  in  the  forest  canopy  rather  than  on  the  bower  (Lenz 
1994),  and  so  the  assumptions  of  our  model  are  not  applicable  here.  Spotted 
bowerbirds  spend  less  time  on  the  bower  than  satin  bowerbirds,  yet  suffer  a  lower 
rate  of  theft  (table  7.2),  suggesting  satin  bowerbirds  spend  increased  time  on  the 
bower  to  counteract  the  risk  of  raiding.  However,  to  fully  test  this  hypothesis, 
studies  investigating  both  the  risk  of  being  raided  and  the  time  spent  on  the  bower, 
both  within  and  between  species  are  needed.  Our  model  is  not  restricted  to 
bowerbirds:  Penduline  tits  (Remizpendulinus)  face  a  similar  time  allocation  problem. 
Males  build  nests  to  attract  females,  and  theft  of  nesting  material  is  more  efficient 
than  searching  for  it,  reducing  the  time  taken  to  build  a  nest.  In  this  species,  males 
spend  up  to  80%  of  their  time  near  their  nest,  although  much  less  time  is  needed  for 
construction  (Schleicher  et  al.  1993). 
In  our  model,  the  damage  caused  by  raiding  is  equal  to  the  benefits  gained  by  the 
raider,  and  at  equilibrium,  all  males  raid  and  are  raided  equally  often.  Such 
reciprocal  raiding  has  been  noted  in  bowerbirds  (Borgia  &  Gore  1986;  Frith  et  al. 
1994).  Raiding  is  often  combined  with  bower  marauding,  where  intruding  males 
partially  destroy  an  opponents  bower  in  addition  to  stealing  decorations  (Pruett-Jones 
&  Pruett-Jones  1994).  Thus,  the  impact  of  raiding  on  the  victim  may  exceed  the 
direct  benefits  gained  by  the  raider  (decorations  gained),  suggesting  that  the  intensity 
of  raiding  may  be  important.  Modelling  suggests  that  raiding  may  only  be 
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evolutionarily  stable  when  combined  with  marauding  (Pruett-Jones  &  Pruett-Jones 
1994).  At  well-decorated  bowers,  however,  males  focus  on  stealing  rather  than 
marauding  (Borgia  &  Gore  1986;  Borgia  1995),  thus,  bower  quality  can  impact  on 
stealing  behaviour  (Madden  2002). 
GENERAL  LESSONS:  MALE-MALE  COMPETITION  FOR  RESOURCES  AND  SEXUAL 
SELECTION 
A  common  feature  of  all  sexual  selection  models  so  far  is  that  female  preferences 
cause  the  evolution,  and  sometimes  exaggeration,  of  male  traits  (e.  g.  Lande  1981; 
Iwasa  &  Pomiankowski  1991;  Pomiankowski  et  al.  1991;  Kokko  et  al.  2002).  To  our 
knowledge,  it  has  not  been  realised  before,  that  the  effects  of  competition  between 
males  to  attract  mates  can  drive  selection  in  the  opposite  direction.  Our  model 
suggests  that  intensely  expressed  preferences  of  females  can  cause  the  deterioration 
of  male  ornamentation  through  male-male  competition  (figure  7.4).  In  the  context  of 
the  bowerbird  mating  system,  this  happens  if  raiding  becomes  more  frequent  as 
females  become  increasingly  choosy.  In  a  wider  context,  such  an  effect  could  occur 
whenever  contests  between  males  to  acquire  resources  necessary  for  sexual  displays 
lead  to  deterioration  of  this  resource,  in  other  words,  reduced  ability  to  invest  in 
sexual  ornaments  forming  the  basis  of  female  choice. 
Further  work  is  required  to  explore  the  consequences  of  this  mechanism  for  the 
evolution  of  female  choice.  Could  the  diminishing  male  display  also  mean  less 
accurate  female  choice,  which  would  probably  hamper  the  further  evolution  of 
female  choice?  This  requires  us  to  assess  how  accurately  females  distinguish 
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between  bowers  of  varying  quality.  In  our  model,  at  equilibrium,  all  bowers  are  of 
equal  quality.  However,  in  natural  populations,  variation  will  exist  around  any  trait 
under  consideration  (Pomiankowski  &  Moller  1995).  If  we  expect  traits  to  vary 
around  an  equilibrium,  the  accuracy  of  female  choice  will  depend  on  mean  trait  size 
as  well  as  the  variation  available  for  assessment.  Our  results  have  established  the 
self-limiting  nature  of  female  choice,  whenever  choice  is  easier  when  the  mean  male 
trait  is  larger.  In  other  words,  if  strongly  choosy  females  cause  such  intense  male- 
male  competition  that  traits  evolve  to  be  smaller,  and  if  trait  size  is  easier  to  assess 
when  it  is  large,  then  choosiness  leads  to  diminished  prospects  for  accurate  choice, 
and  the  benefits  of  being  choosy  become  limited. 
Under  what  conditions  would  we  expect  choice  to  be  easier  when  traits  are  large  or 
well  developed?  When  a  trait  is  on  average  large,  it  may  be  possible  to  have  a  larger 
variance  around  it,  and  thus  discrimination  may  be  easier  for  females.  Whether  this 
phenomenon  occurs  is  a  matter  of  empirical  research  rather  than  modelling,  and  thus 
we  have  not  included  it  in  our  study,  instead,  we  discuss  here  the  prospects  of  finding 
such  a  mechanism  in  nature. 
Sexually  selected  traits  are  often  described  as  `elaborate',  suggesting  that  in  general, 
they  appear  larger  or  more  ornate  when  compared  to  other  traits  that  do  not  form  the 
basis  of  sexual  selection.  Darwin  (1871)  noted  that  sexually  selected  characteristics 
are  highly  variable,  and  suggested  that  this  was  to  allow  discrimination  by  potential 
mates.  Recent  meta-analyses  (Alatalo  et  al.  1988b;  Cuervo  &  Moller  1999;  Cuervo  & 
Moller  2001)  have  found  a  larger  coefficient  of  variation  in  sexually  selected  traits 
than  in  ordinary  morphological,  naturally  selected  traits.  A  greater  variance  suggests 
that  female  choice  for  better  quality  males  should  be  easier.  However,  there  is  little 
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data  at  present  regarding  the  accuracy  of  female  assessment  relative  to  the  degree  of 
trait  exaggeration.  We  simply  note  here  that  it  is  plausible  that  larger  traits  have 
absolutely  larger  variances.  It  appears  there  is  limited  data  on  animals'  ability  to 
discriminate  between  traits  of  various  sizes.  Cognitive  limitations  have  mainly  been 
discussed  in  the  context  of  detecting  small  degrees  of  asymmetries  in  sexual  traits 
(Swaddle  1999a,  b).  In  that  context,  animals  appear  unable  to  detect  too  small 
(within-individual)  differences  in  the  sizes  of  morphological  traits.  It  is  conceivable 
that  a  similar  cognitive  constraint  operates  when  attempting  to  detect  differences 
between  different  males;  further  work  is  needed  in  this  area.  Generally,  signals  are 
easier  to  detect  with  increasing  difference  between  the  signal  and  the  background 
(e.  g.  Bushnell  et  al.  2003),  but  a  minimum  change  in  a  signal  is  necessary  before  the 
change  can  be  detected  (Weber's  law;  e.  g.  Shettleworth  1998). 
Whether  choice  really  becomes  self-limiting  depends  on  how  the  mean  and  variance 
of  male  traits  respond  to  male-male  competition.  Our  model  suggests  male-male 
competition  may  hamper  female  choice.  Alternatively,  male-male  competition  may 
increase  the  variance  in  male  sexual  ornaments  due  to  inequalities  in  resource  use,  or 
the  abilities  of  lower  quality  males  to  tolerate  the  stress  of  competition.  Such  a 
pattern  has  been  found  in  sticklebacks  (Gasterosteus  aculeatus),  where  competition 
between  males  enhances  variation  in  coloration,  used  in  female  choice  (Bakker  1994; 
Rowland  1994).  Future  models  could  incorporate  variation  in  male  quality  (in  terms 
of  his  ability  to  construct  a  high  quality  bower)  and  stochasticity  in  the  males' 
decision  making  processes  and  success  in  developing  an  ornament  and/or  attracting 
females  (McNamara  et  al.  1997). 
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Thus,  while  we  have  shown  that  there  is  a  possibility  for  self-limiting  evolution  of 
female  choice  via  deteriorating  resource  use  efficiency  under  intense  male-male 
competition,  the  details  of  the  system  may  matter.  Nevertheless,  we  have  shown  that 
too  intense  male-male  competition  can,  at  least  under  certain  circumstances,  lead  to 
smaller  ornaments  and  thus  deteriorating  accuracy  of  female  choice.  This  could 
provide  a  natural  stopping  point  for  runaway  evolution  of  male  traits,  something  that 
open-ended  models  of  runaway  sexual  selection  require  to  be  realistic  (Kokko  et  al. 
2003).  To  discover  if  such  self-limitation  occurs  in  nature,  resource  use  and 
interference  of  males  should  be  studied  at  different  intensities  of  female  choice,  and 
we  hope  that  our  study  encourages  empiricists  to  do  so. 
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CHAPTER  8 
MATE  GUARDING,  MALE  ATTRACTIVENESS  AND 
PATERNITY  UNDER  SOCIAL  MONOGAMY 
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Abstract 
Socially  monogamous  species  vary  widely  in  the  frequency  of  extra-pair  offspring, 
but  this  is  usually  discussed  assuming  that  females  are  free  to  express  mate  choice. 
Using  game  theory  modelling,  we  investigate  the  evolution  of  male  mate  guarding, 
and  the  relationship  between  paternity  and  mate  guarding  intensity.  We  show  that  the 
relationship  between  evolutionarily  stable  mate  guarding  behaviour  and  the  risk  of 
cuckoldry  can  be  complicated  and  non-linear.  Because  male  fitness  accumulates  both 
through  paternity  at  his  own  nest  and  through  his  paternity  elsewhere,  males  evolve 
to  guard  little  either  if  females  are  very  faithful,  or  if  they  are  very  unfaithful. 
Attractive  males  are  usually  expected  to  guard  less  than  unattractive  males,  but 
within-pair  paternity  may  correlate  either  positively  or  negatively  with  the  number  of 
extra-pair  offspring  fertilized  by  a  male.  Negative  correlations,  whereby  attractive 
males  are  cuckolded  more,  become  more  likely  if  variation  in  male  attractiveness  is 
high,  if  the  reason  behind  female  extra-pair  behaviour  applies  to  most  females  (e.  g. 
fertility  insurance)  rather  than  the  subset  mated  to  unattractive  males  (e.  g.  when 
females  seek  `good  genes'),  and  if  mate  guarding  is  efficient  in  controlling  female 
behaviour.  We  discuss  the  current  state  of  empirical  knowledge  with  respect  to  these 
findings 
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Introduction 
Females  of  numerous  socially  monogamous  species,  particularly  birds,  have  been 
shown  to  actively  seek  extra-pair  fertilizations  (Westneat  et  al.  1990;  Petrie  et  al. 
1998;  Griffith  et  al.  2002).  For  a  female,  having  offspring  fathered  by  a  male  other 
than  her  social  partner  has  a  number  of  potential  benefits  (reviewed  in  Jennions  & 
Petrie  2000).  These  include  improving  the  genetic  quality  of  offspring  (e.  g. 
Hasselquist  et  al.  1996),  genetic  compatibility  (Johnsen  et  al.  2000),  security  against 
infertility  of  her  mate  (Sheldon  1994;  Krokene  et  al.  1998;  Whitekiller  et  al.  2000), 
and  inbreeding  avoidance  (Blomqvist  et  al.  2002;  Foerster  et  al.  2003).  Species  vary 
widely  in  the  frequency  of  extra-pair  young:  in  birds,  the  observed  frequencies  range 
from  0  to  76%  (Griffith  et  al.  2002;  Westneat  &  Stewart  2003).  Such  variation  has 
been  explained  by  factors  such  as  population  density  (Moller  &  Birkhead  1993;  but 
see  Westneat  &  Sherman  1997;  Wink  &  Dyrcz  1999),  breeding  synchrony 
(Stutchbury  &  Morton  1995;  but  see  Griffith  et  al.  2002),  the  magnitude  of  variation 
in  fitness-related  traits  in  the  population  (Moller  1997;  Petrie  et  al.  1998),  and  the 
relative  importance  of  male  parental  care  (Moller  2000),  amongst  others  (reviewed  in 
Griffith  et  al.  2002). 
The  extensive  review  of  extra-pair  paternity  by  Griffith  et  al.  (2002)  does  not 
mention  mate  guarding  as  a  factor  influencing  paternity.  However,  if  females  are 
mating  outside  the  pair  bond,  a  male  should  endeavour  to  protect  his  paternity  and 
guard  against  cuckoldry.  While  female  infidelity  can  obviously  select  for  mate- 
guarding  behaviour  (van  Rhijn  1991;  Fishman  et  al.  2003),  it  also  implies  that  males 
can  have  fitness  opportunities  away  from  their  own  social  mate,  which  could 
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potentially  select  for  males  who  maintain  less  physical  proximity  to  their  social  mate. 
Whenever  mate  guarding  plays  a  role  in  the  sexual  conflict  over  paternity,  one 
should  investigate  how  it  influences  the  evolution  of  within-  versus  extra-pair 
paternity,  and  to  what  extent  it  limits  the  expression  of  female  preferences  (Green  et 
al.  2002;  Valera  et  al.  2003). 
The  matter  is  further  complicated  by  plastic  male  and  female  behaviours.  Females  or 
males  may  follow  adaptive  rules  of  differential  allocation  where  their  reproductive 
effort  and  mating  effort  depend  on  the  attractiveness,  or  quality,  of  their  mate  and 
themselves  (reviewed  in  Magrath  &  Komdeur  2003;  Sheldon  2000).  It  is  reasonable 
to  expect  that  optimal  levels  of  mate  guarding  can  be  similarly  plastic  (Komdeur 
2001).  But  should  an  attractive  male  guard  more  or  less  than  an  unattractive  male, 
and  should  we  consequently  expect  a  positive  or  negative  correlation  between  the 
paternity  a  male  gains  at  home  and  elsewhere?  Here  we  shall  show,  using  game 
theoretic  modelling,  that  the  answer  is  not  straightforward. 
Both  theoretically  and  empirically,  mate  guarding  has  been  studied  much  more 
extensively  in  crustaceans  and  in  insects  than  in  vertebrates  (e.  g.  Parker  1974b; 
Grafen  &  Ridley  1983;  Carroll  1993;  Jablonski  &  Vepsäläinen  1995;  Jivoff  &  Hines 
1998;  Jormalainen  1998;  Mathews  2002;  Plaistow  et  al.  2003;  Härdling  et  al.  2004). 
In  non-vertebrates,  pre-  or  postcopulatory  guarding  is  maintained  by  continuous 
physical  contact.  In  mate-guarding  vertebrates  (e.  g.  birds,  lizards  and  primates), 
males  cannot  guard  their  social  mates  in  this  way.  Instead,  mate-guarding  males 
maintain  proximity  to  their  females,  and  are  thus  at  least  partially  able  to  fend  off 
intruders  or  to  form  a  disincentive  for  the  female  to  seek  potential  extra-pair  males. 
Male  birds  commonly  accompany  females  almost  continuously  from  before  the  onset 
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of  incubation.  The  guarding  period  thus  coincides  with  female  fertility.  By  guarding 
in  such  a  way,  males  face  a  trade-off,  as  they  cannot  simultaneously  maximise  both 
within-  and  extra-pair  paternity  (Hasselquist  &  Bensch  1991).  However,  a 
compromise  strategy,  where  males  guard  during  the  fertile  period  of  their  female  and 
seek  extra-pair  copulations  outside  this  time  appears  to  be  an  evolutionary  stable 
strategy  (Fishman  et  al.  2003;  see  also  Saino  et  at.  1999)  when  female  fertility  is 
asynchronous  within  a  population. 
However,  there  are  many  cases  where  males  are  unable  to  simultaneously  achieve 
high  success  at  home  and  elsewhere.  In  many  species  there  is  considerable  overlap 
between  the  fertile  periods  of  females,  due  to  more  or  less  synchronous  breeding 
(Birkhead  &  Biggins  1987).  Females  may  also  store  sperm  to  some  extent  (Birkhead 
1998),  which  further  extends  the  overlap  between  `profitable'  times  to  approach 
different  females.  In  such  cases,  we  may  expect  that  males  face  a  trade-off  with 
respect  to  time.  When  a  temporal  separation  of  guarding  and  extra-pair  activities  is 
not  possible,  males  must  decide  how  much  time  to  allocate  to  the  two  mutually 
exclusive  activities  of  mate  guarding  and  spending  mating  effort  outside  the  pair 
bond.  Currently  we  lack  theory  on  how  this  conflict  should  be  resolved,  with  two 
notable  exceptions.  Van  Rhijn  (1991)  provided  a  simple  simulation  that  highlights 
the  frequency-dependent  nature  of  the  problem  but  does  not  solve  for  evolutionary 
equilibria,  and  Alonzo  and  Warner  (2000)  studied  a  specific  system  where  mate 
guarding  trades  off  with  sperm  production  in  a  fish.  Here,  our  aim  is  to  develop 
general  predictions  on  mate  guarding  and  patterns  of  parentage  in  socially 
monogamous  species. 
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The  model 
In  our  model,  we  assume  that  mate  guarding  can  only  be  100%  efficient  when  it 
occurs  100%  of  the  time  (Chuang-Dobbs  et  al.  2001  and  references  therein;  see  also 
Johnsen  et  al.  1998),  and  that  there  is  a  trade-off  between  mate  guarding  and  gaining 
extra-pair  offspring  (Gil  et  al.  1999;  Hasselquist  &  Bensch  1991;  but  see  Stutchbury 
1998). 
We  assume  that  females'  fertile  periods  are  synchronous,  and  model  the  trade-off 
between  mate  guarding  and  mate  acquisition  by  assuming  that  the  male  can  only  be 
performing  one  of  these  activities  at  a  time.  Thus,  mate  guarding  is  modelled  as  the 
time  t  (0  t  1)  that  the  male  spends  `at  home'  (i.  e.  in  close  proximity  to  his  social 
mate).  The  remaining  time  1-t  is  spent  `elsewhere'  (away  from  the  male's  social 
mate),  and  during  this  time  the  male  is  free  to  search  for  extra-pair  matings.  For 
limitations  of  this  assumption,  see  the  Discussion.  We  assume  that  males  can  be 
either  attractive  or  unattractive,  and  guarding  time  can  vary  according  to 
attractiveness. 
To  predict  male  fitness,  we  must  assume  a  function  that  relates  a  male's  guarding 
effort  and  attractiveness  to  his  paternity  at  home  (within-pair  paternity  pw),  and 
elsewhere  (extra-pair  paternity  pE).  Biologically  reasonable  functions  for  pw  and  PE 
must  satisfy  the  following  conditions: 
1.  Within-pair  paternity  pw  should  obtain  values  between  0  and  1.  It  should  be 
an  increasing  function  of  t,  the  male's  own  guarding  effort,  and  of  tpo,,  the 
mean  guarding  time  used  by  males  in  the  population.  The  latter  relationship 
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arises  because  guarding  males  will  not  be  able  to  attempt  cuckoldry  as  often 
as  non-guarding  males. 
2.  Extra-pair  paternity  pE  should  decrease  with  t  and  with  tpop,  for  similar 
reasons  as  above. 
3.  If  males  vary  in  attractiveness,  more  attractive  males  should  achieve  more 
within-pair  paternity  than  less  attractive  males,  for  the  same  guarding  effort. 
Likewise,  they  should  achieve  more  extra-pair  paternity,  if  the  time  spent  not 
guarding  is  the  same.  With  diminishing  differences  in  attractiveness  and 
guarding  time  between  males,  the  expected  paternities  achieved  should 
approach  each  other  as  well. 
4.  The  distribution  of  paternity  in  the  whole  population  must  satisfy  self- 
consistency  (Queller  1997;  Houston  &  McNamara  2002;  Kokko  &  Jennions 
2003).  This  means  that  the  total  paternity  achieved  by  all  males  must  sum  up 
to  1  per  brood;  for  example,  it  is  impossible  that  all  males  achieve  100% 
within-pair  paternity  and  also  gain  paternity  in  other  broods. 
A  very  large  number  of  functions  relating  guarding  time  to  pw  and  PE  exist  that 
satisfy  the  above  criteria,  and  it  is  not  feasible  to  study  every  possibility.  We  chose  to 
study  two  very  different,  and  flexible,  families  of  functions  for  pw.  We  examined  the 
following  two  possibilities: 
pw(t,  k)  =  t  (1a) 
t+k(1-t)'c 
o. 
and  pw(t,  k)  =gt 
kc°°,,  (lb) 
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In  these  equations,  the  parameter  k  measures  female  infidelity.  This  is  a  measure  of 
the  eagerness  with  which  females,  paired  to  a  male  of  specific  attractiveness,  seek 
extra-pair  copulations  (and  consequently  how  good  they  are  at  escaping  male  mate- 
guarding  efforts).  k  will  have  different  values  for  different  males,  if  these  differ  in 
attractiveness.  In  our  examples,  we  have  either  assumed  no  variation  (same  k  for  all 
males),  or  that  a  proportion  x  of  males  are  highly  attractive  and  experience  female 
infidelity  k1,  and  the  remaining  1-x  are  less  attractive  and  experience  infidelity  k2  > 
k1.  The  infidelity  parameter  k  alters  the  shape  of  the  guarding  curve:  if  females  seek 
extra-pair  paternity  very  actively  (high  k),  guarding  time  t  needs  to  be  close  to  100% 
(t  =  1)  before  paternity  approaches  its  maximum.  When  k  is  small,  much  smaller 
levels  of  guarding  are  sufficient  to  yield  high  paternity.  We  call  k  `female  infidelity', 
but  it  must  be  noted  that  it  does  not  necessarily  reflect  observed  levels  of  extra-pair 
paternity:  the  latter  results  from  an  interaction  between  k  (female  behaviour)  and 
mate  guarding  (male  behaviour).  Therefore,  k2  >  kl  does  not  mean  that  we  assume  a 
priori  that  less  attractive  males  will  achieve  less  within-pair  paternity,  rather,  they 
will  achieve  less  if  they  do  not  compensate  for  their  unattractiveness  by  guarding 
more. 
The  parameter  g  in  equations  (la  and  b)  measures  the  efficiency  of  mate  guarding. 
Small  values  of  g  imply  that  paternity  improves  slowly  with  increasing  guarding 
effort.  The  difference  between  models  (la)  and  (lb)  lies  in  the  shape  of  paternity 
increase.  In  (la),  males  can  achieve  full  paternity  if  they  guard  full  time,  but  g 
determines  how  quickly  this  goal  is  reached  (figure  8.1a).  In  (lb),  we  assume  that 
males  cannot  achieve  full  paternity  even  if  they  guard  full  time:  g<1  for  this 
equation  (figure  8.1b). 
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Figure  8.1:  Model  assumptions  regarding  within-pair  paternity  pw.  (a)  Model  (la) 
where  100%  guarding  time  will  lead  to  full  paternity.  The  effect  of  the  guarding 
efficiency  is  illustrated  with  two  values  of  g  (thick  line,  g=1.2,  thin  line,  g=0.2). 
Other  parameters:  k=1.2,  tpop  =  0.5.  (b)  the  alternative  model  (lb),  where  males  do 
not  achieve  100%  paternity  even  if  they  guard  full  time.  The  effect  of  the  guarding 
efficiency  is  illustrated  with  two  values  of  g  (thick  line,  g=0.95,  thin  line,  g=0.2). 
Other  parameters:  k=1.2,  tpop  =  0.5. 
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The  parameter  cpop  measures  the  competitive  pressure  from  other  male  members  of 
the  population,  which  is  a  decreasing  function  of  their  mate-guarding  effort  tpop.  cpop 
=X  (1-tpopl)  +  (1  x)  (1-tpop2)a  describes  the  average  competitiveness  of  a  population 
member,  when  the  population  strategy  of  guarding  is  attractiveness-dependent, 
{tpopl,  tpop2}.  The  parameter  a  measures  how  efficiently  the  unattractive  males 
compete  for  mates  in  extra-pair  situations,  compared  with  attractive  ones  (0  <a<  1). 
In  case  of  no  quality  variation,  we  set  a=1,  which  yields  cpop  =1-tip. 
In  order  to  make  our  model  self-consistent,  paternity  needs  to  sum  such  that  every 
offspring  has  one  father  (Houston  &  McNamara  2002;  Kokko  &  Jennions  2003). 
This  is  achieved  by  first  calculating  the  population-wide  average  paternity  at  home. 
This  equalspwpop  =xpw(tpop,  kl)  +  (1  x)  pw(tpop,  k2),  where  either  equation  (1  a)  or  (lb) 
is  used  to  calculate  pw(t,  k).  Note  that  if  males  do  not  vary  in  quality,  x=1  and  the 
equation  simplifies  accordingly. 
Thereafter,  we  express  extra-pair  paternity  for  the  focal  male  as 
PE(t)  =  (1  PWpop)  C/Cpop  (2) 
Here,  1  pwpop  is  the  paternity  (per  brood)  available  for  extra-pair  males,  and  c/cpop  is 
the  competitiveness  of  the  focal  male  in  getting  a  share  of  this  paternity,  relative  to 
average  members  of  the  male  population.  If  males  do  not  vary  in  quality,  the  share 
simply  depends  on  the  time  a  male  spends  not  guarding:  clcpop  =  (I-t)/(l-tpop).  If 
quality  does  vary,  c  =1-tl  for  attractive  males  whose  guarding  time  equals  t1,  and  c= 
(1-t2)a  for  unattractive  males  who  guard  the  amount  t2.  cpop  is  as  defined  above. 
Fitness  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  paternity  at  home  and  elsewhere  and  the  evolutionarily 
stable  guarding  time  t*  is  obtained  by  creating  pairwise  invasion  plots  (see  e.  g. 
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Dieckmann  1997  for  the  exact  procedure).  In  cases  where  males  vary  in 
attractiveness,  the  game  is  solved  by  numerically  seeking  the  values  t1,  pop  and  t2,  pop 
for  which  no  other  ti  or  t2  can  lead  to  increased  fitness,  pW(ti)+pE(ti),  for  either  type 
of  male  (i=1,2).  The  numerical  procedure  is  simple,  as  the  region  of  biologically 
feasible  values  for  t  is  constrained,  0t1,  thus  allowing  to  check  all  combinations 
of  {t1,  t2}  values,  with  accuracy  as  desired.  We  computed  solutions  with  an  accuracy 
of  0.005. 
Results 
Guarding  intensity  might  be  expected  to  increase  with  the  tendency  of  females  to 
seek  extra-pair  copulations  (k).  However,  it  turns  out  that  this  is  not  necessarily  the 
case:  the  relationship  is  nonlinear,  and  depends  on  the  particular  assumptions  made 
regarding  the  shape  of  the  trade-off  between  guarding  and  extra-pair  activities.  Mate- 
guarding  behaviour  is  most  intense  when  it  is  efficient  (i.  e.  high  g),  but  the  effects  of 
female  infidelity  vary  depending  on  the  exact  assumptions  made  (figure  8.2a  and  b). 
The  paternity  function  (la)  predicts  less  guarding  when  females  have  a  strong 
tendency  for  infidelity  (figure  8.2a).  The  function  (lb),  on  the  other  hand,  predicts  an 
initial  increase  in  guarding  time  with  increasing  infidelity,  and  then  a  decrease 
(figure  8.2b). 
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Figure  8.2:  Evolutionarily  stable  mate  guarding  effort  as  a  function  of  female 
infidelity  k  and  mate  guarding  efficiency  g,  with  within-pair  paternity  obeying  (a) 
equation  la,  or  (b)  equation  lb.  Note  that  responses  to  infidelity  differ  between 
model  assumptions.  All  males  are  assumed  to  be  of  equal  quality  (a  =  1,  identical  k 
values  among  males). 
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Males  that  behave  optimally  clearly  trade  off  the  fitness  gains  obtained  at  home  with 
gains  elsewhere.  If  females  never  seek  extra-pair  copulations,  the  time  invested  in 
guarding  does  not  have  any  fitness  consequences  for  the  male,  and  is  selectively 
neutral.  With  increasing  infidelity,  the  importance  of  mate  guarding  increases,  but  so 
does  the  lost  opportunity  cost  of  mate  guarding.  This  is  because  higher  female 
infidelity  implies  higher  potential  fitness  benefits  to  the  male,  provided  by  extra-pair 
females.  Additionally,  the  net  efficiency  of  mate  guarding  deteriorates  when  females 
seek  extra-pair  activities  very  intensely,  and  this  explains  why  mate  guarding 
becomes  less  intense,  or  vanishes,  at  high  values  of  k. 
When  males  vary  in  their  ability  to  attract  extra-pair  females  and  ensure  paternity  at 
home,  further  complications  are  possible.  Observed  within-pair  paternity  levels  arise 
through  an  interaction  between  the  tendency  of  females  to  seek  extra  pair  mates  and 
the  guarding  behaviour  of  males.  A  typical  result  of  this  interaction  is  that  attractive 
males  guard  less  than  unattractive  males  (figure  8.3):  being  attractive  both  improves 
the  paternity  a  male  gains  at  home  gained  when  he  guards  little,  and  enhances  his 
success  when  he  spends  time  elsewhere  (equations  1  and  2).  In  some  cases  (figure 
8.3a,  low  to  moderate  k),  unattractive  males  spend  all  their  time  mate  guarding,  and 
forego  the  chance  of  any  extra-pair  paternity.  For  attractive  males,  the  trade-off  is 
different:  higher  chances  of  gaining  paternity  away  from  home,  together  with  their 
social  mate  being  less  inclined  to  seek  extra-pair  offspring,  means  that  the  optimal 
time  attractive  males  spend  guarding  is  smaller. 
However,  this  argument  does  not  always  hold,  due  to  possible  nonlinear  relationships 
between  time  spent  guarding  and  its  effectiveness  in  deterring  extra-pair  activities. 
With  high  values  of  female  infidelity  (k)  in  figure  8.3a  and  b,  unattractive  males  are 
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not  able  to  secure  much  paternity  at  home  regardless  of  their  guarding  effort. 
Consequently  they  may  guard  less  than  attractive  males,  or  cease  guarding 
altogether.  Attractive  males  may  still  spend  some  time  guarding;  unless  infidelity  k 
increases  further  to  make  guarding  inefficient  for  these  males  too  (figure  8.3b). 
The  exact  patterns  clearly  depend  on  how  a  male's  attractiveness  influences  his 
success  at  securing  paternity  at  home  versus  elsewhere.  Despite  these  complications, 
attractive  males  are  often  predicted  to  guard  less,  given  their  higher  success  outside 
the  pair  bond.  Does  this  also  mean  that  they  gain  less  paternity  at  home,  or  is  reduced 
guarding  fully  compensated  by  their  attractiveness  (such  that  their  social  mate  does 
not  tend  towards  infidelity  as  strongly  as  females  of  other  males)?  The  former 
possibility  predicts  that  within-  and  extra-pair  paternity  gained  by  a  male  should 
correlate  negatively,  whereas  the  latter  predicts  a  positive  relationship. 
Our  model  predicts  that  either  scenario  is  possible.  In  the  example  of  figure  8.3a, 
compensation  is  nowhere  near  complete:  attractive  males  suffer  from  lower  within- 
pair  paternity  when  they  spend  less  time  mate-guarding  than  unattractive  males, 
except  for  a  small  region  at  high  infidelity  values  where  guarding  times  are  almost 
identical.  They  enjoy  much  higher  extra-pair  paternity,  however.  Interestingly,  they 
are  only  able  to  cuckold  other  attractive  males,  as  unattractive  males  spend  100%  of 
their  time  guarding,  which  totally  protects  their  within-pair  paternity  interests.  In 
figure  8.3b,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  assumed  that  full-time  guarding  does  not 
guarantee  full  paternity.  Consequently,  guarding  is  less  intense,  paternities  are  more 
evenly  distributed,  and  attractive  males  win  on  both  fronts:  they  gain  more  paternity 
both  at  home  and  elsewhere. 
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Figure  8.3a:  The  impact  of  increasing  female  infidelity  (k)  on  the  evolutionary 
stable  proportion  of  time  invested  in  guarding,  within-pair  paternity,  and  extra-pair 
paternity,  with  within-pair  paternity  calculated  according  to  equation  la.  Solid  lines 
show  time  invested  and  paternity  gained  by  attractive  males,  broken  lines  show 
guarding  time  and  paternity  gained  by  unattractive  males.  Parameter  values  used:  x 
=  0.5,  g=0.8,  a=0.9,  k1  =k  as  indicated  on  the  x  axis,  k2  =2k 
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Figure  8.3b:  The  impact  of  increasing  female  infidelity  (k)  on  the  evolutionary 
stable  proportion  of  time  invested  in  guarding,  within-pair  paternity,  and  extra-pair 
paternity,  with  within-pair  paternity  calculated  according  to  equation  la.  Solid  lines 
show  time  invested  and  paternity  gained  by  attractive  males,  broken  lines  show 
guarding  time  and  paternity  gained  by  unattractive  males.  Parameter  values  used:  x= 
0.5,  g=0.6,  a=0.9,  k1=  k  as  indicated  on  the  x  axis,  k2  =  1.5  k. 
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Thus,  attractiveness  can  sometimes  compensate  for  reduced  mate-guarding  at  home, 
but  it  does  not  always  do  so.  This  is  illustrated  by  varying  the  relative  attractiveness 
of  unattractive  males  (figure  8.4).  When  unattractive  males  have  very  low  success 
elsewhere  (small  a),  their  guarding  becomes  so  intense  that  their  within-pair 
paternity  improves  beyond  that  of  attractive  males.  As  the  relative  attractiveness  of 
unattractive  males  approaches  that  of  attractive  ones  (high  a,  figure  8.4),  the  males 
that  gain  more  extra-pair  paternity  gain  more  at  home  too. 
Finally,  the  sign  of  the  correlation  between  within-  and  extra-pair  paternity  may  also 
depend  on  the  efficiency  of  guarding,  g.  In  the  example  of  figure  8.5,  the  higher 
guarding  effort  by  unattractive  males  almost  perfectly  compensates  for  their  social 
mate's  stronger  tendency  to  cuckold  them.  When  guarding  is  very  efficient  (high  g), 
it  overcompensates,  and  unattractive  males  end  up  with  higher  within-pair  paternity 
pw  than  attractive  males).  When  guarding  is  less  efficient  (low  g),  it  under 
compensates. 
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Figure  8.4.  Evolutionarily  stable  guarding  times  t*,  as  well  as  within-  and  extra-pair 
paternity  for  attractive  and  unattractive  males,  as  a  function  a,  the  relative  success  of 
the  less  attractive  males,  when  they  are  attempting  extra-pair  copulations.  This 
example  uses  within-pair  paternity  function  (la)  with  parameter  values  x=0.5,  kl  = 
0.5,  k2=0.8,  g=0.1. 
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Figure  8.5.  Evolutionarily  stable  guarding  times  t*,  as  well  as  within-  and  extra-pair 
paternity  for  attractive  and  unattractive  males,  as  a  function  of  the  efficiency  of 
guarding  g.  This  example  uses  within-pair  paternity  function  (lb)  with  parameter 
values  x=0.5,  k1=0.3,  k2=0.4,  a=0.8. 
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Discussion 
Our  modelling  shows  that  mate  guarding  can  substantially  alter  paternity  patterns 
from  what  would  be  expected  based  solely  on  how  much  females  are  assumed  to 
benefit  from  extra-pair  fertilizations.  The  extent  of  mate  guarding  in  a  particular 
mating  system,  however,  is  difficult  to  predict  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Firstly,  as  the 
female  tendency  to  seek  extra-pair  copulations  increases,  there  is  more  reason  for  the 
male  to  mate  guard,  but  at  the  same  time  any  particular  level  of  mate  guarding 
becomes  less  efficient,  thus  forming  a  disincentive  to  mate-guard  (see  Morrell  2004, 
chapter  6,  for  a  related  argument  in  a  different  context).  Secondly,  if  mate  guarding 
intensity  is  based  on  a  trade-off  between  paternity  at  home  and  elsewhere,  increasing 
female  infidelity  implies  larger  fitness  gains  for  males  who  spend  more  time  away 
from  home  looking  for  additional  matings.  This  explains  why  mate-guarding  ceases 
if  females  become  very  unfaithful  (or  very  good  at  escaping  male  mate  guarding 
attempts),  and  highlights  the  importance  of  taking  into  account  population-level 
feedbacks  in  a  self-consistent  way  when  developing  models  of  mating  systems 
(Webb  et  al.  1999;  Houston  &  McNamara  2002;  Kokko  &  Jennions  2003). 
The  curvilinear  relationship  between  female  infidelity  and  optimal  level  of  mate 
guarding  also  complicates  the  relationship  between  mate  guarding  and  observed 
within-  and  extra-pair  paternity.  We  investigated  the  consequences  of  two  different 
biologically  feasible  relationships  between  guarding  and  within-pair  paternity,  and  in 
both  cases  the  outcomes  depend  on  details  such  as  the  efficiency  of  guarding,  and  the 
eagerness  of  females  to  seek  extra-pair  copulations.  This  may  help  explain  why  it  is 
difficult  to  detect  an  overall  association  between  mate  guarding  and  paternity  in  an 
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interspecific  comparison  (Moller  &  Ninni  1998).  For  example,  low  mate  guarding 
intensity  can  be  equally  well  predicted  under  conditions  that  yield  low  paternity 
(guarding  is  of  little  use  if  expected  paternity  remains  low  no  matter  how  much  the 
male  guards)  or  under  conditions  that  yield  high  paternity  (if  females  do  not  gain 
much  benefit  from  extra-pair  offspring,  there  is  little  need  to  guard,  as  suggested  for 
the  purple  sandpiper,  Pierce  &  Lifjeld  1998).  Across  species,  `  least  mate  guarding 
occurs  in  highly  polygynous  taxa  (Moller  &  Birkhead  1991),  which  fits  in  well  with 
our  results  that  predict  cessation  of  mate  guarding  at  highest  values  of  infidelity  k. 
If  females  vary  in  their  behaviour  depending  on  the  attractiveness  of  their  mate,  we 
can  also  expect  complications  in  the  relationship  between  male  attractiveness  and  his 
paternity  with  his  social  mate.  Attractive  males  are  often  predicted  to  guard  less  in 
our  model,  yet  an  attractive  male  does  not  necessarily  suffer  a  great  fitness  loss 
through  cuckoldry  in  his  own  nest,  if  his  attractiveness  makes  his  social  mate  less 
prone  to  mate  with  extra-pair  males.  However,  in  other  cases  we  predict  that 
unattractive  males  guard  so  much  more  intensely  than  attractive  males  that  the 
within-pair  paternity  of  the  latter  remains  smaller.  Such  cases  are  reflected  as  a 
negative  correlation  between  paternity  at  home  and  elsewhere,  and  we  predict  this  to 
be  particularly  likely  when  variation  in  male  attractiveness  is  high  (low  a  in  the 
model),  and  when  females  do  not  pay  disproportionate  attention  to  their  own  social 
mate's  attractiveness  when  `deciding'  whether  to  engage  in  extra-pair  activities. 
Another  requirement  for  a  negative  correlation  is  that  mate  guarding  is  sufficiently 
efficient  to  limit  free  expression  of  female  mating  preferences,  since  this  allows  the 
inferior  males  to  maintain  high  within-pair  paternity. 
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Is  there  evidence  supporting  our  result  that  it  can  sometimes  pay  attractive  males  to 
reduce  mate  guarding  to  such  a  degree  that  their  paternity  at  home  suffers?  A  meta- 
analysis  (Moller  &  Ninni  1998)  implies  that  male  birds  with  more  extravagant 
secondary  sexual  characters  generally  enjoy  higher  paternity  in  their  own  nests,  but 
this  study  did  not  explicitly  quantify  if  the  same  males  also  had  elevated  success 
elsewhere.  Both  positive  and  negative  correlations  can  be  found  in  the  literature 
(Westneat  &  Stewart  2003).  For  example,  older  Bullock's  orioles  Icterus  galbula 
bullockii  lost  less  within-pair  paternity  and  gained  more  extra-pair  fertilisations  than 
did  yearling  subadult  males  (Richardson  &  Burke  1999).  Similarly,  most  extra-pair 
males  in  the  blue  tit  Parus  caeruleus  did  not  lose  paternity  themselves  (Kempenaers 
et  al.  1997),  and  in  this  species,  poor  quality  males  who  guard  lose  paternity  to  good 
quality  males  despite  their  more  intense  mate  guarding  behaviour  (Kempenaers  et  al. 
1995).  But  in  the  yellow  warbler  Dendroica  petechia,  known  extra-pair  sires  were 
just  as  likely  to  be  cuckolded  themselves  as  any  male  in  the  population  (Yezerinac  et 
al.  1995),  and  for  the  pied  flycatcher  Ficedula  hypoleuca,  it  has  been  reported  that 
attractive  black  males  are  cuckolded  more  than  brown  unattractive  ones  (Lifjeld  et  al. 
1997)  -  although  these  authors  did  not  find  mate  guarding  an  adequate  explanation 
for  the  pattern.  Only  a  handful  of  studies  exist  that  document  relationships  between 
male  mate  guarding  and  other  aspects  of  the  mating  system.  Black-throated  blue 
warbler  Dendroica  caerulescens  males  with  many  extra-pair  opportunities  have  been 
shown  to  guard  less  and  consequently  end  up  with  less  paternity  in  their  own  broods 
(Chuang-Dobbs  et  al.  2001),  while  in  wheatears  Oenanthe  oenanthe,  good  body 
condition  seems  to  aid  paternity  at  home  as  well  as  improving  success  elsewhere 
(Currie  et  al.  1999). 
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In  the  example  of  the  wheatear,  the  positive  correlation  may  be  partly  explained  by 
adaptive  time  allocation:  males  guard  intensely  when  the  female  is  close  to  laying 
(Currie  et  al.  1998),  which  may  allow  the  best  males  to  escape  the  strict  trade-off  and 
achieve  high  paternity  at  home  as  elsewhere.  In  our  model,  we  assumed  that  males 
could  not  escape  the  trade-off;  if  they  do  so  (at  least  partly),  the  likelihood  of  positive 
correlations  between  within-  and  extra-pair  paternity  will  increase.  In  any  case,  late 
breeding  wheatears  are  documented  to  use  direct  guarding  more  than  early  breeding 
ones  (Currie  et  al.  1998),  a  pattern  predicted  by  our  study  if  the  early  arriving  birds 
are  better  competitors  (Kokko  1999).  Similarly,  in  penduline  tits  Remiz  pendulinus 
-a  species  in  which  neither  mate  guarding  nor  cuckoldry  is  particularly  intense  - 
males  who  guarded  most  were  more  likely  to  suffer  cuckoldry  (Schleicher  et  al. 
1997). 
The  extent  to  which  female  choice  for  extra-pair  fertilizations  is  restricted  by  mate 
guarding  requires  much  more  study.  The  above  results  give  the  impression  that 
examples  where  less  attractive  males  gain  more  paternity  at  home  (due  to  extensive 
and  efficient  mate  guarding)  are  quite  rare.  If  this  proves  to  be  true  generally,  mate 
guarding  does  not  appear  a  very  strong  evolutionary  force  in  shaping  mating  systems. 
But  if  females  regularly  escape  mate  guarding  attempts,  we  face  an  enigma:  why 
does  mate-guarding  evolve,  if  it  is  so  inefficient?  Currently,  we  do  not  have  a  general 
answer  to  this  question.  Studies  on  paternity  rarely  present  data  in  a  form  that  allows 
direct  comparison  of  within-  and  extra-pair  paternity,  and  direct  data  on  mate 
guarding  is  usually  lacking.  Such  data  are  crucial  before  general  conclusions  can  be 
made  about  the  importance  of  mate  guarding  in  shaping  genetic  parentage  in  socially 
monogamous  species. 
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Thus,  we  can  only  point  to  a  surprising  lack  of  knowledge  on  natural  systems 
regarding  the  various  theoretical  possibilities:  the  relationship  between  male 
attractiveness  and  mate-guarding  may  mean  that  sexual  selection  uniformly  favours 
attractive  males  both  in  their  own  brood  as  well  as  elsewhere,  or,  alternatively,  less 
attractive  males  perform  relatively  well  under  social  monogamy,  due  to  their  mate 
guarding  efforts.  In  the  latter  case,  mate  guarding  diminishes  the  intensity  of  sexual 
selection  arising  through  female  choice.  Even  in  the  cases  where  mate  guarding  can 
be  shown  to  be  efficient  in  restricting  female  infidelity  (as  has  been  shown 
experimentally  for  the  Seychelles  warbler.  Acrocephalus  sechellensis,  Komdeur  et  al. 
1999,  and  black-throated  blue  warblers,  Chuang-Dobbs  et  al.  2001),  between- 
individual  variation  can  allow  for  a  variety  of  different  relationships  between 
guarding  and  paternity.  These  patterns  remain  to  be  investigated  in  wild  populations, 
as  do  those  that  arise  from  the  interaction  between  mate  guarding  and  alternative 
paternity  guards,  such  as  frequent  copulations  (Moller  &  Birkhead  1991). 
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Game  theory  approaches  have  been  applied  to  a  wide  range  of  evolutionary  questions 
(Nowak  &  Sigmund  2004),  including  animal  behaviour,  resource  allocation  in  plants 
(Falster  &  Westoby  2003),  arms  races  between  predators  and  prey  (Abrams  & 
Matsuda  1997)  and  the  acquisition  of  language  in  humans  (Nowak  et  al.  2002). 
Game  theory  models  of  animal  behaviour  have  provided  a  strong  framework  for 
explaining  many  aspects  of  behaviour  in  terms  of  the  costs  and  benefits  to  the 
individual,  from  co-operation  (e.  g.  the  Prisoners  Dilemma;  Axelrod  &  Hamilton 
1981)  to  conflict  (e.  g.  the  hawk-dove  game;  Maynard  Smith  &  Price  1973).  Models 
of  animal  behaviour  can  only  be  of  practical  use  in  behavioural  ecology  if: 
"  Their  predictions  can  be  tested  using  empirical  systems,  in  order  to  determine 
whether  the  underlying  assumptions  are  accurate.  For  example,  the  duration 
of  fights  decreases  with  increasing  size  asymmetry  between  the  contestants 
(e.  g.  Englund  &  Olsson  1990;  Pratt  et  al.  2003,  see  chapter  2),  as  predicted 
by  the  sequential  assessment  game  (Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  & 
Enquist  1984),  or 
"  They  can  explain  existing  patterns  in  the  data.  For  example,  an  explanation 
for  the  observation  that  in  territorial  contests,  owners  tend  to  win,  was 
provided  by  the  hawk-dove  game,  where  `bourgeois'  (attack  if  resident, 
retreat  if  hawk)  was  an  ESS  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976),  or 
"  They  are  used  to  investigate  the  underlying  assumptions  of  other  types  of 
models,  such  as  mechanistic  approaches.  For  example,  the  assumptions  of 
mechanistic  models  of  movement  and  scent  marking  in  wolves  (Lewis  & 
207 General  Discussion  Chapter  9 
Murray  1993;  White  et  al.  1996)  have  been  tested  using  a  game  theoretic 
approach  (Lewis  &  Moorcroft  2001). 
In  this  thesis  I  have  used  and  developed  a  number  of  game  theory  models  to 
investigate  aspects  of  conflict  resolution  in  animals,  and  have  aimed  to  either  test  the 
predictions  of  existing  mechanistic  models,  or  provide  testable  predictions. 
In  chapter  2,1  tested  the  predictions  of  existing  models  of  territorial  contests. 
Although  many  models  of  animal  conflict  exist,  there  are  many  further  avenues  of 
research  emerging,  and  it  is  unlikely  that  a  single  model  can  be  applicable  to  all 
species  and  situations.  Researchers  have  developed  several  different  models  of 
animal  conflict,  aiming  to  predict  the  outcome,  duration  and  in  some  cases  the 
sequence  of  behaviours  occurring  during  a  fighting.  These  are  outlined  in  chapter  1 
and  discussed  in  chapter  2.  However,  determining  which  of  these  models  is 
applicable  to  different  situations  can  be  difficult.  The  sequential  assessment  game 
(Enquist  &  Leimar  1983;  Leimar  &  Enquist  1984;  Enquist  et  al.  1990)  and  war  of 
attrition  (Parker  &  Rubenstein  1981;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982)  assume  that 
mutual  assessment  of  opponents  occurs  during  conflict,  and  makes  predictions 
regarding  duration  on  the  basis  of  that  assumption.  The  energetic  war  of  attrition 
(Payne  &  Pagel  1996,1997;  Payne  1998)  and  the  war  of  attrition  without  assessment 
(Mesterton-Gibbons  et  al.  1996)  assume  that  no  such  assessment  needs  to  occur,  and 
yet  make  similar  predictions  about  fight  duration. 
Taylor  and  Elwood's  (2003)  recent  investigation  of  these  different  game  theory 
models  of  conflict  duration  suggests  that  many  studies  of  fight  duration  may  have 
involved  incorrect  interpretation  of  the  data,  due  to  the  similar  predictions  of  these 
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different  models.  They  presented  a  framework  for  the  analysis  of  fighting  duration 
which  attempts  to  distinguish  between  different  models,  and  therefore  to  determine 
which  of  the  underlying  assumptions  are  applicable  to  a  particular  species.  In 
chapter  2,1  investigated  the  duration  of  fighting  in  fiddler  crabs  (Uca  mjoebergi),  in 
order  to  determine  whether  contest  duration  was  a  results  of  individual  thresholds 
reached  first  by  the  loser,  or  by  the  loser  assessing  its  relative  inferiority  and  deciding 
to  retreat.  Finding  that  neither  of  the  hypotheses  investigated  by  Taylor  and  Elwood 
(2003)  provided  a  good  description  of  fighting  duration  in  this  species,  I  further 
developed  their  framework  incorporating  an  alternative  game  theory  model  -  the 
cumulative  assessment  game  (Payne  1998,  see  chapter  1).  Chapter  2  highlighted 
the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  different  models  of  fighting  behaviour,  and 
provided  an  alternative  explanation  for  the  patterns  seen. 
The  cumulative  assessment  model  and  the  sequential  assessment  game  both  make 
predictions  as  to  the  sequences  and  rates  of  actions  the  contestants  employ  during  a 
fight.  For  example,  the  sequential  assessment  game  predicts  that  actions  should 
increase  in  intensity  during  the  fight  (Enquist  et  al.  1990),  while  the  cumulative 
assessment  game  allows  for  de-escalation  to  occur  (Payne  1998).  It  is  clear  that 
further  detailed  studies  of  fighting  behaviour  are  needed  to  accurately  determine 
which  models  of  fighting  provide  the  best  description  of  the  behaviour  observed  in 
U.  mjoebergi  and  other  species. 
It  has  already  been  suggested  that  much  data  on  fight  duration  needs  to  be  reanalysed 
(Taylor  &  Elwood  2003;  Gammel  &  Hardy  2003),  since  many  researchers  have 
failed  to  investigate  the  possibility  that  duration  is  determined  by  individual 
thresholds  and  predicted  by  the  size  of  the  loser.  Instead,  much  previous  work  has 
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concentrated  on  investigating  relative  size  as  a  predictor  of  duration  and  found 
support  for  mutual  assessment  of  relative  size.  The  findings  of  chapter  2  suggest  that 
individual  thresholds  are  important,  supporting  the  call  for  reanalysis. 
In  the  study  of  fighting  in  fiddler  crabs  (chapter  2),  fighting  was  size  assortative, 
with  intruders  selecting  opponents  that  were  of  similar  size  to  themselves,  but  I 
observed  cases  in  which  small  males  were  aggressive  towards  larger  males,  when 
they  were  both  intruders  and  owners.  Aggressive  behaviour  directed  towards  a  larger 
opponent  has  been  noted  in  many  species  (Dow  et  al.  1976;  Enquist  &  Jakobsson 
1986;  Ribowski  &  Frank  1993;  Smith  et  al.  1994;  Morris  et  al.  1995;  Moretz  2003), 
and  there  are  a  number  of  explanations  as  to  why  this  might  be  the  case.  In  chapter 
3,1  discussed  these  reasons,  and  developed  a  model  in  which  the  individuals  could 
accurately  assess  their  chances  of  winning  (to  remove  the  possibility  that  perception 
errors  cause  misdirected  aggression;  Bradbury  &  Vehrencamp  1998;  Just  &  Morris 
2003),  and  the  resource  was  of  equal  value  to  both  competitors  (to  remove  the 
possibility  that  smaller  individuals  value  the  contested  resource  more  highly;  Davies 
&  Houston  1981;  Shutler  &  Weatherhead  1992;  Eason  &  Hannon  1994;  Johnsson  et 
al.  2000;  Johnsson  &  Forser  2002).  1  found  that  small  individuals  are  predicted  to 
attack  large  ones  when  they  have  some  chance  of  winning  and  the  probability  of 
finding  an  alternative,  uncontested  resource  is  low.  Thus,  aggression  can  be 
expected  when  body  size  does  not  perfectly  determine  outcome  and  individuals  have 
few  alternative  options  (the  desperado  effect;  Grafen  1987). 
In  addition,  the  model  in  chapter  3  predicted  that  low  intensity  aggression  (displays) 
by  a  small  individual  could  result  in  a  retreat  response  from  a  larger  opponent.  In  this 
situation,  small  individuals  would  appear  more  aggressive  than  their  larger 
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opponents.  This  has  some  similarities  to  the  paradoxical  strategies  discussed  in 
chapter  1,  and  investigated  in  chapters  4  and  5.  This  ESS  coexisted  with  a 
common-sense  alternative,  where  large  individuals  display  and  small  individuals 
retreat.  It  was  predicted  to  occur  when  the  competitors  had  many  alternative  options 
for  gaining  access  to  resources,  and  when  the  smaller  competitor  had  a  good  chance 
of  winning,  suggesting  that  aggression  is  not  worthwhile,  and  either  competitor  may 
retreat  in  these  circumstances.  Opportunities  to  extend  this  chapter  include 
asymmetries  in  the  value  of  the  resource  to  the  two  contestants  (Shulter  & 
Weatherhead  1992;  Eason  &  Hannon  1994),  and  asymmetries  in  the  costs  paid  by 
them  (Zahavi  1975;  Neat  et  al.  1998a;  Maan  et  al.  2001).  This  could  potentially  lead 
to  a  wider  range  of  ESSs  than  found  in  chapter  3. 
Although  the  different  game-theory  models  of  fighting  are  supported  in  various 
species,  they  generally  consider  pair-wise  interactions  between  individuals  fighting 
over  an  indivisible  resource  such  as  a  territory,  and  assume  that  the  resource  can  only 
be  gained  after  winning  a  fight.  Stamps  and  Krishnan  (1999,2001)  developed  a 
mechanistic  model  of  fighting  behaviour  suggesting  that  in  cases  where  resources  are 
divisible,  for  example,  when  newly  settled  individuals  are  dividing  an  area  of  habitat 
into  territories,  space  can  be  won  through  'nagging':  repeated  low  cost  interactions 
with  the  same  individual,  and  through  a  tendency  to  avoid  places  where  those 
interactions  have  occurred  (Sih  &  Mateo  2001).  In  chapters  4  and  5,1  used 
modelling  approaches  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  avoidance  of  fight  locations  can  lead 
to  the  acquisition  of  space,  firstly  in  a  one-dimensional  context  (chapter  4)  and  then 
two-dimensionally  (chapter  5)  where  space  was  modelled  explicitly. 
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In  chapter  4,1  found  that  both  Stamps  and  Krishnan's  (1999,2001)  hypothesis,  and 
the  winner-takes-all  assumptions  of  some  game  theory  models  (Maynard  Smith  & 
Price  1973;  Grafen  1979;  Maynard  Smith  1982)  were  supported,  but  under  different 
parameter  values,  and  therefore  different  assumptions  about  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
fighting.  Avoidance  of  areas  where  fights  have  occurred  can  be  adaptive,  but  only  if 
the  benefits  associated  with  access  to  the  resource  are  low  compared  to  the  costs  of 
fighting.  Otherwise,  one  individual  (typically  the  winner)  responds  by  returning  to 
the  contested  area  while  the  other  (the  loser)  avoids  it,  and  space  is  gained  by 
winning  fights. 
While  game  theory  approaches  can  be  used  to  test  the  assumptions  of  mechanistic 
models,  there  is  an  important  difference  between  these  two  approaches.  Mechanistic 
models,  which  describe  animal  movements,  tend  to  be  spatially  explicit  in  two 
dimensions  and  thus  in  some  ways  more  realistic  than  game  theory  models,  in  which 
space  is  not  modelled  explicitly  (Parker  &  Knowlton  1980),  or  modelled  only  in  one 
dimension  (Maynard  Smith  1982;  Lewis  &  Moorcroft  2001;  Mesterton-Gibbons  & 
Adams  2003;  Pereira  et  al.  2003).  It  may  be  appropriate  in  some  cases  to  consider 
whether  the  predictions  of  game  theoretical  approaches  hold  up  under  a  spatially 
explicit  treatment.  Chapter  5  represented  an  attempt  to  bridge  this  gap  between 
existing  mechanistic  and  game  theoretical  models  of  space  acquisition. 
Chapter  5  also  considered  whether  avoidance  of  fight  locations  is  adaptive,  but  in 
two-dimensional  space.  This  chapter  supported  the  findings  of  chapter  4:  when  the 
costs  of  fighting  were  high  relative  to  the  benefits  of  using  the  resource,  the  most 
adaptive  behaviour  was  to  use  an  avoidance  strategy,  and  this  led  to  the  formation  of 
well-defined,  exclusive  territories.  Chapter  5  also  considered  the  effect  of 
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population  density.  Adaptive  avoidance  behaviour  and  exclusive  territoriality  were 
predicted  to  occur  when  populations  exist  at  low  densities.  Chapter  5  predicted  that 
high  densities  (and  low  fighting  costs)  lead  to  the  breakdown  of  territoriality  and  the 
formation  of  large  overlapping  home  ranges.  Thus,  while  I  was  able  to  show  that 
avoidance  behaviour  could  be  adaptive  in  chapter  4,  chapter  5  demonstrated  that,  of 
the  strategies  investigated,  only  the  avoidance  strategies  could  lead  to  the  formation 
of  territories,  while  supporting  the  findings  of  chapter  4. 
In  the  wild,  territory  size  tends  to  vary  with  body  size  (e.  g.  Schoener  1968;  Petrie 
1984;  Hart  1987;  Keeley  &  McPhail  1998;  Keeley  2000),  resource  abundance  and 
intruder  pressure  (see  Adams  2001  for  a  review).  Chapter  5  provides  another 
possible  observation  to  explain  variation  in  territory  size  among  individuals:  even 
though  all  individuals  were  of  equal  fighting  ability,  and  the  habitat  was 
homogeneous,  territory  sizes  varied  between  individuals.  This  is  because  territory 
expansion  for  each  individual  began  from  a  randomly  selected  location,  and  for  some 
individuals,  this  may  not  be  the  most  favourable  location  (for  example,  it  may  have 
several  near  neighbours). 
Game  theory  models  of  fighting  behaviour  often  show  that  a  paradoxical  alternative 
to  the  common-sense  solution  is  stable  under  at  least  some  of  the  parameter  values 
investigated  (Maynard  Smith  1974;  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Enquist  & 
Leimar  1987;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992;  Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  1998). 
However,  apparently  paradoxical  strategies  are  extremely  rare  in  nature,  and  may  not 
be  paradoxical  at  all  when  other  factors  are  taken  into  account.  For  example, 
Hernandez  and  Benson  (1998)  found  that  in  territorial  contests  between  male 
Heliconius  sara  butterflies,  smaller  males  tended  to  win,  suggesting  a  paradoxical 
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strategy.  However,  in  this  species,  large  male  have  less  to  gain  from  holding  a 
territory  as  they  are  better  able  to  compete  for  females  at  pupal  emergence  sites 
(Field  &  Hardy  2000;  Kemp  2000),  leaving  small  males  to  make  the  `best  of  a  bad 
job'  and  defend  territories.  Thus,  small  males  may  have  more  to  gain  from  winning, 
and  hence  be  prepared  to  fight  harder.  This  represents  a  common-sense  solution  to 
the  problem  (chapter  1).  While  paradoxical  solutions  remain  a  feature  of  some  game 
theory  models,  their  absence  in  nature  (or  presence  within  a  modelling  framework) 
needs  to  be  explained  before  the  models  can  truly  be  said  to  accurately  represent 
nature.  Chapters  4  and  5  investigated  whether  a  paradoxical  solution  for  the  division 
of  space  (rather  than  in  winner-takes-all  fights  that  were  the  focus  of  early  game 
theory  models;  Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Hammerstein  &  Parker  1982;  Enquist 
&  Leimar  1987)  can  be  evolutionarily  stable.  In  chapter  4,1  found  that  paradoxical 
solutions  can  only  persist  when  asymmetries  are  small,  and  cannot  evolve  from  a 
common-sense  ancestral  population  strategy.  These  findings  are  in  line  with  the 
occurrence  of  paradoxical  strategies  in  early  hawk-dove  games,  where  the 
paradoxical  strategy  tends  to  have  a  smaller  basin  of  attraction  in  comparison  to  the 
common-sense  alternative  (Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976).  Additionally,  in  chapter 
4,1  found  that  paradoxical  strategies  were  found  only  when  animals  adhered  strictly 
to  behavioural  rules.  When  incorporating  `errors  in  decision  making',  individuals 
may  choose  the  option  that  leads  to  lower  fitness,  if  the  fitness  difference  is  small 
(McNamara  et  al.  1997).  Using  this  method  has  two  potential  benefits.  Firstly,  a 
common  problem  with  the  iteration  of  the  best  response  map  technique,  often  used  to 
find  the  ESS  (McNamara  et  al.  2000)  is  that  the  sequence  of  strategies  sometimes 
oscillates  without  converging  to  an  ESS,  and  by  incorporating  errors,  oscillation  can 
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be  eliminated.  In  addition,  incorporating  errors  can  increase  the  biological  realism  of 
game  theory  models. 
Game  theory  models  of  fighting  behaviour  tend  to  assume  that,  for  a  given 
individual,  a  fight  can  only  end  with  one  of  two  possible  outcomes:  a  win  or  a  loss 
(Maynard  Smith  &  Parker  1976;  Enquist  &  Leimar  1987;  Hammerstein  &  Parker 
1982;  Mesterton-Gibbons  1992).  However,  in  nature,  some  fights  may  end  without  a 
clear  winner  and  loser,  ending  instead  in  a  stalemate  or  draw  (Bleistein  et  al.  1994; 
Stamps  &  Krishnan  1994a,  b,  1997,1998;  Adams  1998;  Stamps  1999;  Draud  et  al. 
2004).  Although  draws  were  incorporated  into  the  model  of  chapter  4,  their 
importance  was  not  investigated.  Chapter  5  investigated  the  importance  of  draws  in 
determining  the  stability  of  common-sense  versus  paradoxical  strategies.  In  contrast 
to  earlier  models  that  ignore  draws,  I  defined  the  paradoxical  strategy  to  include  the 
opposite  responses  to  draws  compared  to  the  response  of  the  common-sense  strategy. 
When  this  difference  was  taken  into  account,  I  found  that  when  draws  occurred 
relatively  uncommonly  the  common-sense  and  paradoxical  strategies  behaved 
similarly,  but  when  draws  occurred  commonly  (as  occurs  during  the  division  of 
space;  Stamps  &  Krishnan  1999),  the  common-sense  strategy  was  more  often 
adaptive  than  the  paradoxical  alternative. 
There  are  many  previously  modelled  aspects  of  fighting  and  territoriality  that  were 
not  incorporated  into  chapters  4  and  5,  but  would  present  interesting  avenues  for 
further  research.  In  addition,  chapters  4  and  5  present  some  techniques  that  could  be 
incorporated  into  other  models.  Opportunities  for  further  work  on  the  acquisition  of 
territories  include: 
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"  In  chapter  5,  all  individuals  were  assumed  to  be  equal  in  terms  of  their  RHP. 
Stamps  and  Krishnan  (2001)  incorporated  asymmetries  between  individuals  into 
their  model  of  spatial  division,  and  found  that  stronger  individuals  ended  up  with 
larger  territories,  as  they  suffered  lower  costs  of  fighting  and  so  were  less 
deterred  from  returning  to  areas  where  they  had  been  involved  in  fights. 
Asymmetries  between  individuals  (as  in  chapter  4)  could  be  incorporated  into 
models  investigating  the  adaptiveness  of  strategies  in  a  two-dimensional  context. 
This  would  allow  for  investigation  of  the  resulting  territory  size,  and  whether 
different  strategies  were  adaptive  for  individuals  of  differing  RHP. 
"  Prior  experience  of  winning  and  losing  can  be  important  in  determining  the 
outcome  of  fights  (the  winner-loser  effect,  Dugatkin  1997;  Hsu  &  Wolf  1999; 
Johnstone  &  Dugatkin  2000;  Dugatkin  &  Earley  2004).  Where  sequences  of 
fights  occur,  this  could  be  incorporated,  and  it  might  lead  to  effects  such  as  the 
winners  of  fights  ending  up  with  larger  territories,  even  when  they  do  not  differ 
in  fighting  ability  (RHP). 
"  An  interesting  case  for  further  development  of  chapter  5  would  be  the  inclusion 
of  landmarks  and  habitat  heterogeneity.  Territory  size  and  shape  known  to  be 
influenced  by  factors  such  as  the  availability  of  perch  sites  (Yosef  &  Grubb 
1994),  the  visibility  of  areas  that  must  be  defended  (Eason  &  Stamps  1992),  the 
space  use  of  potential  mates  (Butchart  et  al.  1999)  and  the  occurrence  of 
landmarks.  Landmarks  can  be  used  as  conventions  dictating  the  boundaries  of 
territories,  and  therefore  reducing  the  frequency  of  aggressive  encounters  (Eason 
et  al.  1999;  LaManna  &  Eason  2003;  Mesterton-Gibbons  &  Adams  2003). 
Investigating  the  limits  of  such  conventions  in  a  two-dimensional  setting,  and 
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examining  the  population  consequences  of  landmark  usage  would  be  a  fruitful 
avenue  of  further  research. 
The  later  chapters  of  the  thesis  considered  how  individuals  should  resolve  trade-offs 
between  two  or  more  mutually  exclusive  behaviours.  Models  of  the  trade-offs 
between  behaviours  tend  to  focus  on  specific  examples,  such  as  the  trade  off  between 
parental  care  and  seeking  additional  mating  opportunities  (Magrath  &  Komdeur 
2003),  and  thus  there  is  much  scope  for  investigating  how  behaviours  trade  off  in 
different  systems. 
Houston  and  co-workers  (2003)  showed  that  differences  in  individual  quality  can 
produce  counter-intuitive  patterns  of  optimal  behaviour,  when  there  is  a  trade-off 
between  survival  and  reproduction,  and  when  fitness  can  be  written  in  the  form  of  a 
product  of  these  two  behaviours.  The  possibility  that  one  behaviour  is  an  essential 
prerequisite  to  the  other  (i.  e.  fitness  is  not  simply  a  product  of  the  two  behaviours)  is 
incorporated  into  chapter  6.  In  an  optimality  approach,  I  showed  that  the  counter- 
intuitive  pattern  is  seem  only  when  an  individual's  ability  to  perform  the  second  (less 
essential)  of  the  behaviours  is  altered.  Understanding  that  models  predict  counter- 
intuitive  patterns  of  behaviour  may  be  essential  if  we  are  to  fully  understand  trade- 
offs  that  are  seen  in  nature,  and  in  chapter  61  made  some  suggestions  as  to  how 
empiricists  could  investigate  the  patterns  that  I  predicted.  Chapter  6  presented  a 
general  model  that  does  not  provide  an  accurate  description  of  any  particular  study 
system,  but  could  be  adapted  to  make  it  more  specific.  For  example,  in  a  trade-off 
between  territorial  defence  and  mate  attraction,  females  may  gain  information  on  a 
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male's  quality  as  a  mate  from  observing  his  defensive  behaviours  (e.  g.  Gronstol 
1996),  or  from  the  quality  of  the  territory  he  is  defending  (Real  1991;  Reynolds 
1993),  and  the  trade-off  may  therefore  be  different  from  that  predicted  in  chapter  6. 
Optimisation  models  of  territory  size  (e.  g.  Hixon  1980;  Ebersole  1980;  Schoener 
1983;  Hixon  1987;  McNair  1987)  assumed  that  intruders  arrived  at  random  and 
owners  could  expel  them  if  they  choose  to  do  so  (Adams  2001).  In  reality,  however, 
territories  are  likely  to  be  constrained  by  the  presence  of  neighbours  holding 
contiguous  territories  (Hixon  1980;  Grant  1997;  Adams  1998;  Keeley  2000),  and 
other  approaches,  including  game  theory,  were  needed  to  describe  how  boundary 
locations  result  from  the  interaction  of  individuals  (see  chapter  5).  A  territorial  male 
may  spend  some  time  intruding  onto  neighbouring  territories,  or  interrupting  the 
courtship  of  other  males,  and  his  own  defensive  effort  may  depend  to  some  extent  on 
the  amount  of  time  his  neighbours  spent  doing  the  same  thing.  A  further  avenue  of 
research  into  the  trade-offs  between  behaviours  (discussed  in  chapter  6)  would  be  to 
adopt  a  game  theoretical  approach,  as  in  chapters  7  and  8,  to  investigate  how  the 
trade-off  between  behaviours  occurs  when  the  actions  of  other  individuals  are  taken 
into  account. 
The  fact  that  the  decisions  of  others  affect  the  behaviour  of  a  focal  animal  is  central 
to  game  theory,  and  is  likely  to  be  important  in  the  optimal  resolution  of  time  or 
energy  conflicts.  In  addition  to  considering  the  behaviour  of  individuals,  we  also 
need  to  consider  how  the  environment  experienced  by  an  individual  changes 
according  to  the  behaviour  of  other  individuals  in  the  population.  For  example,  in 
chapter  5,  the  way  in  which  individuals  divided  space  affected  the  payoffs  available 
to  each  one.  More  generally,  resource  availability  may  depend  on  the  behaviour  of 
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others.  Such  an  approach  was  taken  in  chapters  7  and  8,  where  the  optimal  decisions 
of  resource-owning  males  depended  on  the  behaviour  of  others  in  the  population,  and 
this  also  affected  the  payoffs  available.  In  chapter  7,1  assumed  that  the  activity 
decisions  of  male  bowerbirds  depended  on  how  other  males  were  allocating  their 
time,  and  this  affected  the  quality  of  the  male's  bower.  High  levels  of  raiding  in  a 
population  led  to  pressure  on  males  to  spend  more  time  protecting  the  bower  from 
competitors,  and  thus  time  spent  on  the  bower  conflicted  with  time  that  could  be 
spent  searching  for  decorations  to  improve  the  bower  quality,  or  raiding  the  bowers 
of  other  males,  to  increase  an  individual's  own  bower  quality  while  reducing  the 
quality  of  his  competitors.  The  model  is  a  simple  description  of  bowerbird  behaviour, 
and  data  on  bowerbird  time  budgets  is  scarce,  and  thus  the  predictions  are  difficult  to 
test.  Where  data  are  available,  the  model  predicts  more  time  spent  on  the  bower  than 
has  been  observed.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  this  may  be  the  case,  outlined 
in  chapter  7,  and  modification  of  the  model  may  provide  a  better  fit  to  the  data.  For 
example,  the  assumptions  of  the  model  may  not  be  applicable  to  all  bowerbird 
species:  I  assumed,  for  example,  that  courtship  occurs  at  the  bower,  whereas  in 
Regents  bowerbirds  (Sericulus  chrysocephalus),  courtship  begins  in  the  canopy.  In 
chapter  4,  the  likelihood  of  making  errors  when  choosing  the  optimal  behaviour 
(McNamara  et  al.  1997)  was  important  in  determining  the  ESS  that  was  reached 
(paradoxical  or  common-sense)  and  the  incorporation  of  errors  in  decision  making 
into  chapter  7  could  potentially  increase  the  fit  between  the  model  and  the  observed 
data. 
The  main  finding  of  chapter  7  is  that  increasing  female  discrimination  for  mates  is 
predicted  lead  to  deterioration  in  the  average  quality  of  one  of  their  sexual 
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ornaments,  in  this  case,  their  bowers  (additionally,  bowerbirds  have  plumage  and 
behavioural  displays;  e.  g.  Coleman  et  al.  2004).  This  occurs  through  a  mechanism 
whereby  female  discrimination  leads  to  an  increase  in  competition  between  males  in 
the  form  of  raiding,  but  may  also  be  applicable  to  situations  where  males  compete 
less  directly  for  females.  This  could  provide  a  natural  stopping  point  for  the  runaway 
evolution  of  male  traits,  something  that  open  ended  models  of  runaway  sexual 
selection  require  to  be  realistic  (Kokko  et  al.  2003).  In  chapter  7,1  assumed  that  all 
individuals  were  equal  with  respect  to  their  bower-building  ability,  and  the  model 
sought  the  equilibrium  bower  quality  under  such  conditions.  In  nature,  variation  is 
likely  to  exist  around  any  trait.  In  chapter  7,1  proposed  that  a  decrease  in  mean  trait 
size  could  hamper  female  choice  if  smaller  traits  have  less  perceptible  variation 
around  them. 
Asymmetries  between  individuals  are  known  to  be  important  in  determining  the 
outcome  of  contests  over  territories  and  food  resources  (Davies  1978;  Krebs  1982; 
Marden  &  Waage  1990;  Beaugrand  et  al.  1996;  Jennions  &  Backwell  1996; 
Chellappa  et  al.  1999),  and  the  same  is  likely  to  be  true  when  males  compete  for 
ornamental  objects.  In  bowerbirds,  much  variation  in  the  quality  of  bowers  has  been 
observed  (Borgia  1985,  Lenz  1994;  Uy  &  Borgia  2000;  Madden  2003),  and  bowers 
are  known  for  being  extremely  elaborate,  and  females  very  selective  (Uy  et  al.  2001; 
Coleman  et  al.  2004).  Incorporating  variation  in  male  quality  into  a  future  model  of 
bowerbird  behaviour  could  lead  to  increased  variation  in  bower  quality.  Competition 
between  males  increasing  the  variance  in  male  sexual  ornaments  has  been  noted 
before:  in  sticklebacks,  competition  between  males  enhances  the  variation  in  red 
colouration,  used  in  female  choice  (Bakker  1994;  Rowland  1994). 
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Chapter  8  investigated  the  optimal  allocation  of  time  to  mate  guarding  versus 
seeking  extra  pair  copulations  in  socially  monogamous  birds,  although  the  findings 
are  also  applicable  to  mate-guarding  mammals.  Although  there  is  extensive 
theoretical  work  regarding  mate  guarding  in  crustaceans  and  insects  (Parker  1974b; 
Grafen  &  Ridley  1983;  Jormalainen  1998;  Härdling  et  al.  2004),  the  results  from 
these  models  are  not  applicable  to  all  animals:  in  invertebrates,  guarding  takes  the 
form  of  continuous  physical  contact  (amplexus).  In  mate  guarding  vertebrates  such 
as  birds,  males  cannot  guard  their  mates  in  this  way  and  instead  do  so  by  maintaining 
physical  proximity  to  fend  off  other  males  and  prevent  the  female  from  seeking 
extra-pair  copulations.  Thus  the  dilemma  facing  a  male  bird  is  not  how  long  to 
maintain  guarding  before  seeking  a  further  mate,  but  how  to  allocate  time  to 
guarding  a  social  mate  when  extra-pair  copulation  opportunities  are  available 
(Hasselquist  &  Bensch  1991).  Fishman  et  al.  (2003)  investigated  this  problem,  and 
found  that  an  ESS  is  to  guard  during  the  female's  fertile  period  and  seek  extra-pair 
copulations  outside  this  time.  This  strategy,  however,  is  only  effective  when  female 
fertility  is  asynchronous  within  the  population.  Chapter  8  investigated  the  situation 
where  female  fertility  is  more  or  less  synchronous,  and  found  that  the  behaviour  of 
females  and  the  quality  of  males  were  fundamental  in  determining  how  males  should 
allocate  their  time  to  guarding. 
In  chapter  8,1  found  that  paternity  patterns  within  nests  cannot  necessarily  be 
predicted  by  the  guarding  behaviour  of  males:  paternity  should  depend  strongly  on 
the  attention  that  females  pay  to  the  quality  of  their  mate.  If  females  mated  to  high 
quality  males  are  less  likely  to  seek  extra-pair  copulations,  then  high  quality  males 
should  have  higher  paternity  in  their  own  nest  than  low  quality  males.  If  however, 
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females  are  equally  unfaithful  to  both  high  and  low  quality  males,  high  quality  males 
should  gain  lower  within-pair  paternity,  since  they  are  predicted  to  reduce  guarding 
activity  due  to  the  many  extra-pair  opportunities  available  to  them.  In  general,  it 
seems  that  there  are  few  examples  where  unattractive  males  gain  more  paternity  at 
home  than  attractive  ones,  but  there  have  been  few  empirical  studies  that  investigate 
both  guarding  behaviour  and  other  aspects  of  the  mating  system.  In  black  throated 
blue  warblers,  Dendroica  caerulescens,  attractive  males  with  many  extra-pair 
opportunities  have  been  shown  to  guard  less,  and  as  a  consequence,  end  up  with 
lower  paternity  in  their  own  broods  (Chuang-Dobbs  et  al.  2001).  Chapter  8  provides 
a  previously  lacking  theoretical  framework  for  the  combined  empirical  investigation 
of  attractiveness,  paternity  and  guarding  behaviour.  However,  the  question  as  to  why 
mate  guarding  should  evolve  in  socially  monogamous  birds  remains  unanswered,  and 
more  empirical  studies  into  the  relationships  between  attractiveness,  paternity  and 
guarding  behaviour  are  needed  before  conclusions  can  be  drawn  regarding  the 
importance  of  mate  guarding  in  shaping  parentage  in  socially  monogamous  species, 
and  the  extent  to  which  mate  guarding  is  effective  in  restricting  female  infidelity. 
Chapters  7  and  8  both  investigated  the  importance  of  female  choice  in  determining 
how  males  should  behave,  showing  female  behaviour  can  have  strong  effects  on  the 
optimal  trade-off  decisions  of  males.  While  this  obviously  has  fitness  consequences 
for  the  males,  it  can  also  feed  back  and  influence  the  females  themselves.  In  chapter 
7,  increasing  female  choice  led  to  the  deterioration  of  bowers,  which  could 
potentially  hamper  the  ability  of  the  female  to  choose  the  highest  quality  males. 
Game  theory  approaches,  particularly  to  modelling  conflicts,  often  only  include  the 
sex  of  interest:  if  it  is  males  who  fight  over  territories,  then  the  behaviour  of  a  male  is 
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presumed  to  depend  only  on  the  behaviour  of  other  males.  Chapters  6  and  7 
highlight  the  importance  of  considering  the  behaviour  of  individuals  not  under  direct 
consideration  when  developing  game  theory  models. 
Developments  in  game  theory 
There  have  been  a  number  of  recent  developments  in  game  theoretical  techniques, 
which  have  the  potential  for  increasing  our  understanding  of  animal  behaviour  and 
providing  better  matches  for  observed  data  where  this  is  required.  These  techniques 
provide  useful  avenues  of  research  in  game  theoretical  modelling  of  different 
systems,  some  of  them  have  been  included  in  the  models  in  this  thesis,  and  others 
could  potentially  be  used  to  extend  the  work  presented  here. 
"  Self-consistency  in  game-theory  modelling.  In  one  of  the  classic  models  of 
parental  care  (Maynard  Smith  1977),  males  gain  offspring  that  do  not  appear 
in  calculations  of  female  fitness  (Kokko  &  Jennions  2003).  A  fundamental 
constraint,  however,  is  that  in  sexually  reproducing  species,  each  offspring 
must  have  exactly  one  mother  and  one  father  (Houston  &  McNamara  2002). 
Such  conservation  of  paternity  has  been  shown  to  have  important 
implications  for  the  caring  decisions  of  males  and  females  (Queller  1997, 
Kokko  &  Jennions  2003),  and  the  principles  of  self-consistency  should  be 
incorporated  into  game  theory  modelling  (as  in  chapter  8). 
9  Coevolution  of  male  and  female  behaviours.  In  chapters  7  and  8,  male 
behaviour  was  free  to  evolve,  while  female  behaviour  was  fixed.  In  reality, 
females  too  should  be  free  to  respond  to  changes  in  male  behaviour:  the 
optimal  behaviour  for  a  male  should  depend  on  the  behaviour  of  females,  and 
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vice  versa  (Houston  &  McNamara  2002;  Kokko  et  al.  2003;  Hall  et  al.  2000). 
In  the  example  of  chapter  8,  if  males  evolve  to  guard  their  females  more 
intensely,  then  females  aiming  to  gain  extra-pair  copulations  should  evolve 
behaviours  that  allow  them  to  escape  the  males'  paternity  guards. 
9  Negotiation.  The  standard  approach  in  two-player  games  is  to  assume  that 
each  individual  chooses  the  best  response  to  the  behaviour  of  its  opponent. 
McNamara  et  al.  (1999)  suggest  that  an  alternative  approach  is  to  view  such 
games  as  a  negotiation  between  the  opponents,  where  each  individual  seeks 
the  evolutionary  stable  negotiation  rule  rather  than  the  evolutionary  stable 
action.  This  approach  has  been  applied  in  models  of  parental  effort 
(McNamara  et  al.  1999;  McNamara  et  al.  2003),  and  in  the  evolution  of 
cooperative  behaviour  (Taylor  &  Day  2004).  The  resolution  of  conflicts 
through  negotiation  would  be  an  interesting  development  of  some  chapters  in 
this  thesis. 
0  Variation  in  behaviour.  The  standard  solution  to  the  Prisoners'  Dilemma 
game  (Axelrod  &  Hamilton  1981)  is  that  the  only  ESS  is  mutual  defection. 
McNamara  et  al.  (2004)  recently  showed  that  if  there  is  variation  in 
behaviour,  maintained  by  external  factors  such  as  migration  and  mutation, 
then  high  levels  of  cooperation  could  be  evolutionarily  stable,  as  there  is 
always  some  chance  that  the  opponent  will  cooperate.  Potential  sources  of 
variation  that  may  promote  cooperation  also  include  stochastic  strategies, 
variation  between  individuals  in  their  quality  (McNamara  et  al.  2004)  errors 
in  decision-making  (McNamara  et  al.  1997;  incorporated  into  chapter  4,  see 
also  Fawcett  &  Johnstone  2003). 
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Pure  and  mixed  ESSs.  In  models  of  asymmetric  contests,  where  individuals 
can  accurately  assess  their  opponent's  ability,  Selten  (1980)  showed  that  only 
pure  strategies  can  be  stable  (as  in  chapter  3).  In  contrast,  when  games  are 
symmetrical,  mixed  strategies  (probabilistic  behaviour)  can  exist  (Maynard 
Smith  1982).  Recently,  Crowley  (2000)  has  shown  that  if  individuals 
categorise  their  opponents  (same  size,  larger,  smaller),  rather  than  accurately 
assessing  size  on  a  continuum,  mixed  strategies  can  be  found  as  solutions  to 
asymmetric  games  (Crowley  2000,  Flaxman  2000).  As  such,  assumptions 
about  whether  assessments  are  discrete  (categories)  or  continuous  can  have 
important  consequences  for  our  predictions  of  what  we  could  observe  in 
nature  (Flaxman  2000),  particularly  with  respect  to  fighting  behaviour. 
0  Unpredictability  in  behaviour.  Social  behaviour  such  as  aggression  often 
appears  to  be  unpredictable,  and  prevents  opponents  from  developing 
effective  counter-strategies.  Kazem  and  co-workers  (2004)  have  shown  that 
unpredictable  punishment  of  subordinate  individuals  by  dominant  ones  can  be 
adaptive,  as  it  deters  the  subordinates  from  behaviours  that  draw  punishment. 
Unpredictable  behaviour  may  therefore  be  important  in  determining  the 
dynamics  of  social  relationships,  and  should  be  considered  further. 
0  Spatial  structure.  It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  incorporation  of  spatial 
structure  into  the  Prisoner's  Dilemma  game  leads  to  the  evolution  of 
cooperation  that  does  not  exist  in  the  absence  of  such  spatial  structure,  as 
neighbours  are  more  likely  to  cooperate  with  one  another  (Wilson  1975). 
Recent  work,  however  suggests  that  this  may  not  be  the  case  in  a  version  of 
the  hawk-dove  game,  known  as  the  snowdrift  game,  where  spatial  structure 
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may  reduce  the  proportion  of  co-operating  individuals  (Hauert  &  Doebeli 
2004;  Taylor  &  Day  2004).  Thus,  spatial  structure  may  change  the 
conclusions  of  spatially  implicit  models.  In  chapter  5,  the  findings  of 
chapter  4  were  supported  when  space  was  modelled  explicitly,  and  the 
spatial  approach  allowed  further  questions  to  be  investigated. 
"  Social  context.  Aggressive  interactions  between  individuals  are  often 
modelled  as  pair-wise  interactions,  but  in  reality  take  place  within  a  social 
environment,  and  this  may  affect  the  dynamics  of  current  and  future 
interactions.  Previous  experience  of  winning  or  losing  can  influence  future 
behaviour  and  success  in  fights  (Dugatkin  1997;  Hsu  &  Wolf  1999),  as  can 
`eavesdropping'  on  interactions  between  other  conspecifics,  where  bystanders 
gain  information  individuals  involved  in  contests  (Johnstone  2001;  McGregor 
et  al  2001;  Earley  &  Dugatkin  2002;  Whitfield  2002).  Finally,  third  parties 
may  become  involved  in  fights,  forming  coalitions  to  defend  territories,  for 
example  (Getty  1987;  Backwell  &  Jennions  2004) 
Individual  behaviour  and  population  dynamics.  A  limitation  of  chapter  4  is 
that  population  density  is  a  parameter,  rather  than  a  consequence  of  the 
population  dynamics  generated  by  individual  behaviour  (Eshel  &  Sansone 
1995;  Mylius  &  Diekmann  1995;  Kokko  &  Lundberg  2001).  Behaviour- 
based  models  of  population  growth  determine  the  ESS  behaviours  underlying 
density  dependent  processes  that  effect  population  dynamics  (e.  g.  territorial 
behaviour  Kokko  &  Sutherland  1998;  see  Sutherland  &  Norris  2002).  These 
models  can  then  be  used  to  make  predictions  regarding  the  effects  of 
environmental  change  on  populations,  through  the  responses  of  individuals  to 
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those  changes  (reviewed  in  Sutherland  &  Norris  2002;  Norris  2004),  and 
game  theory  can  provide  answers  to  conservation  problems. 
In  conclusion,  game  theory  has  been  extremely  important  in  explaining  apparently 
selfish  patterns  in  animal  behaviour,  and  behaviours  that  do  not  appear  to  benefit  the 
individual.  The  modelling  chapters  in  this  thesis  have  developed  new  game  theory 
approaches  to  modelling  animal  conflict,  investigated  the  trade-offs  that  occur 
between  behaviours,  and  provided  a  number  of  predictions  which  can  be  tested  in 
empirical  systems,  as  well  as  investigating  the  adaptive  behaviour  behind  existing 
observations  and  mechanistic  models. 
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